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ABSTRACT 
Africa is currently experiencing a movement toward more democratic systems of 
government. The causes of such changes are numerous, but the literature on African 
democratization, like that on similar changes elsewhere in the world, places emphasis 
on the role of internal or domestic factors. The role of international pressures toward 
democratization is almost completely ignored. 
The case of Mozambique illustrates the dangers of such an omission. During the past 
decade Mozambique has undergone considerable political change. The single-party, 
Marxist-Leninist oriented state has been replaced by a multi-party system, devoid of 
explicit references to any guiding ideology. The government has also expanded its 
contacts with the West, particularly by means of its assuming membership of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These changes in Mozambique's 
political orientation have been accompanied by economic reforms, designed to arrest the 
precipitous decline in the Mozambican economy. In this dissertation I argue that the 
causes of both the economic and political reforms lie in this decline and in the 
government's need to secure capital and debt relief internationally. In order to do this, 
the Mozambican government had to change the aspects of its political system which 
were seen as being unacceptable by the West, in particular the lack of multi-party 
competition and its overtly Marxist orientation and close ties to socialist countries. 
Because the reforms had their primary genesis in Mozambique's need for international 
acceptance and not in the growth of popularly based democratic organisations, the 
reforms are fragile and their meaningfulness questionable. 
11 
INTRODUCTION 
Reform may be a dirty word .... but it begins to look more and more like 
the most promising route to success in the real world. I limit myself to 
most promising rather than only for the simple reasons that all 
certitude must now be suspect 
Chinua Achebe AntmUs of the savannah 
(quoted in Sandbrook 1988: 264) 
Democracy is sweeping through Africa. African countries, which have for years 
suffered under dictatorships, military or single party rule, are one by one beginning 
to introduce more democratic systems of government. Between 1988 and 1991, 
multi-party systems have been newly introduced into nearly twenty African countries 
(see Appendix 1) and thus far in four of these, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, 
Benin and Zambia, the ruling parties have been replaced by means of electoral defeat 
(Africa Research Bulletin 28, 1 & 3: 9723-4 & 10045). 
These dramatic changes in the African political scene provide a welcome relief from 
the pessimism that has pervaded African politics for the past three decades, as the 
initial optimism accompanying independence gave way to a seemingly unstoppable 
decline into dictatorship and authoritarianism. 
In making these changes, African governments seem to be following world trends. 
The past three years have seen dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. Communism has largely been abandoned and the authoritarian systems of 
government that have characterised it over the past forty-five years have crumbled 
under a dramatic resurgence of popular democratic activity. Preceding this, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, many nations in Southern Europe and Latin America had 
undergone transitions from authoritarian rule to more democratic systems of 
government. 
A concern with the turn toward democratization has dominated the literature on 
African politics to the point of having become hegemonic (Fatton 1990: 455). Within 
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this new literature, the changes in Africa are often seen in the light of the 
democratization occurring elsewhere in the world. They are seen as having been 
strongly influenced by these changes, especially those that have taken place in Eastern 
Europe. But, more than this, further causes of African democratization are also seen 
as being similar to those that brought about the fall of Communism and Southern 
European and Latin American authoritarianism. 
Following the lead of the voluminous scholarship on Latin American transitions to 
democracy, the literature on African democratization lays particular stress on the 
effectiveness of groups and associations outside of the state, within civil society, in 
demanding more of a say in government. Both literatures also attach great importance 
to the role of the incumbent political leadership in initiating and controlling reforms. 
But in stressing these more contingent and voluntaristic causes of democratization, 
the new literature on Africa, like that on the changes elsewhere in the world, has 
either ignored or grossly underplayed the international factors important in bringing 
about the re-establishment of democracy. 
This has led to a serious misunderstanding not only of the causes but also of the 
nature and the consequences of African democratization. To stress only the internal 
causes of the recent changes, the re-emergence of extra-governmental groups and 
associations and the decision by the political leadership to democratize, is to 
overestimate both the strength and capabilities of these two groups and their 
commitments to real democracy. Not only that, but it obscures the real, although 
often quite subtle role played by international factors at a number of different levels. 
These factors include Africa's serious economic and debt crisis and hence its ever 
increasing need for funding. This it has to seek in an environment where aid budgets 
are shrinking and where Eastern European countries are claiming an ever larger 
share, from a donor community that has become increasingly centralised under the 
influence of the two major international financial institutions the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
The donor community in general has also started to assume a serious interest in 
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democratization, with a number of the major Western governments frequently talking 
publicly about linking further aid disbursements to democratization by African 
governments. The IFI's have been less direct in their demands and there is some 
doubts that they would ever go so far as to prescnbe political reforms in the same way 
as they do economic policy. However, there are suggestions that they are attaching 
increasing importance to democratization, particularly in light of Africa's dismal 
economic performance and its obvious link to a lack of accountability in government. 
Either way there is a clear perception on the part of African countries that to avoid 
economic marginalisation they need to emphasize their democratic credentials and 
their moves in the direction of democratization. This is shown not only by statements 
to this effect by representative organisations like the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) but also by the democratization efforts of numerous African countries in 
response to their own worsening budgets and their desire for more foreign funding. 
This sort of change is well illustrated by the case of Mozambique. In the general 
literature on democratization Mozambique has been cited as one of the prime 
examples of African countries making the move from a Marxist-Leninist single-party, 
authoritarian state, to having one of Africa's more liberal constitutions enshrining 
multi-party competition and a number of other freedoms including that of the press. 
Thus far little analysis has been done of Mozambique's political reform programme, 
most attention having been paid to the extensive economic changes introduced under 
the IMF sponsored Economic Recovery Programme (or PRE) and even this tends to 
be mostly of a descriptive nature. Few reasons are advanced as to why the significant 
political changes have been introduced. 
It might be tempting, following the emphasis in the general literature, to ascribe a 
central role in bringing about political change to those groups opposed to the ruling 
party FRELIMO's monopoly over government and calling for free elections under a 
multi-party system. Since FRELIMO assumed power in the mid 1970s the most 
important amongst these groups has been the Resistencia Nacional da Mocambicana 
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(or Renamo) which has been waging a guerrilla war against the government since 
1976. 
However, to credit Renamo with the move toward democratization in Mozambique 
is to ignore a burgeoning literature on the way Renamo operates but, most 
importantly, it is to seriously misunderstand the nature of Mozambican politics. 
Renamo like many African "pro-democracy" movements has poor credentials in this 
regard but the primary impetus for democratization has come from within the upper 
echelons of the ruling party and government, in a hesitant, piecemeal and often 
contradictory manner. 
The moves toward increased democracy have often been made against the wishes of 
the population and have little or no institutional structure to build upon. However, 
they have been made against the context of Mozambique's ever worsening economic 
and security situation and its increasing reliance on foreign funding. 
Right from the beginning significant political concessions had to be made in order to 
get access to that funding but as time has passed further changes have had to be 
made. It is impossible to get a full picture of exactly what concessions were demanded 
and by whom - such details are concealed by the confidentiality of the donor-recipient 
relationship. It is also possible that political conditions or political demands were 
never explicitly stated. 
However, it is clear that the major origin of Mozambique's political reform lies within 
the FRELIMO government who for economic reasons have been anxious to improve 
their relationship with the West. This is shown by the way that the first real 
discussions about making more democratic changes originated within the party, the 
way the changes have been introduced and their coming at a time when Mozambique 
is almost excessively reliant on foreign aid. Of course other more domestic issues, and 
specifically Renamo, have played a role in the democratization process but, I argue, 
this has been an ancilliary one compared to that played by Mozambique's 
relationships with aid donors. 
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In order to show the linkage between Mozambique's political reforms and its need to 
address the wishes of external funders, I will first examine the new literature on 
African democratization, arguing that it vastly underestimates the role of international 
factors. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 1 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 
The late 1980s and the early 1990s have been a time of immense change in African 
politics. Much of this change has been directed toward replacing the dictatorships, 
one-party states and military autocracies on the continent with more democratic 
systems of government. 
Nowhere are the pro-democracy mood and these changes more apparent than in the 
press. In addition to describing the ongoing demands for democracy and the changes 
that they have brought about within individual African states, the press has begun to 
appreciate and to describe the more generalised nature of these processes and their 
broader ramifications. Africa is descnbed as a "continent in transition" (Independent 
29 July 1991: 2), swept by a "second wind of change" (Stop Press 3, 15, 1990:27) which 
has brought about a continent - wide "shift to democracy" (Guardian, 1 September 
1990: 3). There is further talk of there being some kind of "contagion" to this wave 
of democratization with changes in one part of Africa sparking off, or encouraging, 
changes in another, much in the same way as happened in Eastern Europe in 
1989/1990 (Independent, 2 June 1991: 9). 
The enthusiasm for, and concern with democratization in Africa has also been 
reflected in the academic literature. Pre-dating by some years much of the actual 
change itself, this literature has its roots in Richard Sklar's seminal 1982 presidential 
address to the American African Studies Association in which he vigorously defended 
the ideal of democracy and called upon Africanists to reexamine their attitudes to 
African politics (Chabal 1986: 1). Sklar criticised scholars for not questioning the 
primacy of economic development over democracy, and the inherent incompatibility 
of the two. He adopted a far more optimistic tone in talking about the possibilities 
for democracy in Africa than had become the orthodoxy, referring rather to Africa's 
potential as a "workshop of democracy" (Sklar 1986: 18). 
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Sklar's call was at odds with the trend predominant in the literature on democracy in 
Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. This literature was of two types: that which argued 
that for largely historical reasons, the question of democracy in Africa was irrelevant, 
and that which focussed on the decay, decline and even the impossibility of 
democratic systems of government in Africa in the face of political and especially 
economic realities (for example see Jackson and Rosberg 1985; Huntington 1984 and 
Sandbrook 1985). But his call gave heart to those who saw some hope for the 
establishment of democracy in Africa. The result has been an increasing number of 
books and articles taking as their focus the possibilities for and the emergence of 
renewed African democracies. 
This new literature on African democracy has been influenced by a number of factors. 
Not only have the growing number of African pro-democracy movements and the 
actual moves made toward increasingly democratic systems of government by 
numerous African countries been important, but so has the world-wide trend toward 
democracy, especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The renewed focus on 
economic reformism as a result of the adoption of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)/World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes, has also led many 
scholars to reopen the question of African democracy, almost as a by-product of their 
concern with liberalizing African economies. 
However, in studying renewed efforts at African democracy, scholars have been most 
influenced by the literature on the transitions to democracy in Latin America and 
Southern Europe. This literature has fed directly into the scholarship on African 
democratization which has reproduced many of its characteristic features: the use of 
individual case studies, a focus on the resurgence of democratic values and groups 
within society and on the role played by elites and by the ruling party leadership in 
moving from authoritarian systems to a form of democracy. In doing so, the new 
literature highlights a number of previously neglected areas of African politics but it 
has also duplicated many of the weaknesses of the material on Latin America and 
Southern Europe. In particular it grossly underplays the role of external forces in 
bringing about changes toward greater democracy. This role is increasingly becoming 
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more overt and is being documented in the press. However, its neglect within the 
literature has serious consequences for how we understand the democratization 
process in Africa and our predictions of its consequences. 
Against the context of earlier work on democracy in Africa, this section examines 
reasons for the change in focus, the major themes in the new work on African 
democratization and its strengths and weaknesses. It is argued that the short-comings 
arise largely out of the very reasons for the renewed focus, but that it is necessary to 
overcome these weaknesses in order fully to understand recent African 
democratization. 
Earlier literature on African democracy 
Amongst many scholars, the granting of independence to African colonies in the 
1960s was greeted with great enthusiasm and optimism for the new democracies 
(Crowder 1987). However, even from the beginning there was considerable pessimism 
regarding the sustainability of the democratic systems and institutions which had often 
been installed with the help of the departing colonial powers, and "realists warned 
that democracy in Africa ... would bleed and die" (Sklar 1986: 17). Since then a lot of 
the literature on African politics has reflected this pessimism, arguing that the general 
tendency of African post-independence politics was toward authoritarianism, with the 
prospects for democracy very poor indeed (Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill & Rothchild 
1988: 132; Markowitz 1977: 289; Jackson & Rosberg 1982: 266). This often led to 
downright "indifference" regarding the issue of African democracy (Ake 1991: 31), 
with the question most often being ignored in favour of more pessimistic analyses of 
the pathologies of African politics. 
Initially, the pessimists focused on the obstacles facing African democracies. In 
particular these studies predicted that absolute levels of poverty common to much of 
Africa, (Sandbrook 1985: 157), the lack of a democratic tradition, especially in the 
institutional sphere (Jackson & Rosberg 1982), severe ethnic divisions and cultural 
practices iniquitous to democracy would serve to cause its decay (Joseph 1983). 
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These fears and reservations were largely borne out as country after country lapsed 
into military rule or dictatorship, constitutions were either ignored and rejected, and 
opposition crushed. Scholars now concerned themselves with descnbing precisely and 
vividly, the nature of these third-world lame "Leviathans" (Sklar 1987: 686). The 
breakdowns occurred in one of three ways: into personal dictatorships, into military 
rule established by means of a coup, or into one-party states. 
Of these, the personal dictatorship was perhaps the most easily identifiable as being 
non-democratic. Examples of such rule abound in post-independence Africa, for 
example the presidencies of Kenyatta (and now Moi) in Kenya, Houphouet-Boigny 
in the Cote d'Ivoire, Amin in Uganda and Banda in Malawi (Jackson and Rosberg 
1982). 
Similarly, military rule was a widespread and clear example of the breakdown of 
democracy. Nearly half of all African states have experienced military intervention at 
one time or another, many of them more than once, for example Ghana and Nigeria 
(Shaw 1991: 197). 
More difficult to comprehend however, was the African one-party state. Although this 
broke with most of the conventional understandings or definitions of democracy, it 
had its apologists who argued that it represented a unique form of democracy best 
suited to the difficult conditions which most African states faced. It was argued that 
the single party was a natural consequence of the struggle for independence, usually 
conducted by one umbrella nationalist organisation. It was necessary to carry this 
unity through into the post-independence period in order to prevent the divisiveness 
of multi-party competition in facing the severe economic and political challenges with 
which these new African states were confronted. It was also held that even though 
many of these states allowed but a single party, they were still democratic, as there 
was sufficient space for discussion and competition within the party. This argument 
was often closely connected to yet another justification of one-party rule which was 
that it most closely resembled the democratic nature of traditional African societies 
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which were inherently democratic in a consensual rather than an oppositional manner 
(Hodder-Williams 1984: 115-124). 
These arguments in defence of the one-party state often also serve to criticise the 
literature on the absence of democracy in Africa, maintaining that the latter were 
either ethnocentrist or imperialist, trying to impose a limited and strictly Western 
understanding of democracy onto an unwilling and historically quite different Africa 
(see Staniland 1986: 54-55). Although much in vogue in the 1960s (for example see 
Carter 1964), such justifications became far less common as their inadequacy became 
clear in the face of the gross abuse of power occurring in many African states. They 
also increasingly came to be refuted on ideological grounds as being over idealised 
and patronising (Mhone 1972 and Bates 1971). 
But far more common than either the misplaced optimism or the grim pessimism was 
an indifference to the issue of African democracy (Ake 1991: 31). For many scholars 
it simply was not an issue and instead they focused on the politics of development or 
on the nature and pathologies of the African state. Thus the recent interest in African 
democracy is surprising, especially in view of the fact that the obstacles which seemed 
to overpower it are still very much in evidence. 
Why the new Cocus on African democracy? 
The reasons behind the change in focus and the change in attitudes toward democracy 
in Africa are to be found in a number of quite different areas. Most obvious amongst 
these are the actual moves made toward democratization by increasing numbers of 
African countries. Less obvious as a cause, are the changes in Eastern Europe and 
also prior to these, those in Latin America and Southern Europe. The latter two 
regions, which experienced far- reaching democratic transitions in the 1970s and 
1980s, are especially important in the way that they gave rise to a vast literature on 
transitions to democracy which has increasingly fed into and shaped the literature on 
democratization in Africa. A final reason for the switch in focus is to be found in the 
spate of structural adjustment agreements made between African governments and 
international financial institutions as a result of Africa's growing indebtedness and 
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economic marginalisation. Although primarily concerned with economic reform, the 
debates surrounding structural adjustment have also raised, amongst other things, the 
question of the necessity of a link between a free- market economy and a democratic 
polity, causing many scholars to start rethinking the question of African democracy. 
The spread of democracy in Africa 
Perhaps the most obvious reason behind the renewed interest in African 
democratization is the spate of recent moves in this direction by numerous African 
states or sigtPficant sections of their populations. Since the mid-1980s the majority of 
African states have either made moves toward increased democracy or else 
experienced protests or discussions about doing so. 
In a large number of countries multi-party systems have been newly introduced, for 
example in Zambia, Mozambique and Togo (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 8, August 
1991: 10240; 28, 9, September 1991: 10265), to replace the single-party systems, 
military governments or personal dictatorships that had existed previously. In other 
states there have been discussions about the possible introduction of multi-party 
systems in the future, for example in the Congo (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 6, June 
1991: 10163) and Tanzania (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 3, March 1991: 10043). 
Military government has given way to civilian rule, for example in Benin, or else this 
has been put on the political agenda and a commitment made to doing so, as in 
Nigeria (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 3, March 1991: 10045; Oyediran & Agbaje 1991). 
Most promisingly, a number of incumbent parties or heads of state have been 
displaced by means of electoral defeat, for example in Sao Tome and Principe, Cape 
Verde and Zambia (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 1, January 1991: 9723-4). 
Many countries have also experienced more subtle changes pointing towards 
democratization. Changes made to the way in which the head of state is elected, such 
as breaking the automatic link between the head of the party and the premiership so 
as to allow instead for direct election by means of popular vote. Mozambique 
represents one such example (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990: 
Article 118). Limiting the terms of office of the head of state, as has been done in 
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Rwanda, is a further subtle step towards democratization (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 
1, January 1991: 9726). The holding of elections which, in many African countries, 
have been postponed or even ignored for years, is another, as is the introduction or 
re-introduction of a secret ballot in elections (for example Benin in 1991, Africa 
Research Bulletin, 28, 2, 1991: 1008). Many states have also introduced substantial 
improvements in human rights legislation, particularly in terms of political freedoms, 
hence liberalizing, if not actually democratizing their regimes. In a number of 
countries, society-based groups, especially students and the youth, have been 
demanding more of a say in government and an opening up of the political system, 
for example in Togo and Mali (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 3, March 199110051; 28, 
4, April 1991: 10075). 
An interesting feature of these changes is the way that democratization in one country 
seems to inspire or spark off similar sorts of changes in others. Authors have 
commented on this phenomenon which they have referred to in various ways, as 
"political parallelism" where one process of democratization has a noticeable 
"demonstration effect" (Fishman 1990: 427) on other countries, or as democratic 
"snowballing" (Huntington 1991: 13). 
Thus far few explanations have been offered as to why this sort of chain-reaction has 
occurred (and its occurrence is not limited to Africa, - it has been a noticeable feature 
of the changes in Eastern Europe). Most authors imply that changes in one country 
inspire or provoke the population of another to demand similar changes of their own 
governments (for example, Kunz 1991: 224). However, one particular case of this 
"demonstration effect" is instructive, and this is the case of South Africa. 
A number of authors have commented on the effect that the changes in South Africa 
since February 1990 under De Klerk, have had on other states in Africa in forcing 
them to tone down the more authoritarian aspects of their own regimes (for example, 
Anglin 1990: 432). Thus far a full analysis of why and how this should be has not been 
attempted. Most authors suggest that this pressure has come primarily from within the 
African countries themselves, from a populace whom, for the past number of years, 
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have been led to believe that South Africa represented the very worst type of 
undemocratic regime possible. 
Changes in South Africa could provoke some severe questioning of the lack of real 
democracy in tropical African countries which have been vigorously opposed to 
apartheid. No doubt there is some validity in such explanations, but, given the fact 
that the factors operating against democracy in Africa are still very much in evidence, 
this is clearly not the only reason. 
It would be wrong to interpret the "demonstration effect" of movement toward 
democracy in South Africa purely in terms of its impact on the domestic politics of 
other African states. Changes in South Africa have also affected Africa's diplomatic 
position. Many African countries which have in the past played a prominent role in 
the world-wide stand against apartheid, for example Nigeria, might have a little more 
of the spotlight directed at the realities of their own governments and polities, 
perhaps forcing them to adopt less authoritarian practices. Furthermore, the 
Organisation of African Unity which, throughout its existence, has been at the 
forefront of directing international attention against South Africa, has started to play 
a strong role in calling for greater democracy and accountability in government on the 
part of its own members (Africa Research Bulletin 27, 7, July 1990: 9747). How much 
more South Africa's political reforms have changed the international diplomatic and 
aid environment, particularly with respect to financial institutions and the availability 
of funding to non-democratic African governments is unclear, but is certainly a factor 
requiring more research. 
The exact nature of democratic reform varies enormously from country to country. 
In many instances "democratization" thus far consists only of verbal commitments to 
change in response to rumblings from donors and international organisations, groups 
within society, or from within government itself. In nearly all cases it is far too early 
to tell exactly what the outcome of the changes will be. In most instances, what is 
under discussion is more the concept of change and the idea of democratization. In 
many countries there is also reason to doubt the sincerity of the reforms or promised 
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reforms. They have been promised before, but dropped as soon as the crisis giving 
rise to them had abated, as in Mobutu's Zaire (Diamond 1990b: 230). 
But the changes made have permeated up into the literature on African politics, both 
in the form of individual case studies from which more general tendencies have been 
extrapolated (for example see Diamond et al 1988) and in more generalized articles 
(see Fatton 1990, Sandbrook 1988 and Kunz 1991). However, given the recent and 
extremely hesitant nature of a lot of these reforms, they are clearly only part of the 
reason for the growth in interest in African democratization. 
The effect of democratization in Eastern Europe 
Indeed, the spread of democracy has not been limited to Africa. The changes that 
have swept Eastern Europe in the last three years are a further reason for the new 
focus. There is evidence that these changes have affected perceptions and 
expectations of politics in Africa. Jeffrey Herbst states that it is natural to ask whether 
or not Africa will follow Eastern Europe's "march toward democratisation" (Herbst 
1990: 92). Furthermore, in looking at the changes in Africa, the link between the two 
areas is often made. Colin Legum writes about how African popular dissatisfaction 
against not only individual rulers but entire systems is "reminiscent" of Eastern 
Europe (Legum 1990: 75). 
Hence the world-wide "zeitgeist" (Diamond 1990b: 227) for democracy, so passionately 
displayed in the revolts in Eastern Europe, has also permeated African studies 
perhaps causing them to look for democracy and democratization where a decade ago 
they might only have sought its denial. However, although the literature is increasingly 
making the link between the "spread" of the "idea" of democracy in Eastern Europe 
and the taking-root of the "idea" of democracy in Africa (Young 1989: 22), the exact 
nature of this movement remains very unclear. It is also a link that, on the ground, 
is often denied. For example, Flight- Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings denied that the 
spread of democracy in Eastern Europe had any effect on Ghana where, he argues, 
the process was already underway (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 1, 1991: 9421). 
Similarly, President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique argues that his government 
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embarked upon reform long before their Eastern European allies (New African 279, 
December 1990: 20). 
Democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe 
But the sources of the interest in African democratization are also to be found even 
further abroad than this. An undoubtedly important influence are the changes in 
Latin America and Southern Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s reflected in an 
already vast literature (see for example 0' Donnell & Schmitter 1986 and Baloyra 
1987). The notable fact about this literature is its degree of theoretical sophistication 
relative to that on transitions to democracy in Africa. 
Briefly, it too grew out of a similar response to changing reality. Prior to this, the 
literature, especially on Latin America had focused on increasing authoritarianism and 
the "improbability" of democracy (Remmer 1991a: 479-80). Much of it was situated 
within the dependency paradigm which allowed for little economic development or 
real political democracy because of Latin America's peripheral and dependent 
position in the world capitalist system. At first, as changes in a democratic direction 
began taking place they were largely ignored, but eventually the transformations of 
the 1980s, and the literature on transitions to democracy to which they gave rise 
began to pose a serious theoretical challenge to the dependencia school (Remmer 
1991a: 480; Levine 1988: 377). 
This was not only because they allowed for the development of democratic systems 
of government in places doomed by dependency theorists to "endless authoritarianism" 
but also because of the sorts of issues on which they focus in explaining these 
transitions. Whilst the dependency school had had a macro and structural focus, 
looking at international determinants of domestic politics, the new theorists of 
democratization concentrate not only on the micro, internal dynamics of states, but 
on the more voluntaristic aspects of domestic politics. They examine issues such as the 
nature of the leadership within a particular state and the formation of pacts in 
negotiations and manoeuvering leading up to a democratic transition (Levine 1988: 
377-385). It is most often within the leadership of the authoritarian regimes 
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themselves that the primary impetus for democratization is located (Fishman 1990: 
427) and many of the studies look at the jockeying between these "soft-liners" and the 
more resistant "hard-liners" (0' Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 15). 
The external determinants of democratization are down-played and 
under-emphasized. Transitions to democracy are explained as occurring 
"predominantly" due to "domestic, internal factors" (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 18; 
see also Baloyra 1987: 10). Where such exogenous, international influences are 
examined, scholars tend to focus on the more obvious aspects, such as invasion by the 
army of a foreign power bent on effecting a "democratic" transition, or the actions 
of international human rights groups, and then only as additional factors (see 
Whitehead 1986; McEwan 1988: 119). The only structural role allowed the 
international environment is in imposing "ideological constraints" or economic 
pressures that "accelerate" democratization in an unspecified way (O'Donnell & 
Schmitter 1986: 18). 
Within the literature a distinction is often drawn between "hberalization" and 
"democratization" (for example see O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986 and Baloyra 1987). 
The former is generally understood for example as "the process of making effective 
certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups", by which are usually 
meant basic liberal freedoms such as freedom of association and habeus corpus, whilst 
the latter is seen as the expansion of political institutions to include those previously 
excluded or to cover new issues (O'Donnell & Schmitter 19867-8). However, within 
the discussions both about liberalization and democratization, the concern in the 
literature is with liberal democracy, fairly narrowly defined in political rather than 
socio-economic terms (MCEwan 1988: 117). Both liberalization and democratization 
are seen as occurring in a slow, gradual and piecemeal fashion with the former 
gradually leading into the latter (Diamond 1990b: 231-4). 
Liberalization gIVes further space t? groups within civil society to call for 
democratization and this "resurrection of civil society" is seen as an important factor 
in the establishment of democracy (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 49). The emphasis 
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is very much on transitions to a fairly unspecific, though democratic, endpoint (Levine 
1988: 377; Diamond 1990b: 228). This means that the literature is very short-term and 
narrow in its focus, looking at the contingent factors surrounding a democratic 
transition and the tactical manoeuvering leading up to it rather than its long term 
structural causes or consequences. However, there is a growing concern with the 
impact of the debt crisis on the long term future of the new democracies (see 
Remmer 1990a and 1991a: 481) 
The literature has been subject to much criticism. Although rich in empirical materia~ 
it has been accused of over-reliance upon the case study method. Hence there are 
large numbers of case-studies focusing on the idiosyncratic conditions surrounding the 
democratization of, for example, Argentina, but little comparative study drawing out 
generalities (Remmer 1991a: 485). However, where this has been done, it has been 
argued that the result has been "theoretical asymmetry". The authoritarian regimes 
are explained, as having occurred as a result of structural and world-historical factors, 
whilst democratization comes about because of contingent voluntaristic factors 
(Remmer 1991a: 484). 
This "excessive" voluntarism within many of the explanations has been strongly 
criticised (Karl 1990: 6). In part it is a result of the overly narrow and formalised 
notion of politics that many of the studies are working within. The less obvious 
aspects of power, particularly from a socio-economic perspective are ignored. 
Democracy tends to be defined in institutional terms, as the presence, amongst other 
things, of elections and "oppositional rights" (McEwan 1988: 117). Anything outside 
of this, for example about the economic bases of society and the general political 
culture, is excluded. 
But the most striking weakness of the literature on democratization in Latin America 
and Southern Europe is its neglect of the international context of democratization. 
Like its narrow definition of domestic politics, it has a very narrow definition of 
international politics and therefore describes only the most obvious things like foreign 
invasion and political lobbying. It ignores the more subtle pressures operating within 
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the international diplomatic and economic environment that have pushed states to 
democratize, for example the pressures on the authoritarian regimes of Southern 
Europe to change in order to gain entrance to the European Economic Community 
(Huntington 1991: 14). Hence in the majority of the studies we are left with a very 
one sided view of the democratization process that would need to be supplemented 
with broader, structural analyses of the international aspects of their changes. 
But the literature has been influential in shaping approaches to African 
democratization, both in a direct and in an indirect way. One of the most influential 
books in the literature on African democratization, Democracy in developing countries. 
by Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988) is part of a larger four volume work, that 
includes a large number of Latin American case studies, and within the general 
articles there is a strong bias toward Latin American scholarship. Numerous 
references to the influence of this wider literature are made, for example Sandbrook 
(1988: 241), Shaw (1990: 206), Fatton (1990: 456) and Crawford Young (1989: 22). 
Further evidence of this influence is given by the similarity of the themes contained 
within both bodies of scholarship: the focus on the resurgence of associationallife and 
its role in re-establishing democracy and on the role of the incumbent political 
leadership. 
Structural adjustment programmes and economic reformism 
Over thirty African countries currently have structural adjustment or stabilization 
programmes administered by the World Bank or IMF (Lancaster 1990: 43). These 
programmes have had the effect of bringing scholars attention to the issue of African 
democracy and democratization for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the implementation of the programmes has often been accompanied by 
widespread popular dissatisfaction at the harshness of the measures adopted. Where 
a regime has been undemocratic and lacked popular legitimacy, this dissatisfaction has 
also tended to be focussed on calls for greater democracy and much of the literature 
on structural adjustment and economic reform has started to take cognisance of this 
fact (see Shaw 1991). Secondly, the urgency of many African countries' need for 
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assistance and the severity of the economic crisis in much of Africa has caused many 
scholars to increasingly question the extent to which such problems are not the result 
of ungovernability arising out of a lack of democracy (Lancaster 1990: 44). Finally, the 
very presence of large scale and far reaching economic reforms within the majority 
of African countries has brought many political scientists to ask whether or not a 
similar range of political reforms is possible. 
Hence the wave of economic reform currently affecting Africa allied with a 
world-wide concern with democratization, recently strengthened by the changes in 
Eastern Europe and informed by a vast and increasingly influential literature 
analysing democratization in the context of Southern Europe and Latin America, has 
brought about a significant shift in the study of African politics toward a new focus 
on democracy. 
Themes within the new work on African democracy 
Although the study of democratization in Africa has been said to have become 
"hegemonic" (Fatton 1990: 455) within African studies, the literature on the issue 
remains fragmented and hesitant, due largely to the emergent nature of the subject 
matter. However, a number of common themes emerge: the emphasis on the 
resurgence of "civil society" and its role in establishing democracy, the role of African 
leadership and pre-colonial traditions in the democratic renewal, the link between 
development and democracy, the connection between economic privatisation and 
political liberalization and the influence of the changes in Eastern Europe. 
In speaking of democracy and its establishment in Africa, the literature tends to be 
concerned with liberal democracy, understood as 
"a system of government that meets three essential conditions: 
meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised 
groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of 
government power at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; 
a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of 
leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such 
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that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and 
political liberties - freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 
freedom to form and join organisations - sufficient to ensure the 
integrity of political competition and participation." 
(Diamond et al 1988: xvi) 
This sort of definition is common within the literature, although it has been criticised 
by more radical scholars as being an overly narrow and vague definition which 
effectively excludes the socio-economic issues involved in democratization (see 
Beckman 1989). 
However, if such definitions are used, it is clear that no country in Africa would yet 
qualify as a democracy. Hence, in practice, democratization in Africa has been 
identified in terms of a number of other factors. Firstly, in the breakdown of extant 
political and economic institutions, secondly, in the abandonment of single-party 
systems and their replacement with multi- partyism, and thirdly, in the growing chorus 
against undemocratic forms of rule. It is also indicated by the establishment of centres 
for the promotion of pluralist political systems and in the spread of the African based 
human rights movements (Legum 1990: 79-80). 
Therefore, much of the literature is attempting to catch the essence of a process that 
has only just begun, with events rapidly overtaking predictions and analyses. Things 
have happened so quickly and, in most countries, the more democratic systems 
promised have yet to be fully established or operational, and those that have are still 
to be tested by time. 
The resurgence of civil society 
This is partly why so much emphasis in the literature is placed on the invigoration 
of groups within society opposed to their own exclusion from the political process and 
demanding a say in government. Thus far, such protests and opposition movements 
constitute most of the evidence for democratization and by far the most weight is 
placed on this factor in explaining the process. It is looked at on two levels, at the 
level of popular protest and opposition to non-democratic regimes by students, the 
peasantry, traders and religious and ethnic groups., as well as on the more intellectual 
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level in terms of the spread of organisations devoted to the establishment of African 
democracy (Legum 1990: 81). 
Kunz speaks of how liberalization should be seen as "issuing from the growing 
significance and maturity of social forces" (1991: 224) whilst Larry Diamond descnbes 
how "a rich and vibrant associational life has developed in African countries" and this 
"expansion of nonformal participation in autonomous, voluntary associations has 
become a major means for the limitation of state power" and "the cutting edge of the 
effort to build a viable democratic order" (Diamond 1988: 23-26). Other authors also 
place the main responsibility for the movement toward democratization squarely at 
the door of newly established or recently strengthened groups outside of the state (for 
example, Wieland 1991: 5), especially those recently squeezed by economic hardships 
introduced under structural adjustment programmes (Sandbrook 1988). Some have 
even gone so far as to ascnbe more importance to these groups than to formal 
political institutions. Jean-Francois Bayart writes that "Africa's potential for 
democracy is more convincingly revealed by the creation of small collectives 
established and controlled by rural or urban groups (such as local associations) than 
by parliaments and parties" (1986: 125). 
Particularly important are groups organised around religious and ethnic cleavages. 
Such divisions have traditionally been seen as working against any hopes for 
democracy (and indeed many of the studies on democratization in Africa still 
acknowledge the threat they pose, see, for example, Oyediran & Agbaje 1991: 234 and 
Sandbrook 1988: 259). But increasingly they are also being seen in a distinctly positive 
light, as potentially good sources of much needed plurality in African political life 
(Ronen 1986; Diamond 1988; Bayart 1986 and Bratton 1989). 
Hence, for example, ethnic differences in Nigeria are seen as giving rise to forces 
acting against political centralisation and the dominance of either one person or one 
party (Diamond 1988b: 68). Similarly, in Cameroon and Senegal religious factors, 
particularly the division between Catholic and Muslim are seen as having contributed 
to democratization in those countries, with Islam also making a contribution to the 
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institutionalisation of democracy (Bayart 1986: 115). Another example cited is that 
of Kenya, where religious organisations are seen as one of the few means of mounting 
a popular challenge to the one-party state (Odhiambo 1988: 133). 
The mass media, for example in Nigeria (Diamond 1988b: 68), students, for example 
in Togo and Zimbabwe (Africa Research Bulletin, 27, 10, 1990: 9860), organisations of 
professionals, as in Nigeria and Ghana (Diamond 1988b: 14; and Sandbrook 1988: 
261), and organisations of commercial and peasant farmers in Zimbabwe (Sithole 
1988: 244) are further examples of groups from whom pressures for democratization 
have been detected. Whilst many of these groups could be said to be members of an 
African "middle class", they tend in the literature not to be identified as such. This is 
surprising, given the long association between liberal democracy and the middle class, 
though it could be a reflection of many of the scholars hesitance to bring any issues 
of class or economic issues into their explanation 
The emphasis has been placed on the reinvigoration of civil society to such a degree 
that it is increasingly being claimed that its study represents a significant shift away 
from the "state-centric" analyses that have till now dominated African politics, toward 
a more "society-centred" approach (see Kunz 1991: 224-226; Shaw 1991: 266 and 
Bratton 1989). The emphasis is now to be on looking at how groups "disengage" from 
the state (see Chazan et al 1988) and use this political space to gather support, 
establish legitimacy and then in time mount a challenge to the political domination 
of a single person, group or party. 
However, there do remam some cautious VOIces who warn against being 
over-optimistic about the capacity of previously disempowered groups in society to 
play the predominant role in reshaping African states into democracies. In parti~ular 
they warn against underestimating the structural constraints, especially those of an 
economic nature, acting against the pro-democracy efforts of such groups. Mahmood 
Mamdani, for example, argues against attaching too much importance to the efforts 
of the African peasantry in democratization for this reason (Mamdani, in Nyongo, 
1987). 
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The role of African political leadership 
Seemingly at odds with the importance attached to popular opposition to 
authoritarian rule is the importance attached to the role of the African political 
leadership in moves toward democratization. 
The focus has been on the role of the leadership in three main capacities. Firstly, on 
the ability of important members of the incumbent government to control divisions 
within their parties in the events leading up to the establishment of more democratic 
systems of government so as to prevent these divisions halting the process, for 
example in Nigeria (Diamond 1988b: 67). Secondly, on the instances where African 
leaders heading undemocratic regimes have themselves taken the initiative in 
instituting democratization, as, for example, with Senghor and then Diouf in Senegal 
(Coulon 1988). Finally, some attention has also been paid to the symbolic importance 
of the abjuration of one-party states by African leaders previously in their favour, such 
as Mugabe and Nyerere, who has recently begun arguing the case for looking to more 
conventionally democratic systems of government, saying that "having one party is not 
God's will" (Kunz 1991: 223). 
However, within the literature, the concept of leadership tends to be narrowly defined 
and mostly the focus is only on the titular head of state and does not include their 
broader support base. There is little if any analysis on why these leaders have come 
to play the role of democracy 'broker' or why there has been a change of attitude on 
their part. In looking at the leadership as "controller" or "initiator" of democratization, 
the literature also ignores the possibility of transitions to less authoritarian systems 
occurring as a result of possibilities opened up by the loss of control on the part of 
the leadership. Malawi, with the ageing President Banda increasingly less able to 
stamp his personality on the political scene is an example of a country where such a 
situation might arise. Finally, the literature on African democratization tends also to 
pay relatively little attention to the role of the military in the political leadership 
bringing about democratization. This is curious given the emphasis on the military in 
the literature both on the decline of democracy in Africa and on transitions to 
democracy in Latin America. 
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However, overall there is not nearly as much emphasis placed on political leadership 
in the literature on Africa, compared to that on Latin American and Southern 
Europe. But it is still seen as being an important and positive factor, although its 
potential negative impact has also been acknowledged (Diamond 1988: 18). 
The link between economic development and democracy 
The literature on democratization in Africa has also raised the long-standing issue of 
the link between economic development and democracy. This is one of the few 
contexts where the issue of African democracy had been kept alive (see Ake 1991: 
34-36 and Sklar 1987). 
Although many scholars remain sceptical as the necessary link between development 
and democracy (see, for example, Beckman 1989: 88-90 and Sandbrook 1988: 246), 
others are at pains to emphasise the inaccuracy of the orthodoxy that there was a 
greater chance of development under authoritarian (and hence more efficient) 
regimes (see Sklar 1986; Ake 1991: 35 and Sandbrook 1988: 243-247, for a discussion 
of this debate). 
Some are content to point to the crisis in legitimacy brought about by the inability of 
some states to effect economic development and the possibilities this raises for 
democratic forces (for example in Sierra Leone, see Zack-~illiams 1990). Others have 
sought to show empirically how authoritarianism and democracy have not necessarily 
gone together, across a range of case studies (for example, Sandbrook 1988). However 
it seems to have been impossible to prove the opposite (Sandbrook 1988: 248), though 
some have attempted to suggest that the fact that some of Africa's more democratic 
states, such as Botswana, are better off economically is not accidental (Diamond 1988: 
16). 
Strong arguments are made that the lack of democracy in Africa is holding back 
efforts at economic development, specifically that the lack of accountability feeds 
directly into state weakness with deleterious consequences for its subsequent 
development capacity (Nyongo 1987: 72). It is further argued that further 
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democratization must be accompanied by economic development, otherwise efforts 
at establishing democracy will break down under the severe economic strain under 
which most African countries find themselves (Uwazarike 1990: 57). 
Democratization and economic privatization 
Closely connected to the discussions about democratization and development are 
those concerning the link~ge between democratization and economic reform and 
privatization, usually carried out under the influence of IMP imposed reforms (see 
Shaw 1991). 
In this regard, the economic reforms and especially the further privatization of state 
dominated economies are put forward as being a positive influence upon 
democratization in the political sphere, although it is not proven in the literature. 
Diamond writes that "the increasing movement away from statist economic policies 
and structures is among the most significant boosts to the democratic prospect in 
Africa" (1988: 27). 
Stress is also placed on the replacement of "socialism" with more free-market type 
reforms (for example see Kunz 1991), indicating a strongly ideological bent within a 
lot of the literature. 
But the concern is not only with the consequences for democratization of economic 
reform at the formal policy leve~ but also at the level of the informal or nonformal 
economy (Bratton 1989: 423-425). As an example, Naomi Chazan quotes Richard 
Sklar on the subject of the parallel economy in Ghana which is seen as an expression 
of the "peoples will" and as a "democratic fact" (Chazan 1988a: 126). But it is not only 
in the way that it acts as a political counterweight to the centralised and undemocratic 
regime or the way that it affords non-regime societal actors with political space in 
which to operate, that the informal economy is important for democratization. It is 
also seen as an important breeding ground for the entrepreneurial or bourgeois class 
that are perceived to be the real hope for the survival of liberal democracy in Africa 
(Diamond 1988: 26). 
25 
The link with democratization in Eastern Europe 
In addition to acting as one of the causes behind the renewed focus on 
democratization in Africa, the changes in Eastern Europe and their effects on African 
politics also feature as a theme within the literature itself. Mostly the focus is on the 
"demonstration effect" that these changes have had, either on authoritarian 
governments or on pro-democracy groups. However, in focussing upon this aspect, the 
literature has succeeded in underplaying the more concrete material impact which 
these changes have also had and which is descnbed in the scholarship on other issues. 
The literature describes how the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe had the effect of destroying the models upon which a number of African 
socialist and Marxist-Leninist states were based (Kempton 1991: 2). This led to the 
official abandonment of Marxism-Leninism by the governments of many African 
countries, for example Mozambique and Benin. 
The changes had a different effect upon other African governments, a number of 
whom saw the possible dangers that such an example could pose. A government 
sub-committee was established in Zambia to discuss the significance of the changes 
for that country whilst the ruling party in Tanzania had a national symposium to 
debate the same issue (Anglin 1990: 434). 
The success of pro-democracy groups in Eastern Europe in bringing about the 
overthrow of authoritarian regimes has also had the effect of encouraging similar 
groups in Africa in their struggles against the central state (Kempton 1991: 15; Anglin 
1990: 434). 
But changes in Eastern Europe have also had a more concrete, material effect on 
politics in a number of African states. Democratization in Eastern Europe has had 
important and deleterious financial consequences for many African countries. Firstly, 
the changes have meant either an end to or a severe reduction in the financial and 
technical support with which these regimes supported numerous African states, such 
as Mozambique and Angola. Secondly, democratization has also meant that a large 
26 
proportion of Western aid that might otherwise have gone to Africa is now being 
routed to Eastern Europe (Anglin 1990: 438). Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, 
aid flows to Africa had been reduced from $9 per capita to $2, whilst that going to 
Eastern Europe had increased to an estimated $34 per capita (Victoria Brittain in the 
Guardian 28 June 1991). 
These changes could have the effect of causing African countries to alter their 
relationships with Western governments or to the domestic policies that have bearing 
on their relations with donors, in an effort to avoid economic marginalisation or to 
compensate for lost resources. However this link with Eastern Europe has not been 
emphasised by the literature on African democratization, which tends to focus more 
on the transmission of the "idea" of democracy. 
International factors 
Indeed, relatively little attention is paid to the influence of exogenous factors upon 
democratization. To the extent th~t this has been done, two points have been 
emphasised: the indirect political pressures placed upon the democratization process 
by the IMP structural adjustment packages which are a fact of life for most African 
countries at the moment, and the impact of external support in maintaining 
undemocratic regimes. 
IMP stabilisation packages, and the austerity measures which necessarily accompany 
them, are widely perceived to pose a threat to the sustainability of democratic 
changes. The economic hardships brought on by these programmes are often most 
keenly felt by the previously privileged and politically volatile urban dwellers. Within 
the literature there is some concern over the vulnerability of new and more 
democratic regimes to the possible actions of this class who might feel that the new 
regime ought to have had the capacity to improve matters economically (for example 
see Sandbrook 1988: 257). Concern has also been expressed over the bureaucratic 
effects of having to implement far reaching and unpopular economic reforms tied to 
structural adjustment programmes. It has been argued that the urgent need to push 
through these tough economic measures will work against the growth and resurgence 
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of a civil society committed to democratic principles. In the context of 
democratization in Nigeria, it is maintained that 
"the simultaneous pursuit .... of political democratization and economic 
reforms in Africa .... within the framework of WB/IMF sponsored 
structural adjustments assumes a more poignant meaning. While the 
logic of such programmes has been to reduce the salience of the state 
in the African economy, in reality the outcome has been to foster 
"commandism" in determining the tenor and pace of reform, especially 
in the face of growing popular reaction to the pains of restructuring the 
economy in an atmosphere of political liberalization. The backlash has 
often been the erection of an anti-mass platform reflecting a lack of 
faith in the people, identifying democratization with 
elite-propelled/defined development, institutional reform, and the 
ideology of domination and control, rather than with the voice and 
resistance of the masses, or as an end in itself. The aftermath has been 
that democratization in Africa has at once been overwhelming and 
fragile." (Oyediran & Agbaje 1991: 220) 
Less often, mention is made of the more positive effects of IMP packages in causing 
undemocratic regimes to take unpopular economic measures which finally destroy 
their legitimacy, encouraging people to take action against such regimes (see 
Diamond 1990a: 48-52 and Shaw 1991: 193). 
Within the literature, reference is often made to the role of external forces in 
sustaining undemocratic regimes, for example French support for Eyadema in the 
Cameroons and American support for Mobutu in Zaire (Sandbrook 1988: 258). The 
continuation of this support was seen as being vital to the continued survival of these 
regimes and its withdrawal, either subtly or more overtly, is seen as being an integral 
part of the beginnings of changes in these countries (Kempton 1991: 15). But in 
discussing such cases of external support or lack of support, it is usually support in 
the most direct sense of the word, in a military or diplomatic sense, that is being 
meant. 
Although the influence of external factors has either been underplayed or interpreted 
in its most literal sense, there are occasional glimpses of the sorts of effects that 
Africa's international position has upon democratization. Of particular interest here 
are the pressures created by structural adjustment programmes which often seem to 
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be working against further democratization either by inciting popular opposition to 
the government instituting democratization or by encouraging governments involved 
in such processes to become "commandist" or undemocratic in their execution. 
Strengths of the new work on African democracy 
In addition to its optimism, the new literature on African democracy has a number 
of strengths. In looking at the possibilities for democracy and the role of domestic 
factors, particularly popularly based groups and organisations, it represents a 
departure from analyses which stressed the overwhelming influence of Africa's 
international position (see Chege 1990) on shaping its politics. The renewed concern 
with democracy and the role of African associational life in its establishment or 
reestablishment, has helped move the focus within African politics away from the 
state (see Rothchild and Chazan 1988). The issue of the state had come to be 
dominant both because of the importance of the state as a political actor and also due 
to the move toward such emphases in political science in general (Skocpol 1985). This 
is a positive development, given the weakness and at times even the absence of the 
state, as generally understood, within the African political arena (Jackson & Rosberg 
1982b). By looking further afield it becomes possible to get a far more accurate and 
complete picture of African political realities and dynamics. 
The return to the question of democracy also brings the study of African politics back 
to the classic concerns of political science, to questions of what constitutes politics, 
democracy, accountability and good government (Chabal 1986: 1), and away from the 
exclusive focus on underdevelopment and dependence that have tended to 
characterise African politics in the recent past. However, in pursuing these new 
perspectives, the literature has also become prey to a number of weaknesses. 
Weaknesses in the literature on democratization in Africa 
Despite these advantages, the literature on democratization in Africa has a number 
of weaknesses. Although it has cast our attention toward civil society and its role in 
renewing demands for democracy, the evidence on which these claims are made is at 
times deficient. Also, in looking for democracy, the studies tend to be working with 
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an overly narrow and formalised understanding of the concept. But the major 
problem with the literature is its under-emphasis of the external forces acting upon 
democratization. 
Partly as a result of the early nature of the changes, the work on democratization is 
empirically weak. Not enough evidence has been gathered and there has not been 
time to see the long-term results of many of the changes. Hence there is perhaps a 
disproportionate number of general articles based on too few in-depth studies. 
Much of the literature appears to have been over-optimistic about the role of 
society-based groups, often relying on insufficient empirical evidence (see Bratton 
1989: 425-438). Also the connection between the presence of such groups and their 
impact on the regime as forces for democracy is generally assumed rather than 
established. Claude Ake argues that in the case of many of these organisations, their 
"democratic potential is limited". Using the example of Kenya he makes the point that 
the presence of popular, legitimate, grassroots organisations is not enough to 
challenge the centralisation of power. There has to be some means of channelling this 
into institutions which would be capable of effecting long-term changes to the political 
status-quo (Ake 1991: 37). Similarly, in focussing on pro-democracy groups within 
society, many scholars are confusing the causes of democratization with its 
preliminary effects. 
Furthermore, the literature, which is heavily historical in nature, is largely unable to 
explain the discontinuity that the current wave of democratization represents (see Van 
Donge 1990: 428). Many of the case-studies which have been done, are historical in 
their focus. Thus they describe in detail all the reasons why democracy has failed in 
the past: poverty, no history of democratic institutions, disruptive ethnic and religious 
cleavages, no democratic culture and so on, without explaining what has occurred to 
dull or to change the effects of these factors or to remove them completely. Hence 
there is a sort of explanatory 'gap' where no attempt is made to explain the 
disjuncture. 
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This is linked to the problematic definition of democracy that much of the literature 
is working within. Although they claim to be adhering to a broad, behavioural 
understanding of democracy (see for example that given by Diamond 1988 above), in 
practice democracy is seen in terms of the presence of conventionally understood 
political institutions, particularly a multi-party electoral system (Bratton 1989: 421). 
Hence not only are many authors inconsistent in their use of the terms democracy 
and democratization, but it is an overly narrow and shallow definition. It is a shallow 
understanding because it tends to exclude deeper analysis of the complex support 
structures that are essential for the survival of democratic systems, and it is narrow 
because it excludes most questions about power relations outside of strictly political 
institutions, particularly those relating to the economy (see Beckman 1989). 
But the most serious weakness of the literature is its under- emphasis of external 
factors in explaining why the changes have come about. Only the most obvious aspects 
of the international environment's effects on democratization are descnbed. Other 
more subtle pressures toward democratization such as reliance upon Western donors 
who might impose certain conditions of a political nature to their aid and indeed the 
effects of such reliance in the first place, are either ignored or down-played. This is 
despite the fact that during the 1980s Africa experienced a severe economic crisis 
(Parfitt & Riley 1987: 1) that caused it to look increasingly to outside donors for 
financial support from funds which have been consistently shrinking (Abernathy 1989: 
81-84). This has led to a debt crisis which, although not large by international 
standards, is enormous relative to Africa's resources and far outweighs the abilities 
of most African countries ever to repay (Haynes, Parfitt & Riley 1987: 343). 
The fact that many of these donors, particularly the IMF, which has enormous 
influence over other donors, including the Paris Club (Hodd 1986: 341; Parfitt & 
Riley 1987: 5-16 and Lancaster 1989: 103), attach stringent economic conditions to 
their aid has been well documented (see for example Biersteker 1990; Hodd 1987; 
Cohen, Grindle & Walker 1985 and Stein & Nafziger 1991). These conditionalities 
generally affect the recipients fiscal and monetary policies as well as often having the 
effect of reducing state involvement in the economy, particularly with respect to state 
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subsidies and parastatal organisations (Biersteker 1990). 
However, relatively little attention is paid to any political conditionalities that may 
also be attached to such aid. Some scholars have sought to show that, especially as 
far as the IMP and World Bank are concerned, a country's regime type has little to 
do with whether or not it receives aid (for example, Moore & Scarritt 1990). This may 
be so, but there are also a myriad of smaller political conditions that have been 
attached to various types of aid for some time, effectively excluding or placing at a 
disadvantage some types of governments and admitting or favouring others. Examples 
of such political conditions are the Berlin Clause, whereby states which in the past 
refused to recognise West Berlin as part of West Germany were excluded from 
European Economic Community (EEC) aid. Similarly, all states classified as being 
Marxist-Leninist by the United States government have been excluded from receiving 
loans from the Export-Import Bank in New York as well as certain types of aid 
administered by Congress, including PU80 aid, an important source of food aid for 
many African countries (for example, these restrictions were all imposed on 
Mozambique in the early 1980s, Southscan 5, 4, 1990: 26). 
A number of factors are likely to be involved when aid agreements are signed. 
Finance is a long established tool of international diplomacy. However with the 
increasing centralisation of aid that occurred in the 1980s, with more and more aid 
being given out under the aegis of international financial organisations, such as the 
IMP and World Bank, whose influence is such that bilateral aid will often not be 
given in the absence of an agreement with them (Hodd 1987: 338), these sorts of 
political conditions start to become more significant. This significance is enhanced by 
the closing off of some alternative sources of aid, from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe and the shrinkage in the amount of aid generally being given out (Abernathy 
1989: 81-84). 
However, a number of factors have recently caused the political conditions attached 
to aid to become both more overt and more directed in terms of their content. One 
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of the major factors has been the ending of the Cold War and the reduction of the 
competition between aid donors that it entailed. This, combined with the renewed 
global concern for democracy and democratization, and the fact that all the Eastern 
European countries asking for aid from the West have been doing so against a 
context of extensive political liberalization, has encouraged Western donors to be 
forthright in their insistence that aid be accompanied by far-reaching political reforms 
on the part of the recipient countries. Furthermore, the severe economic crisis being 
experienced by most African countries and the problems connected with many of the 
structural adjustment programmes that many have entered into has created the 
perception amongst many Western donors that corruption and bad, especially 
unrepresentative, government is seriously holding back economic progress (Lancaster 
1990: 43-44). 
The attachment of "political conditionalities", particularly democratization, to aid is 
increasingly being picked up in the press and the more popular literature on Africa. 
They document how many governments, particularly those of the United States, 
Britain and France are increasingly threatening to link the granting of aid to further 
democratization by African countries (Financial Times, 13 August, 1990: 18; Guardian 
11 September, 1990: 33; Ake 1990: 39; Lancaster 1990: 43). 
For example, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester 
Crocker commented at a committee meeting at Bretton Woods in April 1990 that 
democratization would become another condition for future US assistance (Ake 1990: 
39). France's position was put forward by President Mitterand at a conference of 
Francophone countries at La Baule in June 1990 when he said that "France would 
link its contributions to efforts designed to lead to greater democracy" (Holman 1990: 
18). Lynda Chalker announced in mid 1991 that in future Britain would allocate aid 
to the Third World with a view to promoting "good government", characterised by 
"sound economic policies" and "pluralistic decision making" (Guardian 26 June 1991). 
Later that year, John Major in addressing the Commonwealth Conference in Harare 
warned that future aid would be linked to improvements in human rights and good 
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government (Daily Telegraph 17 October 1991: 2). However thus far there is little 
indication as to how far governments have gone in carrying out these threats and it 
is probably too early to tell. 
The role of IFI's in attaching political conditionalities is also unclear. Thus far they 
have not made the sorts of outright statements many government officials have, and 
there have been suggestions that their traditionally rigid distinction between what they 
see as their proper economic role and political interference would ever allow them 
to do so. It is also argued that their desire to get and keep structural adjustment 
programmes in place would prevent them from taking such steps (Lancaster 1989: 
215-216). However, there have been suggestions that the linking of political 
conditionalities are being extensively discussed by IFI's (Lancaster 1990: 43-4) and 
that they are putting far more emphasis on democracy in their official policy 
statements (Stein & Nafziger 1991: 177). An example is the World Bank which has 
begun calling on African leaders to become "more accountable to their peoples" 
(Financial Times 13 August 1990). 
Whether or not governments and IFI's are imposing or would impose political 
conditions to their aid, there is clearly some perception on the part of African 
countries that they are in danger of further economic marginalisation by Western 
donors if moves toward democratization are not made. This is shown in the 
declaration made by the OAD at their Addis Ababa summit in 1990, The political and 
socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the 
world (Africa Research Bulletin 27, 7 July 1990: 9747). This sort of awareness is an 
important part of any understanding of the relationship between Western donors and 
African countries affecting as it does the moves and changes made by the latter, but 
it has been on just such issues that the literature has been noticeably silent. 
The literature has similarly ignored the extent to which donor demands or donor 
preferences about political reform have been picked up and by some of the emerging 
opposition groups. 
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Conclusion 
Clearly a tide of democratization is sweeping through Africa and a concern with this 
process has· taken a similar hold on the study of African politics. The changes in 
African politics have come about due to a range of different factors. Some of these, 
such as the growth in popular opposition to unrepresentative governments as a result 
of economic hardship, are domestic in ongm. Other factors encouraging 
democratization are of a more international nature. The most important amongst 
these is the ever more serious need for funding from Western donors who are 
increasingly concerned with democracy and whom, because of the changed nature of 
the funding environment, feel ever more able to impose the condition of political 
reform in the direction of democracy to their assistance. It is unclear whether or not 
such conditionalities really operate and really have an effect in the both 
uncompromising and yet murky world of international aid. But what is more certain 
is the fact that increasingly, recipient countries have felt the need to make democratic 
changes, often from above, in order to ease their relationship with aid donors. This 
is a factor much overlooked by the literature on African democratization largely 
because of the strong influence over that literature by the scholarship on transitions 
to democracy in Latin America which itself under- emphasised the international 
dimension. 
However, the international causes of the current democratization process in Africa 
are particularly well illustrated by the case of Mozambique. There, between 1988 and 
the beginning of 1991, the moves made toward democracy have been dramatic and 
their origin lies largely in that country's growing reliance on foreign aid and hence its 
need to appease what were once quite hostile donors. 
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Chapter 2 
PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSITION 
TO INDEPENDENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Introduction 
The current reform and democratization in Mozambique can only adequately be 
viewed against the background of its history. The roots of the situation that the 
country has found itself in since the mid 1980s lie deep in its past, often strikingly 
and powerfully so. 
Early Mozambican history has been interpreted as having been shaped by two 
successive "revolutions". The first of these was the migration of Bantu-speaking 
people into what is now Mozambique, and the successive processes of state formation 
and decline that followed. The second "revolution" involved the intensification of 
Mozambique's ties with the wider world by means of Arab-Swahili and, later, with 
European imperialism (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 11). 
To this can be added a third and more recent "revolution": that commencing with 
nationalist struggles against Portuguese colonialism and ending with the establishment 
of an independent, socialist-oriented state under the leadership of FRELIMO. 
None of these major turning points in Mozambique's history exists in isolation. Each 
was shaped by the effects of the stage preceding it, and in turn they have all 
cumulatively served to influence the most recent phase in the country's politics. 
In order to set the context for a discussion of the reform and democratization in 
Mozambique, this chapter briefly surveys Mozambican history up until independence 
in 1975. Beginning with the Muenumutapa and Malawi kingdoms and their contacts 
with Swahili traders, the gradual establishment of Portuguese colonialism in the area 
is descnbed. Particular attention is paid to the exploitative nature of this colonialism: 
to the way that it seriously undermined Mozambique's social, political and economic 
fabric, and helped engineer that country's position of overwhelming dependency. 
36 
Against this background, I examine the struggle for independence and the transitional 
period, following the coup in Lisbon in 1974, that led to the establishment of the 
independent People's Republic of Mozambique under a FRELIMO government in 
1975. 
Throughout the discussion emphasis will be placed on Mozambique's history of and 
vulnerability to external pressures, whether they be Swahili traders, the Portuguese 
colonisers or foreign business interests. All of what has happened in Mozambique's 
past is a result of the subtle yet complex nexus between domestic resistance and 
inertia on one side and powerful external forces on the other. Much of Mozambique's 
history bears testimony to the fact that the latter have tended to have the upper hand. 
Pre-colonial Mommbique and the establishment of Portuguese hegemony 
Some centuries before the first contact with its Portuguese colonisers, the area of 
what we now know as Mozambique absorbed numerous migrations of Iron-Age 
Bantu-speaking peoples. These groups either displaced or absorbed the stone-age 
hunter gatherers who had previously inhabited the area. They settled in agricultural 
communities, largely in the form of independent chieftaincies where land was 
controlled by the chief, assisted by a council of elders (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 
11). 
For much of the time, prior to the seventeenth century, these chieftaincies were 
loosely organised into one of two systems or confederations, the Muenumutapa 
kingdom in central Mozambique and present day Zimbabwe, and the Malawi 
confederation to the north (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 11-13; Henriksen 1978: 9). 
Both of these systems or 'states' had always been heavily involved in trade, especially 
in gold and ivory. They traded with Swahili merchants who, from their coastal centres, 
operated a trading network that stretched to both Asia and the Middle East 
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-14; Henriksen 1978: 5). 
However, Swahili control over trade in the region was challenged by the arrival of the 
Portuguese who began operating in the Indian Ocean area from around 1500. 
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Anxious to secure gold and ivory to finance their colonial adventures as well as to 
establish refreshment stations and further the spread of Christianity, the Portuguese 
took military action against the Muslim merchants. By 1525 they had gained control 
of the majority of the coastal centres as well as having established a number of 
trading settlements in the interior (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-14). These 
commercial undertakings were always accompanied by evangelical missions (Duffy 
1959: 103-129). However, unlike the Swahili traders who had been content merely to 
trade, the Portuguese were more ambitious and wanted to control production as well. 
They initially tried to achieve this by converting the Muenumutapa elite to 
Christianity. However, with mixed results from this policy, they resorted to taking 
military action against the two confederations. Thanks to fierce opposition and the 
hostile terrain and climate, it took over thirty years before Portugal gained control of 
Muenumutapa gold mines and was recognised as having "suzerainty" over the area 
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 14). 
The prazos 
In order to entrench their rather tenuous position in the interior, the Portuguese 
crown distributed land to a number of its citizens whose task it was to constitute a 
permanent Portuguese presence in the area, help subdue resistance to further 
Portuguese expansion and to extract wealth, particularly in the form of taxes. The 
huge tracts of land given were known as prazos da coroa and their owners prazeiros. 
The prazeiros were given free reign and controlled their own slave armies or 
Chikunda, ostensibly for use against hostile neighbours. One of the few conditions 
imposed by the Crown upon the prazeiros was that they maintain Portuguese 
civilisation and that they remained white (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-15). To this 
end, land could be passed down through only the female line and only if the heiress 
married a white Portuguese subject who had been born in the metropole (Mittelman 
1981: 24). The grants were also made subject to review every three years so that these 
conditions could be enforced (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 13-15). 
As an institution the prazos failed. Cut off from a somewhat distant metropole and 
with relatively unlimited power, many prazeiros became increasingly autonomous, 
38 
powerful and Africanised, adopting some local customs and marrying into the local 
communities. Consequently, many of the prazeiros in time came to oppose rather than 
represent Portuguese interests. This fact, combined with increasing resistance from 
the local communities, led to a severe decline in the Portuguese presence and 
influence in the area, and their role in regional trade was gradually assumed by Asians 
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 15). 
The slave trade 
However, this situation changed dramatically after the mid- eighteenth century with 
the increasing demand for labour, first from the sugar plantations on the islands of 
Ille de France and Bourbon and later from Brazil, the United States and the 
Caribbean (Henriksen 1978a: 66). The slave trade revived Swahili and Portuguese 
interest and commercial activity in the area, but the Yao and Makonde tribes in 
northern Mozambique as well as the prazeiros also played a particularly active role. 
Of course slavery itself, as well as the trade in slaves, was not new to this part of 
Africa. Many of the traditional societies had made use of slaves, they had featured as 
an important commodity in the Swahili coastal trade and they had constituted the 
basis of the prazeiro's mode of production. However, whilst previously slaves had 
been procured on a local, relatively small scale, the expansion in demand for slaves 
coupled with the introduction of modem weapons meant that they were now being 
obtained in far greater numbers (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 16-18). By the early 
eighteenth century, the trade in slaves was the most important economic activity in 
Mozambique, accounting for approximately 85% of its exports at the beginning of the 
1820s (Mittelman 1981: 26). Although the trade never reached Angolan proportions, 
over ten thousand slaves were being legally exported from Mozambique every year. 
Given the prevalence of smuggling the real numbers are no doubt much higher 
(Henriksen 1978a: 66; Duffy 1959: 29;146). 
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Although officially terminated, under British pressure, in 1836, the slave trade 
continued unofficially well into the 1880s (Duffy 1959: 145). In fact it even persisted 
after this until into the 1900s in various modified forms, for example as COlvee labour 
sent to the cocao plantations of Sao Thome. (Henriksen 1978a: 66; Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983: 16-18). 
It is estimated that over a million Mozambicans were removed from the country in 
this manner. Given that most of these would have been in their prime and probably 
amongst the most productive members of society, the social and economic effects are 
obvious. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, to avoid being taken as slaves, 
many people escaped to inaccessible and usually unproductive areas, or even to 
outside Mozambique's borders. Furthermore, whilst removing the most economically 
active members of society, the slave trade contributed very little in return. The vast 
profits made were not invested locally and the goods received in exchange were 
usually cheap consumer goods such as cloth, beads and alcohol (Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983: 18). 
However, despite their extensive involvement in the slave trade, the difficulties posed 
by the climate and the geography as well as the weakness of the administration and 
military in the face of fierce local resistance, meant that the Portugal did not 
meaningfully colonise Mozambique until after the 1880s. Indeed, Portugal took steps 
to cement its claim to the area only after the Congress of Berlin, convened in 
1884-1885 in order to settle disputes between competing colonial powers, questioned 
Portuguese sovereignty and argued that effective pacification and control were 
necessary before Portuguese claims could be recognised (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 
21). 
Portuguese colonialism 
In order to achieve these objectives the Portuguese launched a series of military 
campaigns that took them thirty years to complete. They eventually succeeded in 
subduing most of the local resistance, including the 'warlord' prazeiros, and from the 
early 1900s they attempted to reorganise and strengthen their administration of the 
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colony. However, this proved difficult due to the Portuguese metropole's lack of 
resources and the problems which Mozambique posed to a potential coloniser. Hence 
they increasingly looked toward chartered companies, owned privately but given 
government charters to vast tracts of land, to perform this task for them (Vail 1976: 
389). 
Company rule 
There were three main companies, the Companhia de Mocambique, in the centre of 
the country, the Companhia de Zambezia and the Companhia de Niassa, to the north. 
Although originally it had been envisaged that the companies would serve as vehicles 
by which Portuguese rule could be entrenched and Portuguese interests furthered, 
foreign capital came to predominate in all three (Vail 1976: 389-394). In return for 
relative autonomy and unlimited rights to the resources of, and taxes collected within 
their areas of jurisdiction, the companies' charters held them responsible for 
administration and infrastructural development. 
They proved to be ineffective either as commercial enterprises or as agents of 
development. Furthermore, their administration of the area was particularly harsh, 
characterised by forced labour, high rates of taxation, inhumane working conditions 
and vicious punishments. On observing company rule in 1914 one man was led to 
comment that "as far as the natives are concerned, this is a land of blood and tears 
where the most brutal ill treatment is no crime and murder merely a slight 
indiscretion" (Vail 1981: 401) 
The two major sources of profit for the companies were taxes and the export of 
labour. The latter was especially important, particularly for the Mozambique company 
which provided labour to Southern Rhodesia. The Niassa Company provided workers 
for sisal plantations in Tanganyika and for the copper mines in Katanga (Vail 1976: 
399). Foreign capital dominated all three companies but very little real investment 
occurred. 
Instead, they established a pattern of a brutal, rentier type system, based on a form 
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of direct exploitation which tied the country very closely to other countries in the 
region or to overseas. This was a pattern which the Portuguese inherited and 
continued, following the demise of company rule in the 1930s. 
Portuguese colonialism under Salazar 1926-1962 
The change occurred as a result of developments in metropolitan Portuguese politics. 
In 1926 the republican government was removed by a coup d'etat and by 1932 the 
former finance minister Antonio Salazar had become Prime Minister of the "Estada 
Novo". Under his dictatorship, far more emphasis was placed on the role that the 
colonies ought to play in the development of the metropole (Mittelman 1981: 66-67). 
The colonies were defined as "Overseas Provinces" (Meyns 1981: 43) which meant, 
in addition to their being an important aspect of nationalist ideology, that they were 
seen as a vital source of cheap raw materials for the underdeveloped Portuguese 
industrial sector and a captive market for its uncompetitive wares (Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983: 40). 
In order to achieve these aims and in common with the chartered companies before 
them, the Portuguese colonial administration relied heavily on the exploitation of 
MOZambican labour. Besides making extensive use, throughout the country, of 
'chIbalo' or forced, unpaid labour, the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique also 
exported labour to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The government entered 
into a series of agreements with South Africa and the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association (WNLA), starting in 1897 and culminating in the Portugal - South Africa 
Convention of 1928. These treaties gave WNLA recruiting rights in Southern 
Mozambique in return for 47,5% of all Transvaal exports being routed through the 
port of Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). In addition, the Portuguese government 
received a premium for each worker and their wages were to be paid to the 
Portuguese government in gold at the official price (Mittelman 1981: 61), which, from 
the 1970s was well below the market price. The Portuguese government would then 
pay the miners in Mozambican escudos and resell the gold on the world market, 
reaping a substantial financial profit for Portugal (Henriksen 1978: 120; Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983: 35; Meyns 1981: 45). 
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Labour was exported to Southern Rhodesia on a far smaller scale, but there was 
considerable transit traffic from both Southern and Northern Rhodesia through the 
port of Beira, bringing substantial tariff revenue for Mozambique. Also important in 
this regard was the heavy tourist trade from both Rhodesia and South Africa 
(Isaacman & lsaacman 1983: 48). 
The heavy reliance on labour export and transit revenue was emphasised by Salazar's 
policies on investment and industrialisation in the colonies. Up until the late 1960s, 
the effect of Portugal's colonial policy was to block any foreign investment and any 
industrialisation in the overseas territories so that they could be protected markets for 
manufactures from the uncompetitive metropolitan industrial sector (Mittelman 1981: 
29). Allied to this policy was the imposition of forced cotton cultivation introduced 
in 1938 to provide cheap cotton for Portugal's emergent and struggling textile 
industry. By 1945 over a million peasants in Northern Mozambique were being forced, 
on pain of imprisonment and under barbaric, serf-like conditions, to grow cotton for 
which they were paid extremely low prices and for which they received very little 
infrastructural support (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 41). 
Those who were not involved in either cotton cultivation or migrant labour in 
neighbouring countries were forced by colonial tax and labour laws to find work 
elsewhere. Amongst the places where they did so were the large plantations which 
dominated the agriculture of central Mozambique. The conditions on most of these 
plantations seem little removed from the harsh conditions of company rule, with the 
management determined to get the most work out of their labourers at the lowest 
possible cost (Hanlon 1989: 19). 
With the emphasis in their policy upon exploiting Mozambican labour, the Portuguese 
paid little attention to the provision of social services of any kind. Especially 
deleterious were their policies on education. This was practically non-existent for 
Black Mozambicans, although the Church did supplement what schools were provided 
by the colonial state. However, in both cases the high fees, a low maximum age of 
entry and the general shortage of places served to exclude the vast majority of 
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Mozambicans from any form of education (Mondlane 1983: 61-69). 
Against the context of one of the harshest and most exploitative colonial regimes, it 
is hardly surprising that there was widespread resistance to Portuguese rule. However, 
the repressiveness of the state combined with the fact that the country is a 
predominantly rural one with areas quite isolated from one another, meant that this 
resistance seldom translated into organisations and movements capable of really 
challenging the Portuguese colonial state. 
The liberation Struggle 
Indeed, the struggle for liberation against Portuguese colonialism only really got off 
the ground in the early 1960s. But the struggle itself is seen as having played an 
especially significant part in Mozambique's history because of the way that it served 
as a "laboratory" of government and democracy. Many maintain that it was during the 
liberation struggle that Frelimo as a party, as well as its policies and orientation were 
forged (for example see Henriksen 1978b, Meyns 1981, Luke 1982, Isaacman and 
Isaacman 1983 and for more sceptical interpretations of this process see Young 1988, 
Chabal 1983) 
The founding of FRELIMO 
Although the war itself only commenced in September 1964, the groundwork upon 
which the armed struggle was based had been being prepared since the beginning of 
the 1960s. A number of externally- based nationalist organisations had been 
established, the most prominent amongst which were UDENAMO (Uniao 
Democratica Nacional de Mocambique) based in Bulawayo, MANU (Mozambique 
African National Union) based in Tanganyika and UNAMI (Uniao African de 
Mocambique Independente) which was based in Blantyre. Each of these had its own 
particular, fairly specific regional support base reflecting in part the severe ethnic 
divisions extant within Mozambique itself (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 80; Henriksen 
1978: 155-169; Seegers 1979: 69). 
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Early efforts by these organisations to drum up opposition to Portuguese colonial rule 
were unsuccessful. To an extent this was because of vicious repression by the colonial 
state. For example, a demonstration organised by MANU in Mueda in Northern 
Mozambique in 1961 was severely crushed by the police and 600 people were killed 
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 80). However, the organisations also suffered the effects 
of isolation from one another and having to work so far away from Mozambique. 
This, combined with the lack of a coherent strategy and the divisiveness from which 
they suffered, meant that relatively little was achieved. However, the three 
organisations eventually came together in Tanzania in 1962 to form FRELIMO. This 
merger was the result of much encouragement by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere 
and the Conferencia de Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP), 
the umbrella body of nationalist organisations in the Portuguese territories. 
Opponents of Portuguese rule from within Mozambique, particularly from the 
Makonde tribe, and Mozambican exiles also joined in forming the new organisation. 
A member of the latter group, Eduardo Mondlane, a Mozambican academic based 
in the United States, was elected its first leader (Isaacman & lsaacman 1983: 81; 
Henriksen 1978: 170). 
FRELIMO's First Party Congress in September 1962 revealed relatively little about 
their policies and strategies (Seegers 1977: 67). They claimed to be focussed on the 
establishment of an independent Mozambique, free from Portuguese colonial rule, 
which they hoped to achieve by means of the creation of, as Mondlane put it, the 
"conditions for a successful armed struggle" (Seegers 1977: 66-67). 
This commenced in 1964 in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces. FRELIMO forces, 
trained initially in Algeria but increasingly in Tanzania, started mounting small scale 
attacks aimed at weakening the Portuguese army by a process of attrition. (Seegers 
1977: 68; Henriksen 1978: 186). It seems that the guerrillas had done relatively little 
mobilisation in Mozambique itself prior to launching the military campaign, but relied 
instead upon the "underground infrastructures" of MANU, UNAMI and UDENAMO 
as well as the sympathetic student organisation, the Nucleo dos Estudants Secundarios 
Africanos de Mocambique (NESAM) (Seegers 1979: 69). 
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Conflict within FRELIMO 
However, the Party itself soon became wracked by internal schisms and dissent. To 
some extent these problems arose around ethnic, class and racial divisions within 
FRELIMO, but they soon became increasingly centred upon differences in strategy, 
both on a purely military and on also on a broader socio-economic level. 
The ethnic divisions occurred largely between members from the northern and central 
parts of Mozambique, and those from the south. The divisions played upon tensions 
that had long been a feature of ethnic relations in Mozambique, with northerners 
complaining that people from the south were "aggressive", "domineering" and 
"corrupt" (Opello 1975: 69). 
The problems began when a number of prominent northerners within FRELIMO 
claimed that, as a group, they were under-represented in the leadership which was 
dominated by southerners. There was also some dissatisfaction amongst a number of 
the black members over the important role played in the organisation by whites and 
mesticos (or people of mixed race). Opello (1975) persuasively argues that these splits 
over race and ethnicity merely served to disguise a lot of the jockeying for power that 
was happening at this time. But whatever their cause, these problems did give rise to 
some intra-party violence, for example the revolt by the students from the 
Mozambique Institute in early 1968 and the march on the Dar es Salaam FRELIMO 
office by a number of its Makonde members later the same year (see Opello 1975: 
74). 
The divisions and the way that they were handled also brought about the resignation 
and expulsion of a number of key people from the organisation, for example Matthew 
Mmole, Lawrence Millinga and Manual Mahluza (Opello 1975: 66-77; Seegers 1984: 
31). 
Dissent within FRELIMO also occurred over questions of strategy. From the 
beginning there had been an important split over what type of struggle FRELIMO 
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ought to wage. On the one side of this division were what are seen as the more 
"moderate" members who had comprised the leadership of the early nationalist 
organisations that gave rise to FRELIMO. They tended to be concerned with fairly 
narrowly defined nationalistic goals, specifically, the replacement of Portuguese 
colonialism with Mozambican self-determination. On the other side were the more 
"radical" members, most of whom had been active within Mozambique. The radicals 
aimed at effecting more thoroughgoing changes within an independent Mozambique, 
usually of a socialist nature. The differences in the strategies that each group wanted 
to pursue arose out of their different goals. The nationalists tended to favour a quick 
military solution, whilst the more radical group wanted a prolonged guerrilla-type 
struggle with a strong political content. They wanted not only to get rid of 
colonialism, but also to change the nature of the society as well (Seegers 1979: 67; 
Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 83). 
The debate over strategy led directly to tensions within FRELIMO over the relative 
importance of the military and political wings of the organisation. FRELIMO 
structure had been based on a system of local level cells which combined together to 
form district and provincial level councils. The representatives of the different 
provincial councils formed the party's central committee which had various different 
departments and an executive which handled the day to day running of the 
organisation (Seegers 1984: 30). The political and military wings of FRELIMO were 
initially kept completely separate (Munslow 1983: 91), with the military organised 
along conventional Western lines (Seegers 1984: 30) . By the late 1960s the split 
between the two sections over their relative importance had become serious, with the 
military wing claiming their function to be far more important than FRELIMO's 
political work. A bridging committee was organised to try to coordinate the two 
sections (Munslow 1983: 117), but the debate was only really resolved with the 
ending of the leadership struggle that followed Eduardo Mondlane's assassination in 
1969. 
Unable to decide on a successor, FRELIMO appointed a committee of three men, 
Samora Machel, Uria Simango and Marcelino Dos Santos, to take charge of the 
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party. A bitter struggle broke out between Machel, one of the "radicals" and Simango, 
one of the "moderates". Machel eventually triumphed and Simango was expelled from 
the party. With Machel's ascendancy to the leadership of FRELIMO, the military 
aspect of the struggle became subordinated to the political, and many of those 
strongly in favour of a purely military approach were expelled. This move was 
indicative of an increasing radicalisation of FRELIMO, a process which had already 
been emphasised by divisions that had occurred over economic policy within those 
areas of Mozambique said to be under guerrilla control. 
These areas were known as the "hberated zones". They were areas in which 
FRELIMO claimed to operate with impunity, and to have control, to the extent of 
being able to establish an alternative social, political and economic setup. By the end 
of the war, FRELIMO claimed to have liberated nearly a third of the country and to 
be the de facto government for over a million people (Henriksen 1983: 145). 
Although it varied between one province and another, in these areas Frelimo 
reputedly set about changing social and economic relations and establishing new 
systems of government. They experimented with new ways of organising agricultural 
production and set up numerous "lojas de povo" or people's shops (Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983: 86). 
Dissent arose over the involvement of senior officials in commercial activities in the 
liberated areas. Some FRELIMO members, for example Lazaro Nkavandame who 
was party secretary in Cabo Delgado province, were reportedly enriching themselves, 
at the local peasants' expense' as part of the reorganisation of production (Isaacman 
& Isaacman 1983: 96). This caused enormous tension, within FRELIMO, which came 
to a head at its Second Party Congress held inside Mozambique, in Niassa province 
in July 1968. At the Congress the "radical" line, opposed to the formation of a 
neo-colonial bourgeois class prevailed. Soon after the congress many of those on the 
losing side, including Nkavandame, were expelled from FRELIMO (Egero 
1987:20-25) 
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The radicalisation of FRELIMO 
Thus FRELIMO emerged as a tightly knit organisation, whose "political culture" 
became increasingly radicalised (Young 1988: 167). Their emphasis on consensus 
within the leadership and their not allowing open dissent also meant that they ended 
up With a very narrow leadership base. But this policy also fostered the emergence of 
a number of splinter organisations, established by those expelled from the movement. 
Many of these existed only LJtionally and none ever seriously challenged Frelimo's 
claim to be the only representative of the Mozambican people. The most important 
amongst these organisations was the Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique 
(COREMO) based in Lusaka (Opello 1975: 78-79). 
The radicalisation of FRELIMO was further emphasised by the fact that for much of 
the war, it received very little Western support or recognition. The substantial support 
it received from the communist bloc, in particular the Soviet Union and China, 
combined with FRELIMO's experiences in its "liberated zones" led them to adopt an 
increasingly radical and Marxist line (Seegers 1984: 33-34). 
FRELIMO's experiences m the "lIberated areas" further contributed to the 
radicalisation of their policies. There has been considerable debate as to the accuracy 
of picture sometimes painted of the liberated areas. Firstly, some doubt exists as to 
the degree to which Frelimo can accurately claim to have been in control of the areas 
said to have been liberated. Secondly, further doubt exists as to the extent to which 
they substantially altered socio-economic relationships within these areas (Henriksen 
1983: 145-154; Seegers 1984: 32). 
However, there can be little debate as to the role played by the liberated zones in 
shaping FRELIMO ideology and much of their post independence development 
strategy. In 1973 Samora Machel articulated this importance, saying that "the 
establishment of the liberated zones creates the material basis for the transformation 
of the anti-colonial liberation struggle into a revolutionary struggle, a struggle for the 
establishment of new political, economic, social and cultural structures which give 
49 
expression to the complete power of the masses over the society in its totality" (Meyns 
1981; 49). 
By 1974, FRELIMO guerrillas were active in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete, Manica e 
Sofala and Zambezia provinces (though not in the south), pursuing their policy of 
small scale hit and run operations against the Portuguese, aimed increasingly at 
economic targets. In 1974 the government of Marcello Caetano, Salazar's successor 
was toppled by a coup d'etat led by an organisation known as the Armed Forces 
Movement made up of a number of younger army officers. One of the things to which 
they were committed was to ending the wars in the colonies. However, although the 
coup and the sudden change in their situation caught FRELIMO off their guard, they 
did not bring a halt to their operations. Rather, FRELIMO persisted, determined to 
maintain their advantage and to come to the negotiating table in the strongest 
possible position (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 105-107). 
The Transition to Independence in Mozambique 
Although they experienced enormous difficulties agreeing on even the basic terms and 
principles of the negotiations (Mittelman 1981: 82), FRELIMO and Portuguese 
representatives eventually got down to talks in Lusaka in June 1974. After some tough 
bargaining on the part of FRELIMO, an agreement was reached on 7 September, 
which guaranteed the liberation movement virtually all they were asking for. Under 
the terms of this agreement, a transitional government was established, combining 
both Portuguese and FRELIMO officials. In this transition government FRELIMO 
held a number of important posts, including that of Prime Minister, for which position 
Joaquim Chissano was elected. Portuguese officials also combined with their 
FRELIMO counterparts to form a Joint Military Commission which was to act with 
the transitional government in a coordinating and caretaking role until the 
unconditional hand over of power that was to occur in June 1975 (Egero 1987: 61-64). 
The transition period was characterised by sporadic outbreaks of violence by both 
blacks and whites, especially in the major towns and cities. A group of conservative 
whites in Maputo rallying around the slogan IIFicoll, or 111 stayll, seized the radio station 
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and called on South Africa for assistance in restoring white rule. They were quickly 
crushed by a combined Portuguese-FRELIMO force but this action, combined with 
a number of attacks on the settler community (sometimes in response to provocation), 
helped speed up an already massive flow of whites from the country (Egero 1987: 
61-64). It is estimated that by 1976 approximately 90% of the 250 000 Portuguese 
settlers had left (Saul 1985: 64). 
The massive exodus of whites caused the new FRELIMO government severe and 
immediate problems. Thanks to the skewed educational and employment policies of 
the colonial government, the vast majority of the most important jobs in all sectors 
of the state and the economy had been held by whites. With over 90% of the black 
population illiterate, there was a dire shortage of personnel to replace the Portuguese. 
Not only this, but most them had abandoned their businesses and farms, taken all that 
they could with them and sabotaged what they were forced to leave behind (Egero 
1987: 67-71; Collins 1978: 12). Thus both the state and the economy were in a 
precarious position. 
The already difficult situation was further exacerbated by a number of other factors. 
Amongst these was the presence of over 30 000 black former members of the 
Portuguese colonial army who had been demobilised after FRELIMO had refused to 
absorb them into their ranks. There were also discipline problems within the ranks 
of FRELIMO itself, as the guerrillas tried to adapt to peace-time conditions. In 
particular, many felt that having been on the winning side entitled them to certain 
benefits and hence both corruption and tension arising from unmet expectations was 
rife. A further problem was the fact that FRELIMO was virtually unknown as a force 
in the south as well as in all the cities (Seegers 1984: 37; Collins 1978: 12). 
In order to try to prevent a large scale economic collapse and at the same time 
entrench FRELIMO's position, the transitional government set up small-scale locally 
based organisations known as "grupos dinamazidores" or dynamising groups. It was 
their task to "raise the political consciousness of the masses" and to help overcome 
the worst of the crises in the economy and the bureaucracy by keeping enterprises 
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going and enforcing work discipline (Meyns 1981: 56). They also liaised between 
central government structures and the populace, explaining policy to the people and 
communicating feedback to the upper levels. There were numerous problems with the 
dynamising groups but they do appear to have been successful in helping to forge the 
sense of national unity with which Mozambique celebrated independence on 25 June 
1975 under its first President, Samora Machel (Isaacman & lsaacman 1983: 117-18). 
Conclusion 
Mozambique began its new life as an independent state carrying with it a legacy of 
hundreds of years of both political and economic underdevelopment. Colonialism 
badly distorted Mozambique's economy, society and politics. Economically the 
voraciousness of the Portuguese colonists exploitation obviously denuded the country 
of its wealth. But the long-term structural effects were more serious and these existed 
on a number of levels. Firstly, the emphasis on the exportation of labour, and the 
reliance on income from transit traffic meant that Mozambique was left with an 
'inbuilt' dependency upon other countries in the region. Not only this but the country 
as a whole became oriented toward the outside: railways, roads and other 
communications were never designed to serve Mozambique so much as to remove its 
wealth. Mozambique had become a "service economy" (Mittelman 1981: 30; 55). 
The social consequences of these policies were insidious, particularly as regards 
education where at independence the illiteracy rate amongst Black Mozambicans was 
over 90%. Secondly, the widespread export of the most productive labour, combined 
with the forced cultivation of cash-crops for which there was little monetary gain, did 
serious damage to local society and economies, especially with regard to food 
production. Famine was widespread and many areas (Saul 1985: 41), particularly in 
southern and central Mozambique, became locked into a cycle of poverty and 
underdevelopment from which they seem never to have escaped. Finally, the 
discouragement of any industrial or infrastructural development, left Mozambique 
with a vulnerable and fragile economy, geared toward the production of relatively few 
primary products. 
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The damage done to the economy during the colonial period and by the disruption 
caused by the war, was exacerbated during the transition phase when departing whites 
destroyed or carried with them much of the wealth that had been created, leaving the 
incoming government with a lot of debt but not much else. To add to this the 
economy was suffering the effects of the oil crisis and its concomitant high inflation 
(Mittelman 1981: 82) with the result that by 1975 it was in a state of near collapse 
(Saul 1985: 62). 
Such was the economic legacy of several centuries of imperialism: less often discussed 
are the political consequences. Although there had been a long and illustrious history 
of violent resistance to colonial rule this seems to have declined considerably after the 
1920s as Portugal's grip on the country became firmer. Resistance to the excesses of 
colonialism continued until the 1960s, but it mostly took a localised, passive form such 
as tax evasion or emigration. Some instances of more directly political and 
organisational opposition to colonial rule are sometimes mentioned, for example 
amongst some urban labour movements, independent churches, student groups, 
mutual aid societies, tribal and regional organisations and some elements of the press. 
However, such groups activities were generally limited to urban areas and were often 
centred around assimilado's (blacks said to have been assimilated into Portuguese 
culture by fulfilling educational, professional and linguistic criteria) and mesticos, a 
very small proportion of the population (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 62-73; 
Mondlane 1969: 104-107). However, low levels of education and severe censorship 
and repression worked to keep organised resistance to a minimum (Munslow 1983: 
63). Hence there does not seem to have been a strong and continuous tradition of 
alternative and democratic political structures operating within the country prior to 
the liberation war and in some areas, specifically in the south, until even after the war 
had ended. This is hardly surprising given nature of the environment in which they 
were forced to operate and the paucity of resources at their disposal. But it means 
that in much of the country there was little tradition of any sort of democracy, nor 
any widespread and well-established democratic political culture. This, combined with 
the multi-layered nature of its economic under-development meant that the new 
People's Republic of Mozambique almost didn't have a chance. 
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Chapter 3 
INDEPENDENT MOZAMBIQUE AND THE EMERGING CRISIS 
Introduction 
The new FRELIMO government quickly introduced a wide range of fundamental 
political and economic changes. The essential structure of the new state was set out 
in the constitution published in 1975. This was complemented by a number of 
important policies introduced by FRELIMO at its first post-independence party 
congress in 1977. 
The changes in Mozambique came against the context of years of colonial 
underdevelopment and the traumatic transition described in the previous chapter. As 
if this was not enough, FRELIMO's active support for the Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA) engaged in a liberation struggle against the 
minority white Rhodesian regime, meant that Mozambique almost immediately found 
itself at war with its neighbour. Even after the Rhodesian government was replaced 
after Zimbabwean independence in 1980, things improved little for Mozambique. The 
pseudo-liberation organisation, the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo), 
formed by the Rhodesians in 1976 in order to carry out undercover operations against 
both ZANLA and the FRELIMO government, continued to operate, and with 
increased support, from South Africa. Through the 1980s, the war that they have 
waged and the rural chaos and economic burdens that they have caused have proved 
almost insurmountable obstacles in the way of FRELIMO policy. 
These problems have been compounded and exacerbated by the faults and the 
excesses inherent within the political structure and the policies themselves. The result 
has been that by the early 1980s, the country faced serious crises in both the 
economic and political spheres. 
Against the context of the savage colonial inheritance and the ongoing war waged 
against the Mozambican government, this chapter outlines the political and economic 
changes introduced by FRELIMO after independence and the crises into which these 
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changes soon ran. Besides descnbing the nature and extent of the crises as a 
background to the reforms designed to correct them, I argue that although the strictly 
economic crisis was the most obvious manifestation of the problems into which the 
country soon ran, they obscured a serious political crisis or stagnation which had 
accompanied the economic decline. The political and economic problems interacted 
with one another, exacerbating the problems: the centralisation of political power and 
decline of democratic bodies often served to prevent the necessary economic action 
being taken whilst the growing seriousness of the economic crisis only worsened the 
political problems. The result was that by 1983 the country found itself in a crisis of 
unprecedented proportions. Domestically it did no have a lot of room to manoeuvre 
due to the poverty of its inheritance, the war and political decline and inertia. Hence 
it was forced to look internationally though even here its options were limited. 
Changes introduced by FRELIMO at independence 
Changes to the political structure 
The substance of the new political structure was contained within the 1975 
constitution. This set up a series of representative organisations with which, at all 
levels, the FRELIMO party was closely linked. 
Legislature 
At the apex of the legislative structure was the People's Assembly. This was defined 
by the constitution as the "supreme" representative body. Its membership was 
originally set at 210 members made up of FRELIMO's Central and Executive 
Committees, all Ministers and Vice Ministers, all Provincial Governors, FRELIMO 
representatives from the armed forces, two representatives per province of FRELIMO 
mass organisations, FRELIMO members chosen by the Central Committee, and ten 
citizens, also chosen by the Central Committee (Constitution of the Peoples Republic 
of Mozambique 1975: Article 37). 
The People's Assembly enacted basic legislation, approved the budget and oversaw 
policy implementation. It was convened by the President of the Republic who 
automatically assumed that post as head of FRELIMO. The Assembly was meant to 
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meet twice a year, the routine administration being carried out by a Permanent 
Commission of 15 members proposed by the FRELIMO Central Committee. 
However, much of the actual drafting and implementation of policy lay with the 
Council of Ministers, who were appointed and convened by the President, although 
technically answerable to the People's Assembly. 
Assemblies were also established at provincial, district, city and local levels. It was 
made their task to legislate on matters of exclusive interest to their particular area. 
The Provincial Assemblies had been established in terms of the constitution, but all 
the lower legislatures were set up only after FRELIMO's Third Party Congress in 
1977. The appropriate FRELIMO official automatically headed each level of the 
assembly structure, and by this means help closely to link the legislature to the party. 
Ordinary members were elected by electoral colleges except at the lowest level, the 
Local Assemblies, where they were directly elected by means of popular adult suffrage 
(Torp 1989: 67-69). 
Party 
The FRELIMO party structure itself closely paralleled the legislature, further helping 
to link the party to the state. The importance of the party is firmly stressed in the 
constitution, which descnbes FRELIMO as the '1eading force of the State and 
Society" (Article 3). Having operated as a mass organisation for much of the 
pre-independence period, it was transformed into a vanguard party at the Third Party 
Congress in 1977, where it also formally adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official 
ideology. These changes did not really come as a surprise to those familiar with 
FRELIMO, as it had begun adopting an increasingly Marxist- Leninist tone as early 
as 1970, and the new vanguard role of the party was more in keeping with this new 
political line (Egero 1986: 125; Scott 1986: 40). 
The decision to adopt a vanguard approach referred mostly to the party's preeminent 
role in society and meant in practice more a greater selectivity in the admission of 
members than to strictly limiting its size. Everyone who had joined FRELIMO prior 
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to the end of the liberation war in 1974 was given automatic admission, but 
prospective candidates since then had to undergo a vigorous selection process 
involving public discussion and debate, at their place of work or residence, about their 
personal history and politics. Party membership was effectively denied to all those 
who had in any way collaborated with the colonial government, to polygynists, 
religious leaders and private business people (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 123). 
In 1977 party membership stood at only 15 000. FRELIMO worked hard from 1978 
onwards to establish the party throughout the country so as to enable it to fulfil the 
function set out by itself as the supreme source of government policy and activity 
(Egero 1987: 110). The lowest level of the party were the cells, consisting of three or 
more members, and organised at the workplace and neighbourhood. Above these 
were committees organised on a sub-district, district and provincial level. 
Representatives of these are sent to the Party Congress, theoretically the highest party 
body, that is meant to meet every 5 years to define policy, develop guidelines to direct 
the state, and elect a new Central Committee (Partido Frelimo 1983b: Part IV). 
The actual runmng of the party is carried out by the Central Committee and 
Politburo. The Central Committee is elected by the Congress and meets twice a year. 
It originally consisted of 67 members but was expanded in 1983 to 130 members 
(Torp 1989: 66). Theoretically it wields a tremendous amount of power, although 
most of its important functions, especially between meetings, are assumed by the 
Politburo (Africa Contemporary Record 1985-1986: B674). 
This originally comprised 10 members whose official task it is to organise Central 
Committee meetings and appoint party leaders at Central Committee and Provincial 
level (Partido Frelimo 1983b: Part IV). However, much of the general decision 
making power, both in the party and in the government, seems to reside in this body 
whose membership has remained remarkably stable since independence (Torp 1989: 
66). Within both the Politburo and the Central Committee there is great stress on 
unity. Matters are discussed until consensus is reached and open dissent is seldom 
seen (Ottaway 1988b: 215). 
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However, it was anticipated that most peoples participation in politics would occur 
through the medium of mass organisations, descnbed by a report to the Third Party 
Congress as being "a school of democratic life and organised participation by the 
People". The first of these, the Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) had 
been formed prior to independence, and it was joined by Organisation of Mozambican 
Youth (OJM) in 1977. An additional organisation to accommodate workers, The 
Organisation of Mozambican Workers (OTM) was planned, but did not get off the 
ground until 1983 (Egero 1987: 11), largely because of disorganisation within the 
lowest level structures, the work-place based Production Councils, which were often 
seen by workers as mere arms of management (Keesings Contemporary Archives 
February 1982: 31330) 
State Administration 
The obstacles FRELIMO faced in building its party structures were severe, but they 
paled in comparison to those involved in keeping the machinery of state moving. At 
independence the country was in chaos as a result of the war and the subsequent 
rapid and wholesale departure of the Portuguese. The burdens of the government 
were added to when, in 1976, FRELIMO nationalised the land, hospitals, schools, 
communications, transport and all banking and financial institutions (Luke 1982: 433). 
In addition there was a shortage of professionally trained Africans and the illiteracy 
rate in general stood at over 90%. FRELIMO itself had relatively few resources and 
was very short of cadres to carry out mobilisation and assume control of 
administrative structures. They partly overcame these problems by means of grupos 
dinamazidores (GD's) described in the previous chapter. However, soon after 
independence many of the functions of the GD's were assumed by more formalised 
party structures (see Collins 1978). 
Despite FRELIMO's aims of bringing about a complete transformation of all aspects 
of Mozambican society, the shortage of trained and experienced cadres meant that 
they had to keep intact large sectors of the Portuguese colonial administration which 
had always been characterised by a high degree of centralisation. This, combined with 
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FRELIMO's own approach to administration, to some extent influenced by their 
Soviet allies central planning, meant that there was always a strong tendency toward 
the concentration of power and decision-making at the centre (see Galli 1987: 19-30 
and Young 1988: 166-174). This was enhanced from 1978 onwards following the 
creation of a National Planning Commission. 
Human Rights 
Assuming power immediately after one of the more repressive colonial regimes, the 
new FRELIMO government took seriously the task of improving human rights within 
Mozambique. The new constitution reflected this concern and, in particular, 
FRELIMO's desire to do away 'with all forms of racism, sexism and traditional 
practices that permitted peoples exploitation and oppression (Article 4 and 26). 
FRELIMO seemed especially concerned to improve the position of women, and not 
only sought to promote their participation in all spheres of public life but also, for 
example, made bridewealth and polygyny illegal. 
However, despite its commitment in the constitution to the maintenance of "individual 
freedoms", specifically "freedom to practice .... a religion" (Article 33), the government 
took quite a hostile attitude toward religious followers and leaders. Amongst other 
actions taken, a lot of church property was nationalised, Muslim dress, education and 
the call to prayer was restricted and thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses were exiled to 
the rural areas (Maier 1988). 
Foreign Relations 
In its relations with the wider world, the FRELIMO government strongly committed 
itself to solidarity with all those nations struggling against "imperialism and 
colonialism" (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 20) 
as well as with its "natural allies the socialist countries" (Article 22). 
Mozambique became a member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and 
automatically assumed an important role as a Front Line State. It also joined the 
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Nonaligned Movement but none the less sought closer ties with the Eastern Bloc and 
the Soviet Union. In 1977 it signed a 20 year Treaty of Friendship with the Soviets 
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 181) and from then on became one of their most 
important Third World allies. The Soviet Union, along with East Germany played 
an important role in helping FRELIMO reorganise the political system, party 
structure and the military after independence (Campbell 1988: 103-104). 
Mozambique's relations with the West did not get off to such a good start. In reaction 
to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) support for Portugal during its war 
against FRELIMO, neither the United States nor West Germany was invited to the 
independence celebrations and shortly after this both countries' consulates were 
closed down and Mozambique was subsequently banned from getting and aid from 
the United States (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 184-185). 
Although its trade ties with western nations remained important, Mozambique 
distanced itself somewhat by refusing to become a signatory to the Lome Convention 
which links African countries to the European Economic Community. This was largely 
due to Mozambique's hesitation in agreeing to the Berlin Clause incorporated in the 
Convention. This clause acknowledges West Germany's right to West Berlin, and was 
hence unacceptable to Mozambique's close ally, East Germany. However 
Mozambique's refusal to join the Convention had the effect of cutting the country off 
from EEC administered aid (Henriksen 1978: 446) which was unfortunate given the 
state of Mozambique's economy at independence. 
Changes to the economic structure 
On the economic scene, the FRELIMO government was, perhaps even more than 
most newly independent African governments, particularly concerned with the 
economic transformation of the country. The policies which they introduced following 
independence had been strongly influenced by their experience in the liberation 
struggle, particularly in the liberated areas (Young 1988: 165-6), where they had 
attempted to revolutionise social and productive relationships. 
60 
Reflecting the predominantly rural nature of Mozambique, the Constitution described 
agriculture as being the economic "base". However, industry was to be the "propelling 
and decisive factor" in the economy (Article 6). The importance of the state sector 
was also emphasised, being descnbed as the "leading and driving" force behind the 
national economy (Article 10). 
These basic principles of W'ere fleshed out at FRELIMO's Third Congress in 1977, 
which adopted a set of Economic and Social Directives. These summed up the 
insights gained by FRELIMO during the liberation struggle and put them forward as 
the new basic development guidelines (Meyns 1981: 49). The Congress also called for 
the drawing up of a 10 year development plan, the Plano Prospectiva Indicitavo (PPI). 
This was produced, eventually, in 1981 and, although it was adopted by the People's 
Assembly, it was never published (Gunn 1988: 156; Torp 1989: 35). However, the 
principles underlying most of its policies were strongly reflected in those actually 
implemented in Mozambique's first period of independence (Saul 1985: 110). 
The plan called for a massive increase in state involvement in agriculture. The Third 
Congress had argued that the state sector should be "dominant and determinant" and 
that they should receive the bulk of all technical resources (in Hanlon 1989: 95). Part 
of the argument was that the countryside needed to be modernised and agricultural 
production dramatically increased, and state farms were seen as being the most 
effective way of achieving this (Hanlon 1989: 100). Hence in the first few years of 
independence the government took over previously settler owned estates and farms 
and turned them into large, highly mechanised state farms (Meyns 1981: 61). 
There was also much emphasis on the collectivisation of agriculture. This was to occur 
mostly by means of communal villages or aldeias communais (Meyns 1981: 60). It was 
hoped that this strategy would both assist in increasing agricultural output and bring 
about rural transformation. It was hoped that by centralising the population it would 
be easier to provide rural dwellers with health, education and other basic services 
(Henriksen 1978: 452). By 1980, roughly 1000 communal villages had been established 
(Meyns 1981: 62). 
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Industrialisation of the economy was a further important aspect of the development 
strategy. The emphasis was to be on the strengthening of consumer industries, import 
replacement and the decentralisation of industry (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 163). 
Particular emphasis was to be placed on the development of heavy industry, 
particularly iron and steel (World Bank 1985: iv). 
A new distribution system was set up to replace the departed Portuguese traders. The 
core of the system was the network of state owned people's shops, or lojas da povo, 
but the establishment of consumer cooperatives was also encouraged (Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983: 159). Although the state never sought to completely replace private 
traders, and indeed even started divesting itself of smaller retail businesses as early 
as 1979- 1980, it did have a monopoly of all wholesale trade and maintained a firm 
control over the allocation of all foreign exchange with which all imports were 
purchased. The state also established a monopsonistic agricultural marketing board, 
Agricom, which was responsible for the marketing of all agricultural produce (Kyle 
1991: 640). 
The importance of centralised planning was constantly stressed. The Central 
Committee's report to the Third Congress argued that "the building of socialism 
demands that the economy be centrally planned and directed by the state" (quoted 
in Young 1988: 170). The National Planning Commission, set up soon after the Third 
Congress in 1978 played a central role in this task. The Commission centralised the 
planning process for the economy and set production targets, both for the national 
economy and for the different sectors of the economy (Young 1988: 175). 
The government sought to pursue an ambitious policy regarding the expansion of 
social and welfare services. Education and health care both received particular 
attention. In the educational sphere a number of campaigns were launched around 
the expansion of school enrolment and adult literacy. By 1981 significant progress had 
already been made with school attendance almost double what it had been at 
independence and illiteracy reputedly down to around 75% (Isaacman & Isaacman 
1983: 139). On the health front, FRELIMO tried to overcome the crisis it had faced 
62 
at independence when there were apparently only 87 medical doctors in the country. 
In particular it tried to expand health care in the rural areas by means of primary 
health care clinics and community based health workers or "barefoot doctors" 
(Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 139-141). 
In terms of its economic linkages with the wider world very little has been said in the 
literature on post-independence Mozambique. Although not completely hostile to 
foreign investment, the new government was naturally anxious that this should occur 
within the general development frameworks they had adopted and that it should fit 
in with their own plans. Whilst both aid and investment were received from the West, 
upon which Mozambique continued to remain heavily independent in terms of trade 
(Brochmann & Ofstad 1990: 21), it decided not to join the Lome Convention 
(Henriksen 1978: 446). They did seek to join the rival socialist oriented Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON)(Brochmann & Ofstad 1990: 
21), but in 1981 the Soviet Union refused them membership on the grounds that it 
was not prepared to subsidise Mozambique to the enormous extent that it would have 
to in order to bring it up to the same level of economic development of the other 
members (Torp 1989: 72). 
The emergence of a crisis in Mozambique 
The changes introduced by the new government never really got off the ground as the 
country was almost immediately plunged into a series of crises, emanating from 
sources both outside the government's control as well as from a number of the new 
policies themselves. The war, first with Rhodesia and then with Renamo, the climate 
and the world economic environment exacerbated the faults inherent within some of 
the policies and prevented others from ever taking effect. The resultant crises had 
both political and economic consequences, which were of course interconnected and 
often compounded one another, but which, for purposes of clarity, I have looked at 
separately. 
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The political crisis 
At the heart of the political crisis engulfing the new FRELIMO government was the 
precarious security situation in which it found itself from 1976, and which seems to 
have become only increasingly worse. However severe these problems were (and 
indeed are), they ought not to detract from some of the other serious political 
problems plaguing the state. The decline in political activity and the extent to which 
representative bodies were not functioning effectively, the corruption and abuse of 
power and the problems that Mozambique was experiencing in its foreign diplomatic 
relations, all served to weaken the ability of the government to deal with the other 
crises, and have had a number of long-lasting consequences. 
The war 
The state of war that Mozambique found itself in with its westerly neighbour 
Rhodesia, and the ongoing struggle against the insurgent organisation Renamo, both 
have the same roots: Mozambique's stand as a Front Line State against the minority 
white regime in Rhodesia. 
This resulted directly in numerous attacks on the country's economic infrastructure 
by the Rhodesian security forces, as well as a serious loss of revenue, described below. 
War with Rhodesia also involved attacks on ZANLA camps within Mozambique 
which further served to disrupt the country. 
More insidious was the indirect war begun against the FRELIMO government by the 
Rhodesians. In 1976 the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) 
fashioned Renamo (or the Mozambique National Resistance or MNR, as it is 
sometimes known) as a front organisation to undertake operations against both the 
Mozambican armed forces and ZANLA. Initially they used former members of the 
crack anti-insurgent unit, the "flechas" formed and controlled by the Portuguese secret 
police, the Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE). After independence 
many of those who had collaborated with the Portuguese fled Mozambique to 
Rhodesia. Included amongst these was Orlando Cristina (who later became Secretary 
of Renamo), a former PIDE agent who brought with him many of their files. The 
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Rhodesians used the information thus gained to blackmail people implicated in the 
files into joining Renamo (Metz 1986: 492-493). 
Further recruits came in the form of deserters from FRELIMO. A number of 
guerrillas found the transition from liberation organisation to official army a difficult 
one. A number found themselves in FRELIMO "re-education" camps as a result of 
discipline problems, corruption, or ideological differences with FRELIMO. Some 
managed to escape or were released when Rhodesian forces attacked and "hberated" 
the camps (Fauvet 1984: 114). In addition a number of those who had left FRELIMO 
to form splinter groups during the crises of the 1960s also came to join Renamo, 
particularly at leadership level (Thomashausen 1983: 125-126). 
The guerrillas were trained at and initially operated from a camp inside Rhodesia. 
However, within a few years a permanent base camp had been established inside 
Mozambique under the command of a former FRELIMO quartermaster jailed for 
theft, Andre Matsangaiza. He was replaced in 1979 by his deputy, Afonso Dhlakama, 
after a violent leadership struggle (Fauvet 1984: 114; Metz 1986: 494). 
The organisation was kept under the close supervision of the Rhodesians. The military 
and political wings were kept strictly separate with control of the latter resting ahnost 
exclusively in the hands of white Portuguese- speaking ex-Mozambicans. In terms of 
logistics and support the movement was heavily reliant upon the Rhodesian military 
who kept the numbers low, numbering approximately only 500 troops by 1980 and 
their operations were limited to the south and central areas of the country. 
However, things improved considerably for Renamo when, following Zimbabwean 
independence in 1980, the organisation came under the tutelage of South Africa 
(Fauvet 1984; Metz 1986 and Legum 1986) although there had been some contact 
between the South African military , Renamo and the Rhodesians prior to 
Zimbabwean independence (see Flower 1987). The South Africans had three major 
interests in Renamo and the destabilization of Mozambique. Firstly, South Africa was 
opposed to the loose grouping of southern African states known as the Southern 
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African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) formed in Tanzania in 1979 
in order primarily to reduce the dependence of its members on the South African 
economy. SADCC was immediately effective in attracting a lot of international 
attention and aid to the region and was also a direct affront to President P.W. Botha's 
own plans to set up a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) in which 
South Africa would be hegemonic. Mozambique played a crucial role in SADCC, 
particularly in the transport sector, as it provided the only viable alternative routes for 
the export and import of goods to and from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, other 
than South Africa. Destruction of Mozambique's economic and transport 
infrastructure would vastly diminish the role it could play in reducing the region's 
transportation dependence on South Africa, and there is evidence that it is into this 
role that the SADF anticipated Renamo would fit (see Hall 1990: 58). Secondly, 
Mozambique represented an example of a Front Line State that had overcome 
colonial rule and instituted a strategy aimed at socialist transformation. It thus posed 
something of an ideological threat to the white minority South African regime. Finally 
the South African military was also concerned that FRELIMO should not play the 
same role in offering sanctuary and bases to African National Congress (ANC) 
guerrillas attempting to overthrow the South African government in the same way 
that they had done with ZANLA in the late 1970s. 
To these ends the SADF assumed responsibility for Renamo in April 1980. Renamo 
personnel and supplies were airlifted out of Zimbabwe by the South African Defence 
Force and taken, reportedly, to bases in the Transvaal (Legum 1986: 2; Metz 1986: 
494). Their new South African mentors apparently provided them with improved 
training and logistical support as well as allowing the organisation considerably more 
freedom and independence. Under this new regime Renamo shifted its strategy, 
focussing far more on economic destabilisation, with particular emphasis on disrupting 
the country's vital transport network (Fauvet 1984: 116-117). The scope of Renamo's 
activities also expanded greatly until it was soon operating in nearly the whole 
country, and not just in the southern and central parts (Metz 1986: 495; Young 1990: 
497). 
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South Africa also encouraged Renamo to improve its international image, important 
in which was the attempted development of a political and economic programme. 
Offices were opened in a number of western capitals and a Manifesto and Programme 
was published. In the programme it stated its goals and objectives in quite broad 
terms, descnbing itself as firmly opposed to Communism and in favour of a 
free-market economy (Thomashausen 1983: 125-126; Renamo Provisional Economic 
Manifesto for a Free Mozambique, undated). It demanded a government of national 
unity, the amalgamation of its own forces with those of the government into a single 
army and democratic elections (Young 1990: 501). 
Since 1980 Renamo's activities inside Mozambique have steadily increased, until by 
1982 it numbered between 8-10 000 (Hall 1990: 3). Since then it has been active 
throughout Mozambique, claiming at times to control up to 85% of the rural areas 
(although the extent and nature of this "control" has been disputed, as will be 
discussed below). 
The organisation is, in theory, controlled by a National Council (which includes a 
civilian cabinet) under the leadership of a Secretary-General, but real power is in the 
hands of its President, Dhlakama, who is based in Mozambique (Minter 1989; 14; 
Dhlakama message to the US, press conference, Washington 28 October 1986 in USA 
1987: 81). He also heads Renamo's military wing which is conventionally 
hierarchically structured and divided at regional, provincial and battalion level. Close 
radio contact is maintained between the different levels of the military structure 
(Minter 1989: 9-12). 
Renamo's methods of operation have been described from eye-witness accounts of 
refugees and documented for the US State Department by Robert Gersony. He 
describes three basic modes of interaction between Renamo and the local populace. 
In some places, labelled as "destruction areas", Renamo limits itself to military attacks 
especially on economic and FRELIMO targets. In other areas, which Gersony labels 
"tax areas", Renamo forcibly extracts food, clothing and services, particularly labour 
for transport, from the local populace. Finally, in areas where it constitutes a 
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particularly heavy presence, often having a base nearby, or "control areas", Renamo 
forces most of the population to work for it under extremely brutal conditions. The 
people are usually engaged in growing food for Renamo forces, although they are also 
often used as porters to carry supplies often over very long distances (see Gersony 
1988). 
Throughout the country, Renamo's actions are characterised by brutality, often of an 
almost unbelievably extreme nature. Numerous large scale massacres have been 
carried out but the violence they commit is often of an intense nature. There are 
reports of Renamo fighters crushing the skulls of their victim (USA 1987: 44) and a 
report released by the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference describes 
atrocities such as people being beheaded, heads being stuck on spikes and paraded 
around villages and children being boiled alive in front of their parents (Africa 
Research Bulletin 21, 9, October 1984: 7363; see also Gersony 1988 and Young 1990: 
500). Even against material infrastructure, Renamo's violence is extreme. An 
eye-witness report descnbed a Renamo attack on a town as being an "annihilative 
frenzy: each tile of a mosaic smashed, each pane of a glass block wall painstakingly 
shattered" (Finnegan 1989: 48). 
Given this style of operation and this level of brutality it seems unlikely that Renamo 
would have established any "local" roots. In many ways it has not, having to rely 
heavily on forced recruitment in order to provide itself with person power (see Minter 
1989). However, it has recently been argued that it is wrong to see it merely as a tool 
of external interests (see Hall 1990, Young 1990 and Morgan 1990). This remains 
important although Renamo's external ties have become far more diversified since its 
days as a Rhodesian and then South African protege. Since the early to mid 1980s 
Renamo has also received support of various types from Malawi, possibly connected 
to President Hastings Banda's long- standing claims to parts of northern Mozambique 
or his connections with South Africa (Isaacman 1988: 27-31). Former members ofthe 
white Portuguese business community who either lost or abandoned property in 
Mozambique at independence have also played a role in supporting Renamo (Gunn 
1985: 3). West German interests (Gunn 1985: 4), right-wing organisations in the US 
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(Africa Confidential 29, 22, 1988 and 28, 25, 1987), Kenya (Africa Confidential 31, 11, 
1990) as well as through the Comores and Oman, though the exact support of these 
funds are unknown (Gunn 1986: 4). There is little Renamo relies mostly upon forced 
recruitment. No doubt the famine and general chaos in the rural areas contribute 
greatly to its membership. Because of the weakness of its political programme there 
seems little in the way of common issues around which Renamo troops are mobilised. 
, 
In the early days of :lenamo, Shona speakers were well represented in the 
organisation, particularly at leadership level. However, with the growth of Renamo 
since 1980 there does not seem to be any particular ethnic identity to the 
organisation. However, at times there have been indications that Renamo has tried 
to drum up popular resentment to the presence of a number of non Mozambicans in 
important positions within FRELIMO (Africa Concord 16 January 1986: 103). 
Similarly, FRELIMO's erosion of the power and authority of traditional chiefs and 
their hostile approach to religion have seemed to have played a role in motivating 
Renamo, but the evidence for this is patchy and it is unclear how much of an issue 
these things really are (see Hall 1990). 
Despite the fact that Renamo make so little effort to actively win support from the 
rural population, the FRELIMO government did not have much success in dealing 
with the threat that Renamo posed to their sovereignty. Much of the responsibility 
for this lies with the military which, after its transformation in 1975 from a guerrilla 
movement to a conventional army, found itself unable to cope with the low-intensity 
type of war that Renamo wages. Morale amongst the troops was also been something 
of a problem, due largely to the army's inability to get supplies to the operational 
areas because of either transportation or funding problems. The FRELIMO 
government increasingly had to look outside the country for help. Zimbabwean troops 
came to play an important role, particularly in providing vital security along the Beira 
corridor connecting the port of Beira with Mutare on Zimbabwe's eastern border. By 
1984 there were up to 10 000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique (Isaacman 1988: 
28-31) 
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Despite this assistance, FRELIMO has been forced to divert a lot of attention and 
resources to the military. During the 1980s, defence regularly came to consume over 
40% of the budget (Isaacman 1988: 34) and security concerns were reputedly behind 
many of the shifts and indeed splits within the Politburo. However, because both of 
the nature of the war and the inability of the Mozambican military to deal with 
Renamo, the government was also forced to deal with the matter on a diplomatic 
level. Although often denying that it would ever enter into talks with Renamo, the 
government started some indirect negotiations as early as 1984. It also sought to 
improve its relationship with South Africa, hoping that by so doing it would deprive 
Renamo of its most important source of support. To this end it signed the Nkomati 
Accord with South Africa in 1984. Implicit in the terms of the Accord was an 
agreement that Mozambique would withdraw active support for opponents of the 
South African state operating out of Mozambique, in return for which South Africa 
would cease supporting Renamo. These efforts were unsuccessful in bringing an end 
to or even a lessening of Renamo instigated violence which continued to grow in scale 
and intensity. 
Questions have been raised as to the extent to which Renamo can actually be said to 
control its forces in the field, and to what extent the situation has not, in parts, lapsed 
into one of social banditry. In either case the ever deteriorating security situation 
significantly contributed to the political crisis in Mozambique both in terms of a 
direct challenge to the legitimacy and sovereignty of the FRELIMO government but 
also more indirectly in the way that it has fed into the breakdown of political and 
economic activity. 
The breakdown in political activity 
One of the clearest signs of political crisis was the decline in political activity both 
within the state and the party to the point where one observer commented that 
politics just was not happening (Africa Contemporary Recore! 27, 1984-1985: B676). One 
of the results of this was the breakdown of political structures and the resultant 
increase in the centralisation of power within the central FRELIMO structures. 
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Partly as a result of a shortage of suitably trained people and partly as a result of 
Renamo activity, the legislative structure set up by the government after 
independence soon ran into problems. Local Assemblies were a popular target for 
Renamo attacks which helped worsen an already precarious situation with deputies 
widely dispersed and very short of material resources and expertise (Mozambiquejile, 
150, January 1989: 9). Many of these structures met irregularly, if at all (Africa 
Contemporary Record 27, 1984-1985: B676), a result of which was that questions were 
raised as to the extent to which these structures at all played a meaningful role and 
did anything more than rubber-stamp decisions taken higher up (Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983: 132). 
A similar decline was apparent within party structures. By 1982, problems in the 
functioning of party structures, particularly at the lower levels, were discussed in the 
FRELIMO Central Committee (Keesings Contemporary Archives 29, No.5, May 1983: 
3211). At FRELIMO's Fourth Congress in 1983 it was acknowledged that one of the 
reasons for the spread of Renamo was the weakness, and in places the absence, of the 
party in the rural areas (Campbell 1984: 847). These problems emerged because the 
growth of party structures had not kept pace with the growth in numbers, having 
grown by 635% between 1977 and 1983 (Scott 1986: 97), and the party's geographical 
extent. The poor quality of available cadres was also acknowledged as a problem 
(Partido Frelimo 1983a: 83). 
The popular organisations such as OJM, OMM and OlM which were meant to have 
played an important role in accommodating the masses into mainstream political 
activity also did not live up to expectations. Their activities turned out to be not very 
meaningful, often overly "ritualized" (Scott 1986: 130), rigid in their style of operation 
(Egero 1987: 111) and, like much of the rest of the party, overly bureaucratic (Egero 
1987: 117). Membership of these organisations, for example OMM, had increased 
rapidly at first but had tailed off quite rapidly (AIM InjQrmation Bulletin 141, April 
1989: 9). This was for a number of reasons, the most important of which seems to 
have been the fact that the popular organisations lacked legitimacy and were seen 
rather as mere mouthpieces for the upper echelons of state and party or as 
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instruments of control (Roesch 1988: 28). They lacked any semblance of autonomy 
(see Mozambiqueji1e 157, 1989: 9) and did not function as the vehicles for mass 
participation for which they had been intended. 
The decline was even apparent at the highest levels of the party. Between 1983 and 
1986 the Central Committee, which was meant to meet at least twice yearly, had only 
met on four occasions. The Politburo and People's Assembly had also not been 
functioning as regularly as they had been legislated to do (Africa Contemporary Record 
28, 1985-1986: B674). 
The fact that the party was not working quite as anticipated, contributed to a further 
problem, an inadequate distinction between itself and the government. This 
exacerbated a situation already made bad by the extent to which state and party 
structures paralleled and interlocked with each other (see Campbell 1984: 854; Egero 
1986: 119 and World Bank 1985: 20). Too often all the best Party personnel were in 
government, weakening the Party and to a latge degree undermining both the 
efficiency and the legitimacy of those government structures, which often became seen 
as mere extensions of the party. 
This weakness of both party and government, especially away from the major urban 
centres (see Egero 1987: 114), meant that political power was highly centralised. As 
state and party capacity declined further, the balance of power between political core 
and periphery became worse (see Egero 1987: 118). The gap between what the 
leadership wanted done, and what was possible, became greater and greater leading 
to ever increasing "commandism" and "paternalism" (see Mozambiquejile 157, August 
1989: 9; 153, April 1989: 14). This was exacerbated by the growing security crisis in 
the rural areas, in the face of which the government and party structures became 
increasingly less consultative (see Mittelman 1990: 10). 
There was always a tension between what FRELIMO sought to achieve in terms of 
popular democracy and the thoroughgoing nature of the changes they sought to bring 
about in the harsh context in which they were working (Saul 1990b: 69). However, the 
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inadequate functioning of state and party apparatus, whether due to the war, 
insufficient trained personnel or an overly bureaucratised elitist organisational culture, 
led to a real decline in meaningful political activity and a fading of the democratic 
ideal with which FRELIMO had started. 
Corruption 
It was further eroded by corruption and abuse of power within state and party 
apparatuses. This receives relatively little attention in the literature on Mozambique 
which always seems much more free of this problem than many of its neighbours. 
However, occasional references to problems in the early independence period have 
emerged. Shifts within the Council of Ministers and the Politburo in the early 1980s 
have been put down to accusations of power abuse (Africa Research Bulletin 21, 5, 
June 15, 1984: 7269; Economist 291, 7347, 23-29 June 1984: 58). Similarly, corrupt 
practices are widely acknowledged to have been behind the Political and 
Organisational Offensive launched by Machel in late 1980 by which it was hoped to 
root out some of the problems plaguing state and party bureaucracies (Egero 1987: 
115). Despite these efforts, by the Fourth Party Congress in 1983, bribery, nepotism, 
favouritism, racism and tribalism in the state apparatus were identified as some of the 
most serious problems facing the country (Partido Frelimo 1983c: 21-22). 
Although these examples reflect a readiness on the part of the leadership to recognise 
and deal with the problem, this is perhaps misleading. It has been argued that as a 
result of their shared experiences during the liberation struggle, Machel felt too close 
to most of the leadership to be able to take effective executive action (Saul 1990a: 
22). This is borne out by the fact that apart from occasional campaigns like the 
Offensive relatively little real action was taken. Cabinet members were shuffled and 
reshuffled but none of the top people was ever permanently removed from their post 
or expelled. As one observer commented, "FRELIMO promotes and demotes but it 
only rarely throws any cadre into the wilderness" (Africa Contemporary Record 28, 
1985-1986: B677). 
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This fact, together with the enormous emphasis within the upper levels of FRELIMO 
upon unity and consensus, possibly reflects a response to the violent and damaging 
conflicts that the party went through in the 1960s. By keeping the membership of the 
main decision-making bodies fairly constant and limiting the number of powerful 
people moving out of the Central Committee and Politburo orbit, a degree of stability 
was maintained both within the core bodies of the party and within Mozambican 
politics in general. This was probably achieved partly by the strength and charisma of 
Machel's leadership, by the strong bonds between the main leaders most of whom 
were veterans of the liberation struggle and partly by a unity borne out of shared 
opposition to the threat posed by Renamo. However, although conflict and 
particularly the emergence of splinter groups was minimised, the result was that there 
was little new blood in the party leadership and consensus became almost as much 
of a weakness as a strength and there are suggestions that the party lapsed into a kind 
of "groupthink". Thus the domestic political problems affecting Mozambique have 
perpetuated themselves. 
Human Rights 
Despite its energetic efforts to secure radical improvements in most aspects of human 
rights, the FRELIMO government's record began deteriorating fairly early on. 
Mozambicans faced strict controls on their movements and required permits to travel 
around the country (the Economist Human Rights Report quoted in USA 1987: 105). 
The number of detainees was consistently high (Amnesty International Report 1985: 
69-70), many of whom were held without trial and many of whom were subject to 
torture (Amnesty International Report 1989: 70; USA 1987: 28). Cases connected to 
state security were tried by a body known as the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, 
established in 1979. Although it was anticipated that it would be an interim measure, 
it remained in place until 1989 and did not recognise rights of habeus corpus nor did 
it have a mechanism to deal with appeals (Amnesty International 1989: 71). The death 
penalty was also reintroduced in 1979 and in 1983 the government started publicly 
flogging people convicted of a range of crimes including economic offenses, such as 
trading on the parallel market, and minor offenses, for example not showing sufficient 
"respect" to the authorities (Keesings Contemporary Archives 29, 5, May 1983: 32117; 
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Amnesty International Report 1985: 72). By 1983 Renamo rebels were being publicly 
executed in the presence of government ministers (Africa Research Bulletin 20, 1, 
February 1983: 6696). 
The timing and nature of these human rights abuses suggests that they are connected 
to the deteriorating security situation. The travel restrictions, detentions, torture, use 
of a military tribunal and the reintroduction of the death penalty are all signs of 
FRELIMO's efforts to cope with an increased threat, first from Rhodesia and then 
Renamo. The introduction of public executions and floggings is also possibly 
connected to the war and the state's efforts to counter people's fear of Renamo with 
an even greater fear, by example, of the consequences of collaboration. The serious 
and public crackdown on people convicted of smuggling or dealing on the parallel 
market reflects, to a far lesser extent, the government's efforts to cope with trying to 
restructure and reorient the economy in the face of economic crisis and limited 
administrative infrastructure. Clearly it was contingent rather than ideological factors 
motivating the decline in human rights as the government's attitude toward religion, 
which had been hostile from the start did not deteriorate further and indeed improved 
somewhat (see Hall 1990:47). 
Diplomatic crises 
Although officially pursuing a non-aligned policy with regards to foreign affairs, the 
FRELIMO government as a result of its ideological convictions and their experiences 
with foreign support during the liberation war, had always allied itself quite closely 
with socialist countries (see Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 172). Machel once 
commented that "socialist countries were and are at all times our safe rearguard" (in 
Jinadu 1988: 16). This attitude was further reflected in the friendship treaties that the 
government signed with, for example the Soviet Union, in the increase in trade 
between Mozambique and socialist countries in the first five years of independence, 
and in particular, in the important role that the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc 
countries played in reshaping the Mozambique military in an effort to deal with the 
threats from Rhodesia and Renamo. The Soviet Union especially came to playa vital 
75 
role, being the most important source of military aid to Mozambique (Jinadu 1988: 
32). 
But it would be wrong to see Mozambique as a mere "client" of the Soviet Union or 
other socialist countries (Steele 1985: 285). This is evidenced both by its voting 
pattern at the United Nations and by its consistent refusal to grant the Soviet Union 
the requested naval base in Mozambican waters (Gunn 1988: 150), sticking to its 
principle of attempting to keep the Indian Ocean a "non-nuclear zone of peace" 
(Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 24). Its foreign 
policy was always more nationalist than partisan in character (Isaacman & Isaacman 
1983: 171). It kept its options open, for example by seeking bilateral aid agreements 
with a number of Western nations such as the United Kingdom, Italy, France and 
Canada (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 186).But despite this, its exports to and imports 
from OECD countries dropped appreciably (Jinadu 1988: 37). 
However, from the beginning the FRELIMO government's relationship with the 
United States was problematic. This was despite the promise offered by an amicable 
meeting between Jimmy Carter and Samora Machel in 1978 (Isaacman & Isaacman 
1983: 185). The initial hostility with which the two countries had regarded each other 
at Mozambique's independence worsened during the first years of the stridently 
anti-communist Reagan administration. The 1981 expulsion from Maputo by the 
Mozambican government of suspected Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spies, and 
the United States refusal to replace their ambassador or allow Mozambique to import 
much needed aircraft and agricultural equipment from the US, reflected the extent 
to which the relationship had deteriorated (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 187). During 
a 1981 visit to Mozambique, United States Secretary of State for Africa Chester 
Crocker commented that he found the government "harshly confrontational and 
critical of virtually everything we did and stood for" (United States 1987: 3). 
The result of these diplomatic problems was that the obstacles that the United States 
had placed in the way of Mozambique's access to Congressional and multilateral 
finance and aid remained in place. Unfortunately for Mozambique, this was a gap that 
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could not be plugged with assistance from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. 
Aid flows from the socialist countries were far below Mozambique's needs, and even 
the military aid that Mozambique did receive was often outmoded (Jinadu 1988: 33). 
The Soviet Union's refusal in 1981 to allow Mozambique to join the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) on the grounds that it was not prepared 
to subsidise Mozambique to the enormous extent that it would have to in order to 
bring it up to the same L vel of economic development of the other members, was a 
serious blow for the FRELIMO government (Torp 1989: 72): 
It thus found itself in the invidious situation of being on bad terms with an 
enormously influential United States and in an almost "second-class citizen" type of 
relationship with it's "natural allies" the socialist countries. The consequences of this 
were serious given the extent and severity of the economic crisis into which the 
economy, by the early 1980s, had lapsed. 
The economic crisis 
The changes and new policies introduced by FRELIMO were implemented against 
the context of the serious underdevelopment that colonialism had wrought and the 
trauma of the transition to independence. Despite this, with one or two minor 
setbacks, the first six years of FRELIMO government, between 1975 and 1981, saw 
a modest increase in GDP as production disturbed by the anti- colonial war resumed 
(Africa Research Bulletin 1984: 7222). This growth occurred also in spite of a drought 
in northern Mozambique, serious floods in central and southern Mozambique in 1976 
and 1978 (Saul 1985: 104) as well as the severe problems that Mozambique began to 
experience with its neighbours, Rhodesia and South Africa. However, as the economic 
effects of the war and some of the new policies began to make themselves shown, it 
soon became clear that the country was mired in a severe economic crisis from which 
the problems inherent in its politics, particularly its relations with the outside world, 
prevented it from easily escaping. 
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Economic effects of the war 
As a result of the government's decision to implement the United Nations' embargo 
on trade with the minority Rhodesian regime, Mozambique lost substantial port and 
rail transit revenues, estimated to be in the region of US$150 million per year 
(Mozambique News, no 136, 1987: 6) amounting to a total of approximately US$550 
million (Keesings Contemporary Archives 1980: 30611). 
In addition, partly in response to changing labour needs and partly as a result of the 
South African government's hostility to an independent Mozambique, the number of 
Mozambicans working on South African mines was reduced from 120 000 in 1975 to 
45 000 in 1982. This, combined with the fact that South African ended the agreement 
they had had with the Portuguese, whereby part of the miners wages were paid to the 
government in gold at a preferential rate, meant that in the seven year period to 1982, 
Mozambique suffered a US$3,2 billion loss in anticipated income. South Africa also 
substantially reduced the amount of goods it routed through Maputo, resulting in a 
further loss of earnings for Mozambique of approximately US$250 million (Isaacman 
1988: 21). 
More dramatically, the Mozambican economy suffered from the direct attacks against 
economic infrastructure by the Rhodesian army and its surrogate, Renamo (Munslow 
1984: 12). The war also contributed indirectly to a loss of income, for example from 
the important tourist industry and from lost sales of Cahora Bassa power 
(Mozambique News 136, 1987: 2). 
Surprisingly all these setbacks did not prevent some modest growth in the economy 
in this period. However this fact, although often quoted, especially by the 
Mozambican government, is somewhat misleading. It obscures the fact that the 
economy grew at a rate less than the birth rate (Africa Research Bulletin 20, 11, May 
1983: 6840) and it also serves to hide the fact that, in real terms, production had not 
caught up with what it had been before the disruption of the liberation war (see table 
below). 
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The agricultural and industrial decline 1973 - 1980 
Industrial output 
Marketed agricultural output (volume) 
cashew 
cotton 
maIZe 
rice 
* Constant 1980 prices 
1973 is taken as the last "normal" year of production 
adapted from Brochmann & Ofstad 1990: 19 
1973 1980 
100 77 
100 45 
100 45 
100 54 
100 37 
These declines occurred partly because of the war but also because of the ill 
conceived or poorly implemented nature of many of FRELIMO's economic policies. 
FRELIMO's economic policy problems 
The state farms which were meant to constitute the "dominant and determinant" 
aspect of the agricultural sector proved to be a huge disaster. They tended to be 
unmanageably large, for example one project in Southern Mozambique, the Limpopo 
agro-industrial complex was formed from 1 500 previously settler owned farms. They 
were also overly mechanised despite the fact that there were few people trained in the 
use of the equipment which was also often inappropriate for the job. The state 
planners had misunderstood the labour requirements of the farms and the labour 
structure of the rural areas with the result that the farms often found themselves 
without an adequate labour source (Munslow 1984: 213). Hence, despite the fact that 
over 90% of all government spending on agriculture went into these state farms, they 
were unproductive and ran at a loss. On average they produced a mere 20% of 
agricultural output (Raikes 1984: 102-103; Isaacman 1988: 21). 
The second aspect of the government's agricultural policy, the collectivisation of 
agriculture into communal villages, was equally unsuccessful. Collectivisation often 
proved unpopular with the local people and on occasion the government had to resort 
to force. However, they too contributed little to increasing agricultural production and 
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their total output is said to have halved between 1979 and 1981 (Hanlon 1989: 101). 
The cooperatives tended to be mismanaged, were insufficiently funded by the state, 
and often badly positioned (Munslow 1984: 210-15; Isaacman 1988: 20). Hence they 
too landed up contributing very little to agricultural output. 
Because all the government's energy and funding was being ploughed into state farms 
and collective villages, the small scale family sector which provided the bulk of 
agricultural production was neglected and they received practically no support. Family 
sector output also suffered the effects of pricing policies biased in favour of urban 
consumers, which gave very low returns for agricultural produce. These low prices 
discouraged production as it was often just not worth while selling crops on the open 
market as the returns were either lower than costs, or were substantially below that 
which could be gained on the black market (Munslow 1984: 215-217; Raikes 1984: 95; 
Munslow & O'Keefe 1984: 19-21) . 
The shortage of consumer goods and agricultural inputs such as hoes, seeds and 
fertiliser acted as a further disincentive. The lack of these goods was in part a result 
of government import policies which emphasised the capital goods needs of heavy 
industry and the requirements of the highly mechanised state farms above the more 
modest needs of the small scale farmers and consumers (Munslow 1984: 215-17). 
The absence of these goods in the rural areas was also the result of inadequacies in 
the marketing and transportation systems. Trucks and the spare parts to maintain 
them were either not imported or allocated to the marketing people in sufficient 
quantities, leading to situations where the goods were available in the cities but could 
not be transported to the rural areas or where agricultural produce rotted because it 
could not be taken to market to be sold (Munslow 1984: 215-217). Many parts of the 
country had reverted to barter due to this breakdown in the marketing structure and 
the growth of the parallel market or candonga (MackintQsh 1986: 562). 
The net result of these policies was a severe decline in marketed agricultural produce 
leading to severe food shortages approaching famine conditions in some areas. 
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The industrial policies adopted by FRELIMO in the first years after independence 
did little to achieve their goals of import substitution, closer linkages between 
agriculture and industry and decentralisation. Priority was given to the creation of 
new, usually very large projects often funded from outside the country. These were 
often built with little thought given to real needs and the availability of suitably 
trained personnel, domestic raw materials and foreign exchange (Torp 1989: 41-4). 
The more generalised roots of these problems in agricultural, marketing and industrial 
policies and their execution lie in the way that planning was carried out. Most of the 
problems seem to stem from the over centralisation of policy making and the great 
extent to which the policies are premised on larger, often quite vague goals such as 
the transformation and socialisation of the economy rather than on actual conditions. 
Hence one of the major criticisms of the FRELIMO government's management of 
the economy during this period is its lack of attention to financial viability or general 
resource availability on either a macro, sectoral level or a micro, enterprise level. This 
was reinforced by the relative weakness and at times absence of financial and 
budgetary controls leading to serious overspending (IMP 1986: 2). 
These problems were exacerbated by the highly centralised nature of the economic 
management system which was structured around the National Planning Commission. 
The planning process itself was detailed and complex and tended to be very 
hierarchical in nature, stressing vertical rather than horizontal linkages (IMP 1986: 
2; World Bank 1985: vi). Also, there was far too much emphasis on huge projects 
(Saul 1985: 110). 
Conclusion 
By 1982 it was already clear that Mozambique was in trouble economically. In that 
year the economy experienced negative growth of approximately 7% (Hanlon 1989: 
86) and for the first time it could not meet the interest payments on its foreign debts 
(Brochmann 1990: 21). In 1983 the government did not publish a budget, a clear sign 
that something was very wrong (Hanlon 1989: 88) 
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The decline in production and the growing costs of the war created a need for 
extensive foreign borrowing. However, due to the fact that Mozambique was not a 
member of the IMP or World Bank, its access to multi-lateral credit was severely 
restricted. Its access to aid administered by the United States Congress and the EEC 
was also blocked. Mozambique thus had to rely either on bilateral loans at 
considerably higher interest rates or else loans from private banks. It was able to get 
some financing from more amenable multilateral bodies such as OPEC or the African 
Development Bank but these constituted only a very small portion of the funds it 
required (Africa Research Bulletin 1984: 7222; Miech-Chatenay 1986: 53). 
However, corresponding to this need for foreign money, the general economic decline 
and the over-valued exchange rate meant that exports and export earnings were 
decreasing. In addition the prices fetched on the world markets by Mozambique's 
primary products began to fall precipitously. The average price of Mozambique's 
exports fell by approximately 11 % in 1982 alone (Hanlon 1989: 87). Hence the money 
to payoff the loans as they became due was not available. A report released by the 
Mozambican government in 1984 described the position vis a vis debt repayment as 
"precarious". Indeed, by that time debt service payments, alone, amounted to over 
half what Mozambique earned from exports (Africa Research Bulletin 1984: 7222). 
Hence by 1983-84 the Mozambican government found itself in an unenviable 
situation. On all levels and due to a whole range of factors, described above, 
production was declining. Economic assistance from outside the country was limited 
and hence trying to address the causes of these limitations by means of reform 
became an obvious option. Also, by this time, a number of the mistakes and the 
problems inherent in the policies had become apparent to members of the FRELIMO 
hierarchy and so reforms to address these were increasingly called for (Munslow 
1984). 
However, the severity of the security and economic crises which precipitated the call 
for reform in Mozambique, also had the effect of obscuring the very real political 
decay which had occurred. The result was that the reform was always going to address 
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only the more obvious aspects of the economic and security crises, largely ignoring the 
political decay. Further, because of the way politics had become so centralised, the 
reform itself would occur in a top down fashion. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE 1983-1991 
Introduction 
Finding itself with its back against the wall as a result of the war, policy errors and 
its isolated international position, the FRELIMO government in 1982-1983 embarked 
on a series of reforms. It thus began a process that was to occupy it into the 1990s. 
There were two aspects to the reforms. Changes were made on the one hand to the 
government's internal policies and structures and on the other to its external 
orientation, in terms of membership of international financial institutions and its 
relationships with western countries, particularly the United States. 
Both strands of reform can be divided into four chronological periods. The first 
period covers the reforms made between 1982 and 1984. During this time, FRELIMO 
began to make the first contacts with the IMP, World Bank and EEC, sought to end 
the war by means of the Nkomati Accord between itself and South Africa and, 
following its Fourth Party Congress, to introduce a number of economic policy 
reforms. The second follows directly on from the first and covers the time from 1983 
to 1986. During this period, the FRELIMO government tried to implement some of 
the reforms coming out of the Fourth Congress, but in most cases the ongoing war 
made this impossible. Nkomati caused Renamo only a minor setback and the violence 
and rural destruction continued. The result was an increasingly worsening economic 
situation in the country, against which context the government continued its 
negotiations with the IMP and World Bank. These and earlier moves were interpreted 
internationally as a "move" to the West, but at the same time Mozambique maintained 
its ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, especially with regard to military aid. 
The third period covers the years 1987 till 1990, when the IMP and World Bank 
sponsored structural adjustment programme, the Programa de Reabilitacao 
Economica (Economic Recovery Programme or PRE), was introduced, with its 
resultant social tensions and reliance upon external aid. The reforms introduced 
during the fourth and final period, from 1988 to 1991, are almost exclusively of a 
political nature. This period covers the Fifth Party Congress in 1989, the start of 
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direct negotiations between the FRELIMO government and Renamo, the debates 
around, and the introduction of the new constitution, including the change to a 
multi-party system. 
Against the context of the political and economic crisis provided in the previous 
chapter, and using the periodisation outlined above, this section describes the 
continuing reform in MOTmbique. I argue that the process should be seen as a single, 
unbroken one. Although there are divisions between the four different periods, these 
are blurred and indistinct and serve only to highlight the agglomerative and 
incremental nature of the reforms. This is further emphasised by the fact that the 
reforms become both increasingly extreme in degree and political in content. The 
extent of the reform changed from the relatively mild reforms of 1983-1984 to the 
introduction of one of Africa's most thoroughgoing structural adjustment programmes 
in 1987. Similarly, the content of the reform increased from the almost apolitical 
reforms of the early period, and the consistent refusals to negotiate directly with 
Renamo, to the far-reaching changes introduced in 1989-1990 and the start of direct 
negotiations. 
It is important to see the reform as a single, incremental process in order fully to 
understand its causes. These remain essentially the same, from 1982-1983 until 1991: 
the ever worsening war and economic crisis and the FRELIMO government's efforts 
to deal with these. Although the crises were of both internal and external origin, the 
reforms arose largely as a result of international pressure of either a direct or an 
indirect nature. The government was vulnerable to this pressure partly because of the 
war, and its complex external dimensions and the army's inability to deal with the 
threat, but mostly because of its reliance upon and problems in obtaining foreign 
capital (in the form of aid, loans and debt rescheduling) for its ever weakening 
economy. 
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First Period: Early Reform, 1982 to 1984 
By 1982 the FRELIMO government found itself in the position of being able neither 
to pay its international debts nor raise new capital. The credit squeeze came against 
the context of an extremely weak economy, undermined by decades of colonialism, 
a traumatic transition to independence, some serious mismanagement, and the 
escalating war waged by Renamo in the rural areas. Hence 1983-1984 was to prove 
to be a watershed year for Mozambique (Nowicki 1989: 20). The FRELIMO 
government brought about a number of changes, both in terms of Mozambique's 
international position as well as to domestic policies. 
Changes on the international front 
In a speech made in 1984, President Samora Machel said that by 1982 it had become 
clear to the FRELIMO leadership that the country's isolation had to be broken 
(Hermele 1990: 2). To this end, the government, in 1982, began to make contact with 
the IMP and World Bank with a view to acquiring membership, and hence getting 
increased access to multilateral funding. By 1984, Mozambique had been admitted to 
both organisations, and although this did not in itself lead to immediate financial 
assistance, it did open a lot of other doors. Membership of the IMP had been a 
condition attached to the granting of a lot of other aid, as well as to debt rescheduling 
by the Paris and London Clubs (Hermele 1990: 2; Hanlon 1991: 29) with whom the 
government also entered into negotiations. However, in order to be admitted to the 
IMF and World Bank, concessions had to be made. The pressures to make these 
concessions were quite subtle, but related to negotiating an end to the war and 
making economic policy changes, both of which will be described below. Other steps 
were also taken in an effort to improve the country's international position, and these 
too required the FRELIMO government to make concessions. In particular, the 
government in 1982 accepted the previously problematic Berlin Clause (Kuhne 1989: 
183), and by 1984 Mozambique was a signatory to the Lome Convention, opening it 
up to EEC trade and aid (Adam 1988: 189). 
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Partly as a result of international pressure but also realising the role played by the war 
in undermining the economy and helping bring about the crisis in the first place, the 
government also tried to cut Renamo off at its source by making a deal with South 
Africa, Renamo's principle backers. Negotiating with South Africa was, in many 
respects, repugnant to the FRELIMO government given their strong opposition to 
apartheid, their support for liberation movements, including the ANC, and their role 
as a Front Line State and member of SADCC. However, given their inability to 
overcome the challenge from Renamo on a political or military level, they were forced 
to take diplomatic steps in order to achieve this. Hence in 1983 the FRELIMO 
government entered into talks with the South African government and in March 1984 
signed the Nkomati Accord. According to the terms of the agreement, both sides 
undertook lito forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation of 
irregular forces or armed bands". The Accord also proscribed the provision of transit 
routes or the logistical support of such groups (Metz 1986: 495- 498). 
In making the Accord, the South African government was attempting to deprive the 
African National Congress (ANC) of support from FRELIMO and, particularly of 
bases in southern Mozambique (Davies 1987: 9). The Mozambicans saw the Accord 
as the obvious way of cutting Renamo off at its roots. However, there was also strong 
international political pressure on the government to reach a settlement with South 
Africa. In general terms, the FRELIMO government believed that it would ease the 
international environment in which they had to operate, particularly with respect to 
the US. FRELIMO veterans interviewed by John Saul argued that lithe neutralisation 
of American hostility was front and centre in the calculations that underlay the 
signing of the Nkomati Accord" (quoted in Saul 1990a: 22). More specifically, the 
reaching of a peace agreement was both essential to the continuation of 
Mozambique's talks with the IMP and World Bank (Ottaway 1988a: 203) as well as 
being, along with membership of the IMP, part of the conditions behind Mozambique 
getting "access to concessionary financing and debt rescheduling" (Hermele 1990: 2) 
which was crucial in view of its severe debt crisis. 
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FRELIMO's Fourth Party Congress 1983 
But it was not only with regard to Mozambique's international position that changes 
were made. Partly in response to international pressure (Ottaway 1988b: 217) and 
partly coming out of the substantial and fundamental criticisms levelled at 
government economic policy at the Fourth Party Congress in 1983, numerous internal 
policy reforms were made. Delegates vociferously criticised the over-emphasis on the 
role of the state, particularly in agriculture, and the subsequent neglect of the 
small-scale family sector. The inefficiencies of the state run marketing system and the 
government's stress on very large projects were also attacked. Similarly criticised were 
the state's investment policies, which de-emphasised replacement investment, thus 
contributing to breakdowns, as well as their pricing policies, which kept producer 
prices very low (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 25). Problems were also raised with the way 
that planning took place, especially the way that it occurred on a national rather than 
a provincial or district level and with the way that policy was generated at the top 
levels of government and then filtered down, rather than the other way around. It was 
argued that this was the result of the persistence in state structures of "methods that 
marginalise the people in the resolution of social and economic problems" (Partido 
Frelimo 1983a: 25) rather than a problem with specific policies. 
The Congress documents recommended a greater role in agriculture for small scale 
and private farmers, price liberalization, and greater efficiency in management and 
planning. However, they also reiterated the importance of the state sector and the 
need to "protect and enlarge" it, as well as stressing the need for more emphasis on 
Party control of the state and economy (Partido Frelimo 1983b: 18-34). In fact the 
Congress as a whole, despite the context against which it took place, reflected a basic 
optimism, and there is little talk of far reaching structural changes or dramatic 
reversals in policy. 
Similarly there is little talk of political changes apart from strengthening the party, 
particularly in the rural areas (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 83). The Central Committee 
was enlarged to accommodate new members from the provinces (Keesings 
Contemporary Archives 29, 12, 1983: 32538), but it was argued that the past six years 
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experience had shown that the decision to form a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party had 
been the correct one, "strategically and tactically" (Partido Frelimo 1983a: 83). The 
party hence reaffirmed its commitment to develop and consolidate its "relations with 
the international working class movement and with other Marxist-Leninist parties, our 
natural allies" (Partido Frelimo 1983b: 31). 
Despite the retention of important elements of the status quo, the reforms of 
1983-1984 do represent quite a substantial change of course on the part of the 
government. The causes of the changes are clear: a serious debt crisis and an ever 
worsening economy combined with the realisation on the part of the government that 
Renamo constituted a very real threat with which it could not deal on a purely 
military level. However, it is important to see the changes as strategic moves on the 
part of the FRELIMO government They knew that Mozambique's position vis a vis 
important western donors had to be improved and that it carried a price. This 
included membership of both the World Bank and the IMF which they had 
heretofore resisted in an effort to maintain their independence and carry out the 
socialist transformation that had been envisaged. The costs also included the Nkomati 
Accord, which, although it carried with it the hope of an end to the ever escalating 
war, was also linked to relieving international pressure. The policy changes introduced 
at the Fourth Congress need to be seen in a similar light These too had their primary 
genesis in the problems inherent within and peoples dissatisfaction with especially the 
agricultural policies. However aspects of some of the new policies were an important 
part of Mozambique's entry into IFI's (Ottaway 1988b: 217), while at the same time 
the FRELIMO government was trying to retain the basic principles they had 
introduced in 1975 and 1977. FRELIMO was thus aware of the very real international 
pressure being placed upon it and the limited nature of its options. It thus acted to 
maximise these, trying to balance its cost with the gains it hoped to reap of an 
improved foreign capital flow, an end to the war with Renamo and a halt to the 
economic decline. 
The short-term effects of the changes were improvements in Mozambique's 
international position and the amelioration of its relationships with a number of 
89 
western nations and bodies. The immediate results of this was an easing of the 
country's debt crisis by the London and Paris Clubs, and increased international 
assistance, for example from the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) (Ottaway 1988b: 211). In the longer term, the changes resulted in the 
attempted introduction of some of the new policies mooted at the Fourth Congress 
and ongoing dialogue between the FRELIMO government and the World Bank and 
IMP. 
Second Period: Consolidating Reform, 1983-1986 
During the period 1983 to 1986, the government tried to introduce the changes 
coming out of the Fourth Congress. However, their implementation was severely 
inhibited by the security situation which had improved little after Nkomati, and 
indeed got worse through the mid 1980s. Part of the result was that the economy did 
not improve, despite the new easier international environment. On this front the 
government continued in its lengthy negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. 
These and other continuing contacts were widely hailed as representing a fundamental 
change in the FRELIMO government's ideological orientation, specifically as a "tum 
to the west". However, during this time Mozambique steadily maintained its previously 
close relationships with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. 
In 1984, soon after the Congress, the government published a Programme of 
Economic Action (P.A.E.). This, following the discussion at Congress, stressed the 
need to improve production and productivity, efficiency in management, and trade, 
particularly in the rural areas. The P AE proposed numerous policy changes toward 
these ends, as well as stressing the need to deal with emergency issues, especially 
serious food shortages (Mozambique 1984a: 1-9; World Bank 1985: ix). The 
government also introduced a new code on foreign investment. This was an effort to 
"stimulate and promote" foreign investment and was far more accommodating than 
previous legislation although it did reserve some sectors specifically for the state 
(Mozambique 1984b). 
The P AE was followed up by talks between government and private sector 
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representatives in 1985. These also emphasised the need for more realistic prices, 
more autonomy for management and for more fleXibility in foreign exchange 
allocation (World Bank 1985: ix). However, apart from some price and trade 
liberalisation, the break-up of a number of the larger state farms (Ottaway 1988a: 
207) and the decentralisation of some of the economic planning with more power 
being given to individual ministries (Mackintosh 1986: 572), relatively few of these 
reforms were ever implemented. Some commentators have ascnbed this as being 
partly due to the government's lack of administrative capacity and to the FRELIMO 
leadership's lack of commitment to the changes (Ottaway 1988b). It is certainly true 
that the administration, as descnbed in the previous chapter, was weak and that the 
state lacked the necessary reach and capacity to implement a lot of the policies 
planned at the central level. In this context, carrying out reform would be likely to be 
particularly difficult, given the need to explain the changes and policy reversals and 
bureaucratic inertia and confusion. It is also true that the government's attitude to the 
reforms was complex. As discussed above, FRELIMO had not undergone a road to 
Damascus experience. The changes were strategic and pragmatic and designed to fit 
goals to capacities, whilst at the same time improving Mozambique's international 
standing so as to ease the debt problem. However, whilst both these issues are 
important, they both pale in significance compared to the continuing war, which made 
even limited implementation of the reforms impossible. 
Despite the fact that, following the terms of the Nkomati Accord, the Mozambican 
government took action against ANC members in the country, searching a number 
of residences, forcing a number of personnel to leave the country and allowing only 
diplomatic representation (Davies 1987: 9), South Africa did not keep its part of the 
bargain. 
Documents captured by Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops in a raid on Renamo 
headquarters at Gorongosa in 1985, point clearly to the South African military having 
made a considerable effort prior to Nkomati to provide Renamo with large amounts 
of material in order to keep it going for some time, as well as continuing support 
afterwards (Metz 1986: 498; Isaacman 1988: 25; Davies 1987: 4). 
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Hence the war continued unabated and by 1986 had worsened considerably (Munslow 
1988: 28). The costs were enormous, not only in terms of the ever larger slice of the 
budget that had to be devoted to defence, but also in terms of lives, infrastructure and 
lost income. By the end of 1986 the government estimated that the war had directly 
cost over 100 000 lives. Further, it had resulted in the destruction of 500 rural medical 
units, the removal of over 300 000 pupils from school, over $5 billion in direct 
economic damage and an estimated $568 million in lost foreign income (Africa 
Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 24, 1, February 1987: 8551). In addition, many 
hundreds of thousands of people had been displaced as both internal and external 
refugees, and the lives of many others had been seriously affected by the fighting, 
often by famine caused by the disruption of production. 
The less direct cost of the continuing war was the fact that the policy reforms 
proposed at the Fourth Congress and embodied in the PAE were not implemented. 
This, combined with the escalating rural disruption and dislocation, meant that 
despite the fact that things had looked, in 1984, as though they were about to 
improve, they began to get steadily worse (Hanlon 1991: 31). 
Production of most crops fell during 1983, 1984 and 1985. By 1986, overall production 
had dropped by a third over 1982, exports and foreign exchange earnings were 
dramatically down and the debt service ratio had nearly doubled (see Isaacman 1988: 
28- 29 and Kyle 1991: 639), to the point where Mozambique'S debt repayments were 
double what it earned from its exports (Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 24, 
1, February 1987: 8551). By mid 1986, more than 3,5 million Mozambicans (or 
roughly a quarter of the population) were suffering from acute food shortages 
(Isaacman 1988: 29), and by early 1987 this had risen to four million as a result of the 
rapidly deteriorating security situation (Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 24, 
3, April 1987: 8620). 
During this time aid flows to Mozambique had increased considerably (see Hanlon 
1991: 61). Negotiations between the FRELIMO government and the World Bank and 
IMF also continued. During 1985 and 1986, they had, between them, sent 27 
92 
delegations to Mozambique (Hanlon 1991: 60), and by mid 1987 the talks had 
reached the advanced stage (Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 24, 4, May 
1987: 8657). This was despite a number of problems, including dissent within 
FRELIMO over the issue. Politburo member Sergio Vieira expressed some of the 
opposition to closer ties with the IMP by saying "let no one come here in the name 
of the IMP or the World Bank and spit on the blood that we have shed" (quoted in 
Africa Contemporary Recor": 1985-1986: B693). There were also problems between the 
government and the IFI's who demanded even more far reaching policy reforms than 
the government had put forward in their position papers and programmes (IMP 1986: 
2). There is some evidence that the FRELIMO government was to an extent 
pressurised into an agreement (which came in 1987) by bilateral donors linking 
further aid to the reaching of such an agreement (see Africa Research Bulletin, 24, 
5, June 1987: 8519). 
Mozambique's activities on the international front were widely interpreted as a "turn" 
to the west. In September 1985 Samora Machel visited the US for the first time. The 
visit resulted in the granting of emergency aid which was defended by the Reagan 
administration as "responding to Machel's desire to move from socialist domestic 
policies and reliance on Moscow" (Africa Research Bulletin, 22, 9, October 1985: 7803). 
Similarly, Cabinet reshuffles carried out in mid 1984 were seen as a "move away from 
Russia" and the replacement of Marxist hardliners with "pragmatists" (Economist 291, 
7347,23-29 June 1984). However, it is clear that the US in particular did not see their 
role only as "responding" to Mozambique's "move", but also in more active terms. The 
new policy and aid was seen as being instrumental in "weaning Mozambique away 
from the Soviets" (Secretary of State, George Schultz quoted in Africa Contemporary 
Record 1985-1986: B678). The FRELIMO government, for its part, showed its 
awareness of the extent to which their relationship to the Soviet Union was linked to 
aid and assistance from the west and their own willingness to play on these fears in 
order to increase assistance. With reference to getting the west to pressurise South 
Africa into halting support for Renamo in 1983, Chissano, then Foreign Minister 
argued that "if international measures are not taken to stop South Africa from 
escalating its aggression, Mozambique may require more military assistance from 
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socialist countriesll (Economist 286, 7282, 26 March 1983: 63). 
Despite this sort of dialogue however, FRELIMO denied that Mozambique has 
changed its international orientation. Chissano, who took over the Presidency in 1986 
following Machel's death in a plane crash, denied that Mozambique had llturned to 
the Westll and argued instead that the West had, at last, turned to Mozambique 
(Africa contemporary Record 1986-1987: B693). In fact Mozambique's ties with the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc remained very much intact, reaching a peak in 
1987 (Mozambique Information OjJice News Review 142, December 1989: 7). Soviet 
assistance to Mozambique improved under Gorbachev (Isaacman 1987: 26) and over 
the period 1985-1987, military aid from both the Soviet Union and East Germany 
increased noticeably (Africa Research Bulletin 24, 9, October 1987: 8649). These facts 
were not lost on the US, who, despite their public embracing of Mozambique's 
changes imposed new restrictions on aid. In 1986 the Reagan administration placed 
a new ban on Mozambique's access to certain types of US based loans by virtue of 
its being a Marxist-Leninist state. By late 1987 a lot of potential US aid was still being 
held up by Congressional opposition (Africa Contemporary Record 1987-1988: B640). 
Hence the period from 1983 to 1986 saw not so much the introduction of new 
reforms but the working through of those made earlier. However, during this time, 
the causes that drove the government into making the reforms in the first place, the 
war and the economic crisis, continued to worsen. This, no doubt, helped give extra 
momentum to the government in its negotiation with IFI's, which FRELIMO 
continued in an effort to create an easier international economic environment. By 
1986 they had started to reap some of the rewards of their work in the form of debt 
rescheduling and increased aid flows. 
However, they continued to remain under considerable pressure, particularly from the 
Reagan administration in the United States who showed itself wiling to use aid in an 
instrumental fashion, not only to IIweanll Mozambique from its traditional socialist 
alliances, but also in an effort to dissuade it from maintaining its Marxist-Leninist 
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status. The demands made of Mozambique and the shifts interpreted in its policies 
seem to grow the more changes were made. This is partly due to increased 
expectations on the part, for example of the US, but it is also linked to Mozambique's 
growing need for even more assistance, and hence increased vulnerability, as a result 
of the worsening war and economy. 
Third Period: Structural Adjustment and the PRE 1987-1990 
Mozambique's third period of reform began in mid 1987 when the government's 
negotiations with the IMP came to fruition with the institution of a structural 
adjustment programme, the Programa de Reabilitacao Economica (PRE). The results 
of the programme have been mixed, with some recovery in the economy, but at the 
cost of a serious dependence on outside aid and continuing problems in meeting debt 
repayment obligations. The economic recovery has also been adversely affected by 
some of the social tensions generated by the structural adjustment package as well as 
the continuing war with its attendant rural destruction and dislocation. These 
problems were exacerbated by the substantial decline in assistance from the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc as a result of Eastern Europe's political flux and 
economic uncertainty in the late 1980s. The overall result has been an increase in 
Mozambique's vulnerability, especially toward its major Western donors in the context 
of an ever harsher international environment. 
The Programa de Reabilitacao Economica (PRE) 
By mid 1987 the government had reached an agreement with the World Bank and 
IMF, according to which Mozambique would initially receive $35 million from the 
IMF and $90 million from the World Bank, as well as the promise of a lot more 
bilateral aid and debt rescheduling (Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series 4, 24, 
May 1987: 8670). The structural adjustment programme which the Mozambican 
government had to implement in return, contained substantial monetary, fiscal and 
planning changes. The objectives of the programme were: 
to improve the economic and financial management systems, paying particular 
attention to banking and the management of foreign debt, 
adjustments to the exchange rate so as to make it more realistic and exports more 
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competitive, 
to liberalise trade practices, and in particular, to allow for more freedom in the use 
of foreign exchange. 
to seek debt relief, 
to reduce the government deficit by decreasing spending and reforming the tax 
system. 
to reduce domestic liquidity by tightening up the money supply through the banking 
system. 
to liberalise the price policy, with more realistic prices and fewer fixed prices, 
to reduce the degree of administrative allocation of resources and allow for more 
freedom in the distribution system. 
There are also specific sectoral reforms focussing on, m particular, agriculture, 
industry and fiscal policy (Mozambique 1987: 15-18). 
There was some debate about the extent to which the programme represents a typical 
structural adjustment package or not. The Mozambican government claims that 
crucial aspects of their own adjustment options have been included in the programme 
so as to make it different from the norm. These are said to relate to the provision of 
social services such as health care, the timing of the currency devaluations, the degree 
of involvement of the private sector, the timing of repayments and IMF inspection of 
the economy (Mozambique 1987; Southern African Political and Economic Monthly 2, 
9, June 1989: 4; Africa Contemporary Record 1986-1987: B695). However, most 
commentators, for example Hermele (1990: 12) and Tarp (1990: 176) argue that it is 
indeed a traditional IMP adjustment programme. The FRELIMO government's 
claims probably have more to do with trying to maintain a semblance of autonomy 
and control over the introduction of the PRE. With reference to the programme, 
President Chissano declared that "basically we had started it and developed it 
ourselves and this made it possible for us to give it a certain orientation." (quoted in 
Southern African Political and Economic Monthly 2, 9, June 1989: 4). However, the 
World Bank and IMF did seem to take the lead in policy formulation for the PRE, 
as is shown by the fact that most of the policy prescriptions appeared in their 
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documents before appearing in those produced by the Mozambican government (Torp 
1989: 59). For example, during the 1985 consultations with the government, the IMF 
argued that although security was a crucial and limiting factor, more llfundamental 
changes in economic policy were required", particularly to monetary policy, planning 
and prices (IMP 1986: 2). 
In either case, it was hoped that the policies prescribed in the PRE would halt the 
decline in the economy and that the GDP would achieve 5% growth per annum by 
1990, that exports would be increased and inflation decreased (Mozambique 1987: 
15). 
The government hoped to achieve these ends and implement the policies contained 
in the PRE by reducing centralised administrative controls in the economy and 
encouraging private sector participation, by giving a greater role to the market, by 
putting more stress on economic performance and improving the quality of policy 
making (Torp 1989: 50). 
A central aspect of the changes was the devaluation of the metrical, always a crucial 
aspect in IMP related programmes. Two large devaluations were carried out in the 
first six months of the programme leading to a ten-fold decrease in the value of the 
currency (Africa Research Bulletin 1987: 8766). Devaluations were then carried out, on 
average, twice a year. Price reforms were also implemented, with the prices of some 
commodities increasing by over 500% as a result (Africa Research Bulletin 1988: 9070). 
The price increases also reflected the reduction, and in some cases the removal, of 
state subsidies on certain products, and to state firms. However, the subsidy cuts were 
quite modest (Torp 1989: 52). In order to keep pace with the devaluations, increased 
prices and subsidy cuts, wages for urban workers were increased, though not on the 
same level as the prices have risen (Southern African Economist 2, 2, April-May 1989: 
15-17). 
Changes were made to the management of state firms. Far more emphasis was placed 
on profitability, and their deficits were no longer automatically financed by the central 
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bank (Africa Research Bulletin 1987: 8551). Many other state firms were privatised, 
with only roughly half of all industrial enterprises in state hands at the end of the 
programme, compared to over three quarters before the PRE was instituted (Africa 
Research Bulletin 1991: 10274). The foreign exchange system was also liberalised with 
firms producing for export being allowed to keep a portion of the forex they earned 
for reinvestment and purchase of inputs (Africa Research Bulletin 1990: 10152). 
From the beginning there was a certain amount of pessimism about what the PRE 
would achieve. Even the IMF was not overly optimistic about it. In particular, they 
were aware of the problems posed by the war. An IMF report argued that "even these 
strong policy initiatives will probably not be sufficient to yield a sustainable growth 
and balance of payments outcome. Nevertheless the reform and adjustment measures 
provide a framework for more effective utilization of both domestic and external 
resources in support of structural and institutional changes" (quoted in Hermele 1988: 
18). 
But some success was achieved. The decline in GDP was halted and, in 1987, the first 
year of the programme, the GDP grew by 4%. In 1988 and 1989 the GDP grew by 
a further 4,5% per annum (Bowen 1990: 227). 
As an indirect result of the programme, Mozambique's access to foreign capital was 
also improved. Aid inflows increased dramatically and the government was able 
successfully to conclude debt rescheduling arrangements with the Paris and London 
Clubs on "extremely favourable terms", far better than those they had received from 
the two organisations in 1984 prior to their agreement with the IMF (Africa Research 
Bulletin, Economic Series, 4, 6, July 1987: 8756; Bowen 1990: 227). 
These developments were partly a result of Mozambique's constantly improving image 
with the West. In 1987 a US spokesperson commented admiringly that the PRE 
"policies ... represent one of the most far-reaching programs of economic restructuring 
undertaken by any African country" (United States of America 1987: 5). 
Mozambique's economic policy changes continued to be seen by the US government 
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as linked to a shift in its political leanings, particularly in terms of its orientation 
toward the Soviet Union. Chester Crocker praised Mozambique's "hesitant, yet by all 
evidence, genuine defection from the Soviet orbit", which, he argued, proved that 
capitalism and the market subverted totalitarianism more than did guns (Facts and 
Reports 17, 6, June 1987). He clearly saw the US's aid efforts as being instrumental 
in this task, saying that "the Soviets have been dealt a severe setback in Mozambique 
because of what we am' other western countries have been doing" (USA 1987: 21). 
In response to these sorts of perceptions, the Mozambican government again denied 
moving toward the west. Teodato Hungwana, then Information Minister, argued that 
"Mozambique is not shifting from one side to another, from East to West, we are 
staying at the same point, defending our independence" (The Times 7 March 1987). 
Chissano also denied moving toward the west, but agreed that the relations between 
Mozambique and especially the US were much improved, which he put down to the 
West having changed its position and "understanding" Mozambique far more (in 
Mozambiquejile, 150, January 1989: 12). 
However, the PRE also had its disadvantages, important amongst which were the 
social tensions to which it gave rise. The social costs of the programme proved to be 
severe (see Marshall 1988) both in terms of the increased costs to the public of health 
and education services which were cut back and were no longer free, and in terms of 
the rise in the cost of living. As a result of the currency devaluations, subsidy cuts and 
the lifting of price barriers, by 1988 basic commodity prices had risen by 570%. Urban 
consumers bore the brunt of these increases (Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 
25,3, April 1988, 9070) as it was in the cities that PRE policies had most effect (Torp 
1989: 55). According to the General Secretary of the OTM, by 1989, over 16 000 
workers had been made redundant as a result of the PRE (Economist Intelligence Unit 
1, 1990: 24). 
Not surprisingly, by 1988 there was already growing "popular political irreverence" 
toward the government and FRELIMO (Roesch 1988: 8) and a general "erosion" of 
FRELIMO's legitimacy amongst urban dwellers (Hermele 1988: 21). By late 1989 and 
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early 1990 there was widespread student and worker demonstrations outside party 
structures (Economist Intelligence Unit 1, 1990: 24; Africa Research Bulletin, 27, 1, 
February 1990: 9547). One result of this unrest flowing out of the restrictive economic 
measures introduced under PRE was that the secret police, SNASP, vigilance was 
stepped up (USA 1987: 118). 
A further indirect consequence of the PRE was the noticeable increase in corruption, 
connected to the vastly increased amounts of foreign aid flowing into the country as 
well as the activities of the multitudes of NGO's (see Hanlon 1991: 228-238). This 
both affected the government's relationships with donors but also the state structures 
themselves. One commentator argued that nobody knew the real extent of corruption 
in the army (Mafeje 1989: 42). By early 1989, Chissano was speaking out against 
corruption in state structures (Mozambiquejile 154, May 1989: 8) and by the end of 
that year it was being debated in the national assembly (Mozambiquejile 162, January 
1990: 4). 
Even FRELIMO itself was not immune from some of the side-effects of the PRE. In 
1987 anti-white sentiment and tensions surfaced within the top ranks of FRELIMO 
(Africa Contemporary Record 1987- 1988: B623), due no doubt in part to some of the 
problems associated with implementing such policy reversals. 
The effects of the war on the PRE 
But the problems were not confined to the urban areas and the party. The security 
situation continued to be a significant problem. In late 1986 there had been a massive 
escalation of the war (Hanlon 1991: 33) and by 1987 Renamo claimed to control over 
85% of the country (Africa Research Bulletin, 24,2, March 1987: 8406) and, although 
the extent to which this control was at all meaningful is open to dispute, it does give 
an indication of their activity and an idea of the degree to which state control of the 
rural areas was open to question. In mid 1987 Chissano carried out a number of 
reforms within the military, bringing in a lot of new blood, particularly at top 
leadership level. Many of the most senior officers were veterans of the liberation 
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struggle and, it was felt, not ideally suited to new methods and tactics (Africa Research 
Bulktin, 24, 6, July 1987: 8540). 
These changes did seem to have a positive effect. By 1988 the military situation had 
started improving for the government (Africa Contemporary Record 1987-1988: B626). 
By 1989 there was apparently a "stalemate" in the war in the rural areas, with no side 
being able to gain a permanent, decisive advantage. However, by 1990 things had 
again started to improve for the government (Hanlon 1991: 34). 
What these broad perspectives on the military balance disguise, however, is the extent 
to which the war in the rural areas persisted. Renamo continued seriously to disrupt 
rural production, marketing and transport networks, making huge areas of the country 
economically inviable and no-go areas for government and development officials. The 
majority of Mozambicans remained "trapped in a nightmare of chaotic violence" 
(Meldrum 1988: 24). The number of people seriously affected by the war actually 
increased during this period (see table below) and by December 1990, a World Bank 
report described almost half the population as facing starvation as a result of the war 
(Keesings Contemporary Archives 36, 12, December 1990: 37909). 
People seriously affected by the war (millions) 
CATEGORY 1986 1988 1989 1990 
Refugees outside Mozambique 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.0 
Displaced within Mozambique 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.0 
Affected (production capacity reduced 2.5 2.2 2.9 2.4 
Urban people needing food aid 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.7 
TOTAL 6.3 6.6 8.7 9.1 
% of population 47% 47% 60% 62% 
(adapted from Hanlon 1991: 38) 
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FRELIMO's refusal to negotiate 
Despite the seriousness of the situation and the inability of the army to clear the rural 
areas of the Renamo threat, the FRELIMO government consistently refused to enter 
into direct negotiations with Renamo in order to bring an end to the war. During 
1986 Chissano had made a number of tough speeches about the prospect of 
negotiations, saying that he would only negotiate with the people controlling Renamo 
(Facts and Reports 16, 4, November 1986). In 1987 when the Catholic Church had 
called for negotiations in a pastoral letter, Chissano had publicly chastised them 
(Africa Contemporary Record 1987-1988: B626), although a year later in 1988 he did 
agree to allow Church representatives to meet with Renamo outside Mozambique, 
and in late 1987 had offered a full amnesty to all Renamo rebels who surrendered 
(see Schneidman 1991: 3). 
It was not only the fact that Renamo was seen to be controlled from outside 
Mozambique that caused FRELIMO to reject the notion of talks. The FRELIMO 
government also had problems with the violence and intimidation with which Renamo 
operated (Economist Intelligence Unit, 4, 1989: 20). At the opening of the People's 
Assembly in January 1989, Chissano stressed that there would be no negotiations with 
Renamo, saying that "The people will not allow us to talk to assassins" (Soutmean, 5, 
30, August 1990: 223). 
To some extent these denials and the portrayal of Renamo as an immoral, brutal 
creature of outside interests was probably a standard government ploy, designed to 
mobilise opposition to Renamo and emphasise the difference between them and the 
government as well as further decrease any legitimacy they may have enjoyed. To a 
certain degree there also seems to be an element of the government not wanting to 
lose face by suddenly backing down and recognising Renamo after all the years of 
seeing and explaining them as not having an existence in their own right. In addition, 
the growth of Renamo and the degree to which it took on a life of its own and hence 
became a force that had to be directly reckoned with, possibly took many members 
of the leadership by surprise. However, there is more than mere propaganda to the 
FRELIMO's leadership's attitude toward Renamo and negotiations. It is impossible 
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to read government documents and policy statements without getting a sense of the 
sincerity with which Renamo and their activities were rejected at the most basic level. 
They were after all very closely connected, particularly in their early days, to the 
South African military, and their methods of operating were particularly brutal, as 
described in the previous chapter. Hence the FRELIMO government's hesitance to 
enter into negotiations with Renamo and their constant denials that this would occur. 
The Effects of the PRE and the Continuing War 
The war and destabilisation thus continued, with serious consequences for the 
economy. The launch of the PRE in 1987 had arrested the serious economic decline 
of the mid 1980s, but by 1990 the economic growth rate had slowed down enormously 
and was lower than at any point since the implementation of the programme (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 28, 2, March 1991: 10296). Most economic indicators, particularly 
marketed agricultural production, were showing a sharp decline (Africa Research 
Bulletin 1991: 10296). The trade balance got steadily worse through the PRE period 
(see Kyle 1991: 639) and by 1990, exports continued to decline (Africa Research 
Bulletin, Economic Series, 27, 1, February 1990: 9837). Inflation was a serious problem 
and was as high as 160% in 1987 in the early stages of the programme and never 
dropped below 40% during most of the PRE period (Aft:ica Research Bulletin, 
Economic Series, 25, 5, June 1988: 9140). Government spending increased 
considerably during the PRE, by 221 % in the first year (Africa Research Bulletin 1987: 
8551), and by the beginning of 1990 there were actually more state functionaries than 
there had been at the start of the PRE (Mozamhiquejile 164, March 1990: 15) 
As descnbed above, the war played an important role in the inability of the PRE to 
bring about more than some short term success. Faults within the actual 
conceptualisation of the programme were also responsible, particularly its emphasis 
on price reform, monetary and management changes and its consequent neglect of 
deeper, structural issues (for example, see Tarp 1991). Problems within FRELIMO, 
including opposition to the programme as well as problems in the execution of some 
of the programmes are also partly to blame (see Ottaway 1988b). However, a serious 
contributory factor has been the extent to which the whole PRE has been structured 
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around external aid and loans. 
Much of the early growth achieved during the PRE occurred not because of 
improvements to the economic structure or policies but because of the "massive 
injection of foreign resources" (Torp 1989: 54) to which the PRE gave rise (see Africa 
Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 24, 2, March 1987: 8586) . Aid was particularly 
important when it came to the provision of food. During the PRE period, between 
80-90% of all Mozambique's grain needs were imported (Kyle 1991: 645) and a lot 
of the general economic activity was associated with aid and the activities of the up 
to 180 Non Governmental Organisations (NGO's) that were largely responsible for 
administering it (Hanlon 1991: 64; Economist 314, 7648, 3 March 1990: 49). Reginald 
Green aptly described the economy as being "donor driven" (quoted in Hanlon 1991: 
250). 
By as early as the financial year 1988-1989, foreign aid accounted for 76% of 
Mozambique's GNP, compared to a sub-Saharan average of only 11%. Not 
surprisingly aid officials and business people in Maputo were beginning to refer to the 
country as the "Donors Republic of Mozambique" (Facts and Reports, 21, C, February 
1991). 
This reliance had two interconnected results. Firstly, it seriously deprived the 
FRELIMO government of a lot of autonomy in decision making, particularly with 
regard to economic policy. This occurred both because of the sheer influence that 
controlling the purse strings gave especially to the IFI's who, as Bowen put it "have 
eroded the governments options for self determination" (Bowen 1990 217) but also 
because of the parallel structures that many donors established which had the effect 
of weakening and undermining the government (Hanlon 1991: 248-258). In addition 
the unreliability of their income combined with the fact that much of it had been tied 
to specific uses by the donors meant that the government lost much of their capacity 
for long-term planning. The Planning ministry, long one of the largest and most 
important, was eclipsed by the Finance ministry, and state planning was reduced to 
"specific projects and investments" (Egero 1989: 43). 
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Connected to this loss of control in the face of outside pressure and having to 
implement tough and unpopular policies, was the increase in the "commandism" of 
the state (Mittelman 1990: 18). This even filtered down to the lowest levels of the 
state structures (see Roesch 1988: 28) which as a result became plagued by problems 
associated with a lack of accountability (Mozambiquejile 162, January 1990: 5). 
Secondly, the reliance on foreign aid caused the government to become extremely 
vulnerable to the continued flow of aid. This is particularly so because most of the aid 
had come in the form of repayable loans so that new aid increasingly had to go to pay 
debt, with the result that after 1984 the net capital flow was often negative (Facts and 
Reports, 21, C, February 1991). Mozambique found itself becoming increasingly 
indebted as the reform period progressed. Its total external debt almost doubled in 
the five years from 1982 to 1987, and then more than doubled again in the two years 
to 1989, to $4,3 billion. Hence it increasingly impossible for Mozambique to pay its 
debts (in Mittelman 1990: 18). 
Also, the government's ability to attract new aid declined after reaching a high in 
1987 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2, 1990: 31). Partly this has been because new 
emergencies elsewhere in the world have attracted donor attention and because of 
problems with corruption and theft of aid (Maier in Facts and Reports, 20, H, April 
1990; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2, 1990: 31). However, the two major reasons for the 
government's difficulties in being able to get new aid and in sustaining previous levels 
of assistance are the changes experience by Mozambique's allies, the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe and the increasing impatience on the part of donors with the 
political situation. 
The reduction of aid and military assistance from the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries, especially the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had, 
by 1990, become a serious issue for Mozambique. By early 1990 all types of support 
from Eastern Europe were sharply down on previous levels (Facts and Reports, 20, H, 
April 1990) and the former Soviet Union carried out severe cut backs in the oil 
credits granted to Mozambique. Soviet oil accounted for roughly two thirds of 
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Mozambique's needs, and although it was supplied at market prices, it was provided 
on credit so its reduction was a real blow to the Mozambican government. The 
Soviets also sought to review the cooperation treaty with Mozambique, which had 
come up for renewal in 1990 (Facts and Reports, 21, B, January 1991), and stressed 
that the new agreement would emphasise trade rather than aid (Southscan, 6, 1, 
January 1991: 6). Mozambique received a further blow when 18 000 of its migrant 
workers were repatriated from the former GDR following German unification in 1990 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2, 1990: 23; Mozambiquejile, 164, March 1990: 15), losing 
an approximate $16 million a year in migrant remittances as a result (Africa Research 
Bulletin, Economic Series, 27, 9, September 1990: 10114). 
However, by far the greatest role the former Soviet's and East Germans had had in 
Mozambique was with the military. Soviet military personnel began to withdraw in 
large numbers in 1989 and by 1990 over 550 of the approximately 800 military 
advisors had left (Africa Research Bulletin, 26, 6, June 1989: 9323; Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2, 1990: 23). The seriousness of this was heightened for the 
overstretched Mozambican military by the withdrawal of Tanzanian troops in 1988, 
and the suggestions of a possible reduction in the Zimbabwean military presence as 
Robert Mugabe came under domestic pressure to withdraw his troops from the 
country (Economist Intelligence Unit, 3, 1990: 21). 
Much of the shortfall in aid from Western donors occurred as a result of, what 
commentators have come to term "donor fatigue" (for example, Karl Maier in Facts 
and Reports, 20, H, April 1990). This was largely connected to the lack of progress on 
the political front, including the FRELIMO government's hesitation in negotiating 
directly with Renamo. According to US officials, it was made clear to President 
Chissano on his visit to the US in early 1990 further aid would depend on the 
outcome of the peace talks (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2, 1990, 23). Similarly, the 
"lukewarm attitude" of many donors to Mozambique's 1990 emergency aid appeal was 
interpreted as a "potent signal" that Western government's sympathy and support was 
waning as the country's political problems continued (Economist Intelligence Unit, 3, 
1990: 21) 
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The effects of these cutbacks was keenly felt by the government and served to 
heighten their feelings of vulnerability to their international donors. By as early as 
1988 the government was describing Mozambique's foreign debt as an "enormous 
burden" and by 1990 there was serious concern about shortfalls in even emergency aid 
(Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 25, 8, September 1988: 9256; 27, 1, February 
1990: 9837). In his budget speech to the People's Assembly in March 1991, Prime 
Minister Mario Machl.ilgo stressed FRELIMO's continued concern about 
Mozambique's reliance on foreign aid, specifically its "abnormality" and 
"uncontrolability" (Africa Research Bulletin, 28, 2, March 1991: 10296). 
The third period of reform thus saw the implementation of the first initiated in the 
early 1980s when contacts between the FRELIMO government and the World Bank 
and IMF were first initiated. The nature of the PRE combined with Mozambique's 
increasingly precarious economic position and its ever growing reliance on aid meant 
that to a large extent, although the government saw even these reforms in "tactical 
terms" (Loxley 1988: 5) they had effectively lost much of their control over them. 
However, in common with the previous reforms, they were interpreted as indicating 
Mozambique moving toward the west. To an extent this was true, but only by default 
as Mozambique's ties with the socialist world declined as the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe underwent political change and their own economic crises. This had 
two interconnecting effects. Firstly, it increased the competition for aid in the 
international arena, making Mozambique's task in attracting new aid even more 
difficult (see Chapter 1). Secondly, it seemed to help focus the attention of the 
donors, particularly the US, on Mozambique'S internal politics. Whilst previously aid 
had been used in an instrumental way in an effort largely to change Mozambique's 
external orientation, especially in removing it from its perceived "orbit" around 
Moscow, with the changes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, the 
emphasis seems to have shifted more to its internal policies, particularly to questions 
around the lack of political pluralism and its continued retention of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
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The failure of the PRE to address some of the structural problems affecting the 
economy and the lack of a really long term economic recovery in concert with the 
continuing war meant that Mozambique grew ever more reliant on external aid and 
hence ever more susceptible to the pressure being placed upon it to carry out political 
reform. Ironically, the economic and security crises and the tough policy reforms 
carried out under the PRE served, at the same time as they pushed Mozambique 
toward political reform, to increase political centralisation and commandism, leading 
if anything to a decline in democratic activity. 
Period Four: Political reform 1988-1991 
It was thus political issues that came to dominate the fourth period of reform, from 
1988 to 1991. The process started with the discussions leading up to the Fifth Party 
Congress held in 1989, and was followed by the debates around the new constitution 
introduced in 1990. Within these two forums a number of substantial changes were 
made, including the introduction of a multi-party system, substantial human rights 
improvements and alterations to Mozambique'S guiding ideology. In addition, direct 
negotiations were opened with Renamo. 
The Fifth Party Congress 1989 
Each of FRELIMO's four party congresses had signaled a significant turning point 
for Mozambique (Munslow & O'Keefe 1984: 16), and this was particularly true of the 
Fifth Congress held in 1989. It was scheduled to have taken place in 1988 but was 
postponed till the following year (African Contemporary Record, 1987-1988: B623). 
However, discussions for the Congress started late in 1988 with the preparation of 
draft theses for the actual congress. These set both the agenda and much of the tone 
for the Congress. The greatest emphasis in the draft theses was the call for national 
unity, but they also stressed the need for greater democracy, less emphasis on 
Marxism-Leninism and, especially, for peace, even if this involved negotiating with 
Renamo (Africa Research Bulletin, 27, 1, February 1990: 9547). 
One of the most striking aspects of the Congress was its change of tone compared to 
previous meetings. Commentators noted the extent to which the reports presented to 
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Congress were shorn of, as one put it, "left wing rhetoric" (see Africa Research Bulletin, 
26, 7, August 1989: 9343). The party dropped all references to Marxism-Leninism and 
made the decision to change the country's name from the People's Republic of 
Mozambique to the Republic of Mozambique. Although FRELIMO reaffirmed its 
commitment to socialism, the new programme was described as putting the country's 
problems on a "real framework" rather than the idealistic one which they perceived 
that they had been working with previously (Economist Intelligence Unit, 3, 1989: 20). 
This pragmatism was particularly reflected in the party's position on foreign policy. 
The new programme abandoned the concept of a "world anti-imperialist front" and 
no longer privileged the "international working class". Instead, it placed greater 
emphasis on Mozambique's immediate struggle, saying that FRELIMO applied "an 
independent foreign policy based on the defence of national interests, founded on real 
goals, and in the first place on the elimination of destabilisation, the eradication of 
terrorism, and the defence and reconstruction of the Mozambique nation" 
(Mozambiquejile, 157, August 1989: 15). 
The discussions at the Congress also stressed the need to open up the party and 
return to the broad front adopted during the liberation struggle (Hermele 1990: 31). 
Reference was made to problems experienced in the functioning of the party, 
particularly with respect to mass organisations, who complained of the party's 
"commandist" attitude toward them, and in the rural areas where over 300 party 
branches operated ineffectively if at all, despite the fact that party membership had 
increased by 82% since the Fourth Congress in 1983 (Mozambiquejile, 157, August 
1989: 9-11). Hence, changes were made to the party's definition of itself. It was 
transformed from being a ''vanguard of the peasant-worker alliance" to "a party which 
seeks to express the will and feelings of all the people". Although FRELIMO 
technically remained a "vanguard" party, membership was opened to practicing 
Muslims, Christians, private business people and polygynists in rural areas, so long as 
they held Mozambican citizenship (Mozambiquejile, 157, August, 1989: 14; Africa 
Research Bulletin, 26, 7, August 1989: 9343). In addition, the Central Committee was 
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expanded from 130 to 160 members (Africa Research Bulletin 26, 8, September 1989: 
9379). 
The Congress also addressed the question of the role of the state. It seems, from the 
draft theses presented to the Congress, that FRELIMO was trying to tread a fine line 
between maintaining its traditionally important role, especially in the economy, and 
withdrawing. Hence they argued that "the party must exert a 'leading role' in state and 
society but should not confuse its role with that of state bodies" (Mozambique 
Information Office News Review 143, 4, December 1988: 3). The report goes on to 
argue that "an irreplaceable task falls to the state", especially in promoting equality. 
It saw the state as continuing to play an important role in directing the economy, but 
allowing "greater administrative and financial autonomy to economic agents" (quoted 
in Hanlon 1991: 242). 
These sorts of semi-reversals and contradictions give a strong sense that more than 
just a search for national unity was going on at the Congress. Clearly it was also seen 
as having an important role to play in improving FRELIMO's image overseas and, to 
a lesser extent, to sell a number of political changes to its constituencies. The former 
purpose was obviously involved in the repeated references to state disinvolvement 
from society and the economy, and specifically in the change in tone and the switch 
away from Marxism-Leninism. Politburo member Jorge Rebelo, speaking to party 
members before the Congress said that there was "the problem of the United States. 
At a meeting between US Congressmen and President Chissano, the key point was: 
'Are you a Marxist?' If so, you are our enemy.''' (quoted in Hanlon 1991: 48). 
FRELIMO's efforts produced quick results, by the beginning of 1990, Mozambique 
had been removed from the list of countries banned from receiving certain types of 
US aid (Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 27, 1, February 1990: 9830). 
The way that the Congress was used as a means of "selling" previously made ideas to 
its members is shown by the fact that in strong contrast to previous congresses, the 
Fifth Congress was characterised by relatively little discussion and open democracy 
and a far greater proportion of it was held in secret, closed sessions (see for example 
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Hanlon 1991: 157). However, the Congress gave momentum to and officially set in 
motion two processes that were fundamentally to reshape Mozambican politics over 
the next two years: firstly the start of direct negotiations with Renamo and the 
drawing up of a new constitution. 
The Government Opens Direct Negotiations With Renamo 
A week prior to the Congress, FRELIMO had released a 12 point statement of 
principles for peace, as a way of normalising society. The statement was the means 
by which FRELIMO offered direct talks with Renamo, on the condition that they 
agreed, in principle, to renounce violence, recognise the legitimacy of FRELIMO as 
the government of Mozambique, and abide by the constitution. Daniel Arap Moi of 
Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe were named as potential mediators for the 
talks (Isaacman 1989: 56). At the party Congress, Chissano's plans for negotiations 
received full support, although there was concern that there should be "a peace that 
is not a reward for terrorism". Specifically, party members were concerned that 
Renamo should not be brought directly into the government, but FRELIMO's refusal 
to grant them the status of a party, both in the document and the discussions at 
Congress, temporarily removed this threat (Isaacman 1989: 57). 
Renamo released its own 16 point plan in response to FRELIMO's, soon afterward, 
in August 1989. In the document they argued that it was not their intention "to 
change the existing order in Mozambique through armed force" (point 6) and called 
for negotiations and recognition as a political force (points 5 and 16) (Southern 
African Political and Economic Monthly, December 1989/January 1990: 44). 
The new moves toward negotiations followed up on initiatives taken in August 1988 
by the Catholic Church, and sanctioned by the government. Leading Mozambican 
church representatives met with Renamo outside the country, but with not a great 
deal of success (Isaacman 1989: 58). The timing of the moves toward negotiations by 
FRELIMO, has been interpreted as being "determined by the emergence of a real, 
if fragile, political and military equilibrium between Renamo and Frelimo" and the 
beginning of Renamo's emergence as a "somewhat coherent political organisation" 
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following its first Congress at Gorongosa, inside Mozambique in June 1989 
(Schneidman 1991: 4). FRELIMO was also encouraged to start the process following 
moves on part of US to talk directly with Renamo, something that they had avoided 
previously (Schneidman 1991: 5-6). 
The first meeting between Renamo and government representatives took place on 
10-14 August 1989 in Nairobi. From the start the process was dogged by problems 
arising out of Renamo's continued questioning of the legitimacy of the FRELIMO 
government (which was one of its preconditions for negotiations) and FRELIMO's 
continued demands for a cease-fire, before talks could begin. Eventually, thanks to 
US intervention, some of these obstacles to real negotiations were circumvented and, 
after abandoning plans to meet in Malawi in June 1990, negotiations began in July 
1990 in Rome. They were hosted by the Santo Egidio Community, a Catholic lay 
organisation, and the Catholic church. Starting in mid 1990, the negotiations 
continued on from there, despite running into serious problems over the setting up 
of the Joint Verification Commission (JVC) to monitor the partial cease fire, Renamo 
objections to the presence of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique, and their unease 
with the reforms introduced by Chissano (Schneidman 1991: 6-8) 
The Drawing Up of a New Constitution and the Introduction of a Multi-Party System 
The Fifth Party Congress was also followed by discussions around the introduction of 
a new constitution. A draft constitution was prepared and discussed in meetings and 
amongst organisations all around the country. It generated considerable debate in 
intellectual circles, but there was general apathy and cynicism in the poorer suburbs 
of the large cities. According to the Mozambique Information Agency, AIM, a 
number of meetings in the Maputo high density suburbs had to be cancelled because 
poor attendance meant that there was no quorum (quoted in Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2, 1990: 20). 
The constitutional debates covered a whole range of issues including the role of the 
state and the nature of the economy. However, it was obvious from the start that the 
crucial question was going to be about the possible introduction of a multi-party 
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system (Mozambiquejile 167, June 1990: 8). The original draft of the constitution kept 
FRELIMO as the only legal party (see Africa Research Bulletin 27, 1, February 1990: 
9547), and this was the position that FREIIMO maintained during the discussions. 
FRELIMO spokespersons argued that not only did the majority of people prefer a 
single-party system, but more parties would only selVe to foster divisions and conflict 
within the country. 
Following their meeting in December 1989, the FRELIMO Central Committee 
released a statement saying that "the existence of several parties at this stage of the 
nation would feed divisions" (Economist IntelUgence Unit 1, 1990: 17). It went on to 
argue that "A single party system should not be imposed upon the people, but it is 
equally unacceptable for a multi-party system to be imposed upon the people by 
outside pressures or by violence". The report maintained that the central problem 
facing Mozambique was the "deepening of democracy, both inside the party, and in 
society at large, so as to broaden the space for a pluralism of ideas, and so that all 
citizens may feel free to express their views on questions that concern the nation, and 
may participate in the process of governing". To this end the report recommended the 
further expansion of party membership, the simplification of application procedures 
and the alteration of party structures to make them more flexible (Mozambiquejile 162, 
January 1990: 9-16). 
The Central Committee's opposition to the introduction of a mUlti-party system was 
shared by most of those participating in the debates, particularly by those in the rural 
areas (Mozambiquejile 168, July 1990: 8). However, a number of people in urban areas 
started to come out in favour of a multi-party system, including some influential 
groups, for example civil selVants and the Catholic church (Economist Intelligence Unit 
3, 1990: 23; Mozambiquejile 167, June 1990: 9-10). 
Despite this, by February 1990, President Chissano was still firmly opposed to a 
multi-party system, arguing again that "The realisation of national unity is a 
fundamental task for us all. The creation of several parties could present an obstacle 
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to the vital strategic objective" (in Africa Research Bulletin 27, 1, February 1990: 9547). 
However, in July 1990 the Politburo took the sudden decision to over-rule the Central 
Committee and begin the process of introducing a multi-party system. It took the 
decision after analysing the results of the nationwide debate, concluding that whilst 
"the majority of our people, a big majority, would be in favour of a one-party system 
for a variety of reasons", "there is also an appreciable number of people who are in 
favour of a multi-party system" and " we in the Political Bureau think that it is not 
right to prevent those citizens who want to form parties from doing so" (quoted in 
Southscan, 5, 30, 3 August 1990: 223). However, given the widespread opposition to 
the move, including from within the upper echelons of FRELIMO, it seems most 
likely that the multi-party system was introduced, like most of the reforms, for 
strategic reasons rather than because of popular consensus or pressure. 
In August the FRELIMO Central Committee followed the Politburo and voted 
unanimously, after 9 days of debate, in favour of a multi-party system. (Africa Research 
Bulletin 27, 8 August 1990: 9741). It released a statement saying that "It is the 
consensus of the Central Committee that the choice made by the Political Bureau is 
opportune, just and correct and in accordance with the reality in the country, in the 
region and in the world" (Mozambique Information Office: Special Report 1 1990: 2) 
The Central Committee also accepted the main outlines of the new electoral law 
which essentially disallowed parties without a national base, separatist, discriminatory 
or anti-democratic parties as well as those organised along ethnic and racial lines 
(Africa Research Bulletin 27, 8 August 1990: 9741). 
Renamo's response to the introduction of a multi-party system was instructive. They 
expressed their dissatisfaction at the introduction of a multi-party system and at the 
new laws relating to political parties, despite the fact that the call for an end to one 
party rule had always been at the centre of their rather thin political agenda. Even up 
until late 1989, in their negotiations, Renamo insisted on the introduction of a multi-
party system in response to FRELIMO's retention of the idea of a single party state 
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(Africa Research Bulletin 26, 12, January 1990: 9528). Responding at the peace 
negotiations in Rome, Renamo argued that the multi-party system was unacceptable 
to them partly because they had not been consulted, but also because, as one of their 
spokespersons put it, ''we are the ones who fought for freedom for more than 15 
years" and hence only they deserved to be included in the broadened political arena 
(Southscan, 6, 21, May 1991: 184). 
This response is obviously due to Renamo's concerns that it will not be able to defeat 
FRELIMO in an election given its weak political infrastructure and experience, as 
well as its reputation for brutality and long history of being controlled by outsiders, 
particularly South Africa. Chissano himself argued that Renamo's position was 
weakened by a multi-party system with open competition (in Economist Intelligence 
Unit 4, 1990: 23). Renamo obviously sees its chances as being greatest through a 
negotiated two way settlement with FRELIMO, and not through open competition. 
In making the move to a multi-party system, FRELIMO made a sudden and dramatic 
reversal which fundamentally changed the face of Mozambican politics. Most 
explanations of why the sudden switch was made, link it to the negotiations with 
Renamo. It is argued that it was part of the FRELIMO government's strategy to 
outwit and out manoeuvre Renamo. Having realised that they were not going to 
defeat Renamo militarily or isolate them by diplomatic means such as the Nkomati 
Accord, the government is perceived to have attempted quietly to accede to most of 
Renamo's political demands, thus substantially weakening their position at the 
negotiating table (see, for example Schneidman 1991). 
Chissano denied that the introduction of the multi-party system in particular had 
anything to do with either Renamo or the negotiations (Mozambiquejile, 169, August 
1990: 4), arguing that the changes were an expression of FRELIMO'S strength rather 
than being under pressure (Africa Research Bulletin 27, 8, August 1990: 9741). 
However, given their effectiveness in radically changing the complexion of the 
negotiations where it is no longer a "reformist" movement pitted against a government 
committed to holding a monopoly of political power, Chissano's obvious calculations 
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about Renamo's real position with regard to political pluralism and his history of 
willingness to use whatever strategy was necessary to isolate Renamo, such uses are 
obviously a factor behind the reforms. 
One of the other reasons used to explain the change to a multi- party system was the 
changing nature of the FRELIMO leadership, specifically the more pragmatic 
approach of Chissano and the growth in influence of a younger, better educated party 
elite (Africa Research Bulletin 26, 7, August 1989: 9343). Like the government's efforts 
to out-manoeuvre Renamo this too must have been a factor as Chissano does have 
a very different style to his predecessor, Machel, and has long been perceived to be 
more pragmatic and flexible (for example see Africa Research Bulletin 23, 11, 
December 1986: 8300). This certainly seems to be the impression of the US 
administration. In 1987 Chester Crocker argued that relations between the US and 
Mozambique had "accelerated" under Chissano (USA 1987: 4). However, it does not 
fully explain the changes, particularly not the rapid turn-around in the official position 
on the mUlti-party system, nor the volte face in Chissano's public statements on the 
issue. Membership of the Politburo remained relatively stable during this period and 
so, although new blood was brought in, particularly into the army, the important 
decision making body was the same. Further, Chissano's assumption of leadership of 
FRELIMO and Mozambique dates from 1986 which predates by three years the really 
fundamental political changes. Added to this Chissano has on a number of occasions 
denied bringing about changes in FRELIMO's overall strategy and has stressed the 
continuity in policy. Whilst this may represent merely an effort to deny the seeming 
abandonment of Mozambique'S socialist transformation as well as an effort to 
maintain unity, there is a degree of continuity and hence some truth to his statements. 
So whilst changes within FRELIMO, as well as their need to weaken Renamo's 
negotiating position are part of the reasons behind the reforms, other factors are 
clearly important. Amongst these is FRELIMO's need to expand both national unity 
and its own legitimacy in the face of a number of recurrent problems, such as the 
decline in the number of operative party branches and "weakened" grassroots 
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organisations (Mozambiquejile, 164, March 1990: 15). The increased separation 
between party and state seems to have been seen as having an important role to play 
in improving FRELIMO's legitimacy and fostering a recovery in involvement in party 
structures. Politburo member Oscar Monteiro argued that 15 years after 
independence, the time had come for the state to take on its own role, independent 
of the party. He said that "FRELIMO interests are no longer best served by 
constitutionally enshrining its leading role - it rather needs social acceptance, without 
which its leading role has no meaning" (Mozambiquejile, 166, May 1990: 15). However, 
it is unlikely that this is the only or even the major reason behind the reforms. 
FRELIMO is unlikely to have gone to the length of changing the whole political 
system in order to increase its legitimacy, especially in the face of growing political 
tensions within its own ranks including tensions within the army over the reform and 
serious outbreaks of anti-white sentiment (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1, 1991: 3; 
Indian Ocean Newsletter, 462, January 19, 1991: 4). 
Hence the most important and decisive reason behind the political reform was the 
international pressure that FRELIMO was under given its chronically weak economy 
and its reliance on external aid in an environment when it was becoming hard to get 
and when it was being increasingly linked to political change, both generally and in 
Mozambique's case in particular. The removal of the ban on US Export-Import Bank 
loans in early 1990 was an immediate response to some of the changes but 
Mozambique'S longer-term position as far as aid is concerned also shows some of the 
effects of an improved international image. In 1991 the US agreed to write off nearly 
$50 million worth of debt, and pledges at the World Bank Consultative Group 
meeting on Mozambique in the same year were considerably up on the previous year 
and exceeded the government's expectations (Africa Research Bulletin 28, 12, 
December 1991: 10684; 10661). Mozambique also began to get new aid from the US, 
specifically designed to finance its new democratic political institutions (Africa 
Research Bulletin, Economic Series, 28, 9, September 1991: 10569). The improved aid 
flows were seen as being a "reward" for the switch to political pluralism (Africa South 
9, March-April 1991: 32), and during Chissano's March 1990 visit to the US President 
George Bush said that the political steps taken enhanced the ties between the US 
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and Mozambique (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2, 1990: 23) 
Certainly the one place from which the change toward a multi- party system had not 
come, was from the grassroots. This is shown not only by the apathy surrounding the 
debates around the constitution and the widespread of a multi-party system but also 
by the way that the Politburo took the eventual decision, against the prevailing trend 
and over the heads of even the Central Committee. One member of the Politburo was 
even reported as saying that reform was happening too fast and that it had no 
"popular base" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 4, 1990: 25) 
Further changes in the new constitution 
The new laws setting up a multi-party system supplemented a number of other 
changes going into the new constitution which was published in November 1990. The 
new constitution was far longer and far more technical in its provisions than the 
previous one, but it differed mostly in its tone, in the extent to which it separated 
FRELIMO from the organs of government and state, and in its entrenchment of basic 
human rights. 
In terms of its tone, the constitution formalised the decision taken at Congress to 
change the country's name from the People's Republic of Mozambique to the 
Republic of Mozambique and similarly changed the name of the highest legislative 
body from The People's Assembly to the Assembly of the Republic. It made far less 
reference to the historical emergence of Mozambique and the struggle against 
colonialism than had the 1975 constitution. Further, the new constitution dropped all 
references to Mozambique's commitment to socialism or its "natural allies the socialist 
countries" although it retained its right to "support and be in solidarity with the 
struggles of peoples for their national liberation" (Constitution of the Republic of 
Mozambique 1990: Article 64). 
The new constitution also radically reduced the importance of FRELIMO's role in 
society. Whereas the old constitution had enshrined FRELIMO's leading role, stating 
that "power belongs to the workers and peasants united and led by FRELIMO ( 
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Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique 1975: Article 2) and that 
Mozambique was "guided by the political line laid down by FRELIMO, which is the 
leading force of the State and Society" and which laid "down the political orientation 
of the state and directs and supervises the work of state organs" (Constitution of the 
People's Republic of ~Iozambique 1975: Article 3). In contrast, the only reference to 
FRELIMO in the new constitution was that "the state shall retain as a national 
heritage the decisive role played by FRELIMO in the victory over colonialism" 
(Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990: Article 7: 2). In changing this 
aspect, the constitution effectively reduced the role that FRELIMO had played in the 
leadership of the country, especially by means of its control of the armed forces and 
the legislature by virtue of the head of FRELIMO automatically becoming 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces and President of the Republic. The party 
network within the armed forces was also begun to be dismantled (Eco1Wmist 318, 
7696, March 2 1991: 55). 
The new constitution emphasised the diminished role that the state would play in 
economy and society although important concessions were maintained. During the 
discussions around the constitution, there had been moves to define the economy 
specifically as a "market" economy, this had been blocked by the Governor of the 
Bank of Mozambique who argued that it was not normal practice to put such clauses 
into the constitution (Economist Intelligence Unit 1, 1991: 28). The state was to retain 
all ownership of land (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990: Article 46) 
and was still seen as having an important role to "promote and coordinate economic 
activity, acting directly or indirectly to solve the basic problems of the people and to 
reduce social and regional inequalities" (Article 49). 
The constitution vastly expanded the extent of various freedoms to be enjoyed by 
Mozambicans to include freedom of association, of religion, the right to strike and 
freedom of the press. In addition, a lot more attention was paid to the legal system. 
The judiciary was made a lot more independent of the state and the principle of 
innocence until proven guilty was enshrined in the constitution. These constitutional 
changes supplemented the ban on flogging and capital punishment which had been 
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announced earlier (Africa Research Bulletin, 27, 1, February 1990: 9547; Economist 
Intelligence Unit 4, 1989: 22). 
Whilst retaining the basic legislative structure, the constitution also improved the 
degree of democratic participation by making both the President of the Republic and 
the Assembly directly elected by universal adult suffrage rather than by an electoral 
college. However, provincial governments were still to be appointed by the central 
government (Article 114). 
The reforms in the constitution partly reflect FRELIMO's felt need to clear the 
political space and liberalize the state structures in the face of the impending 
multi-party system. Hence they had to remove their own constitutional role from the 
state and formalize a far broader type of political participation. However, the reasons 
for the nature and style of the changes to the constitution go far deeper than this. 
The changes, like the switch to a multi-party system, can be linked to the negotiations 
and FRELIMO's shrewd efforts to outmanoevre Renamo. By instituting a liberal 
constitution, Renamo's already weak position at the negotiating table was further 
undermined. However, as with the switch to political pluralism, it goes further than 
this. The highly technical nature of the constitution and the extent to which human 
rights are stressed and especially FRELIMO's efforts to include a statutory definition 
of the economy as market based, point again to the government's efforts to improve 
its image with its liberal- democratically minded western donors. 
Despite the fact that it embodied all the political changes that they had ever called 
for, Renamo immediately rejected the new constitution on the grounds that it was 
drawn up by an "incompetent, unconstitutional" and unrepresentative Assembly made 
up only of FRELIMO members, and because it had not been consulted. It also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of clarity in the constitution about election 
procedures, about the fact that provincial governments are appointed by central 
government (Africa Research Bulletin, 27, 11, November 1990: 9894), with the 
continued state monopoly on land and with what they saw as the concentration of too 
much power in the hands of the President (Southscan, 6, 9, March 1991: 95). 
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However, although they had criticised both the new multi-party system and the 
constitution that enshrined it, Renamo showed signs by early 1991 of building on the 
start it had made at its First Congress in 1989 and was trying to transform itself into 
a more political organisation. Reports from Zambezia descnbe it as apologising for 
atrocities and sending many of its most brutal members to other areas as well as 
building schools (Economist InteUigence Unit, 1, 1991: 30). However, this could well be 
just a limited regional initiative on the part of one local commander. 
The months following the promulgation of the new laws also saw the launch of a 
number of new political parties in Mozambique. By mid 1991 there were six new such 
parties, UNAMO (Mozambique National Union), PALMO (Liberal and Democratic 
Party of Mozambique), MANU (Mozambique African National Union), COINMO 
(Mozambique Independent Conference which was very critical of the government), 
MONAMO (Mozambique National Movement which strongly supported Renamo) 
and the PCM (National Convention Party) (Southscan, 6, 21, May 1991: 184). 
However, the activities and support bases of these parties tended to be confined to 
the major towns. Even there it seems unlikely that they were able to construct much 
of a mass base given the existence of a number of factors serving to inhibit political 
activity, such as strikes, power cuts and the high cost of living and the burdens it 
placed on urban dwellers, especially their need to participate in the black market 
(Mozambique Information Office Special Report, 1, 1990: 2). 
FRELIMO itself suffered a serious decline in activity amongst its members, even in 
the urban areas both as a result of the factors mentioned above but also because of 
problems experienced by the grassroots bodies. These complained during 1990 of the 
fact that they had no serious role to playas they had come to be regarded by the 
upper echelons of the party and the government as mere "transmission belts". They 
were hence seldom informed about anything, never mind consulted (Mozambiquejile 
164, March 1990: 15). This is no doubt connected to the government's need to push 
through a range of political reforms from above. Consultation did occur, but far less, 
and in a far less meaningful way than had previously been the case with FRELIMO 
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(see the comments about the Fifth Congress above), and the end result had very little 
to do with the messages coming out of the consultations. The political reforms were 
made by the Politburo, acting alone. Thus the tendency already noticeable in the 
previous period of reform, of commandism and political centralisation and a decline 
in democratic political activity, continued to worsen as an indirect result of the 
reforms themselves. 
Conclusion 
The eight year period from 1983 to 1991 saw a substantial turnaround in 
Mozambique's policies, both domestic and foreign. The economic policies introduced 
in the first five years of independence were largely reversed as a result first of the 
reforms coming out of the Fourth Party Congress and then the IMP sponsored 
structural adjustment programme, the PRE. Similarly, Mozambique moved from 
either rejecting or being excluded from most IFI's to being a closely cooperative 
member, reliant on ever increasing aid flows. On the political scene, Mozambique 
moved from being to a Marxist-Leninist oriented one-party state to having a 
multi-party system, with FRELIMO ready to withdraw substantially from its 
dominance of the state and its constitution enshrining a wide range of human rights. 
These reforms are all interconnected, both in terms of the process and the causes. 
These lay in a range of factors, including changes in FRELIMO leadership, 
FRELIMO's search for greater legitimacy and their desire to out manoeuvre Renamo 
at the negotiating table. However, the most important cause behind the reform lay 
outside Mozambique, amongst the IFl's and other donors, particularly the US. 
Mozambique's weak economy and indebtedness drove it to seek assistance from the 
international community. This set in motion a process of ever more stringent 
economic reforms, starting with the FRELIMO generated changes of 1983 to 1986 
and culminating in the PRE. However, as the success of these changes continued to 
be prevented by the ongoing war, more political reform and a negotiated end to the 
fighting became both an explicit and implicit demand of the donors. There had always 
been an ideological component to FRELIMO's accommodation with aid donors but 
this tended to be limited to economic issues and to Mozambique's links with the 
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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But as the conflict in Mozambique dragged on and 
the international environment changed, combined with Mozambique's closer 
relationships with the donors and its reliance to the point of absurdity on its aid, the 
demand for change became more strictly political in nature. 
The link between the largely economic reforms of the previous periods and 
international pressure are ciear (see also Bowen 1990). Not to see the political change 
which followed the economic reform as a continuation of this process would be a 
mistake. Mozambique, right from the beginning had become locked into an ever 
worsening dependency relationship with donors who had been prepared from the start 
to use their aid in an instrumental fashion in order to bring about a range of reforms 
in Mozambique. These increasingly became focused on the movement away from 
Marxism-Leninism on the one hand and toward a multi-party system on the other. A 
consequence of the reforms that started early on and worsened as the tempo of 
reform increased was a decline in political participation and in the power that 
grassroots party bodies wielded. This is a consequence too of the external causes of 
the reform. The changes were forced on Mozambique from outside, causing the top 
political leadership to make the necessary strategic decisions which then had to be 
implemented often against the wishes of the majority and certainly not in consultation 
with them. 
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CONCLUSION 
Democratization is occurring throughout Africa. Scholars of African politics have 
picked up this trend and, following the literature on similar changes in Latin America, 
Southern Europe and most recently, Eastern Europe, they have identified the causes 
of democratization as being largely of internal origin. Thus, identifying 
democratization with liberal democracy and the increase in political activity, 
particularly elections, improvements in human rights and especially in the introduction 
of multi-party systems, its spread is seen as the result of the resurgence of civil 
society, initiatives on the part of the African political leadership, or a side-effect of 
economic privatization. To the extent that international factors are seen as being 
important as causes of democratization, attention is paid only to, for example, the 
introduction of structural adjustment programmes and the spread of the idea of 
democracy following the changes in Eastern Europe. Too little recognition is given 
to the growing influence of western aid donors whose role has become more 
important in the African debt crisis and who are becoming increasingly vocal about 
linking further aid to improvements in human rights government, specifically to 
increased political pluralism and the introduction of multi-party systems. This 
pressure is unlikely ever to have been the only issue at work, pushing countries toward 
democratization, but it is clearly becoming an issue for donors who are making more 
and more statements linking governability, democracy and further aid. It is most 
likely to have interacted with the internal issues identified by the literature, for 
example the resurgence in civil society and initiatives of the political leadership, to 
advance and perhaps at times inhibit the process of democratization. 
However, the effect of the literature's lack of cognisance of the importance of 
international pressures and the aid issue in particular in causing democratization is 
to ignore some of its consequences, crucial amongst which are its fragility, because 
of the weak internal basis, and the fact that it is being imposed from above, as a 
necessity, by leaderships aware of their nation's limited financial options. The result 
has been a democratization of the formal political space, defined by the constitution 
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and embodied most often in a multi-party system and human rights legislation. But 
the fact that democracy has usually been imposed from above, in response to 
economically linked pressure, and already weak political structure, has normally meant 
that is has been superimposed upon actual decrease in democracy and an increase in 
commandism within the state. 
Mozambique is an example of a country where exactly this process is occurring. The 
country has always been strongly shaped by its international context and the current 
period is no exception. The colonial experience, by undermining the economic and 
political base had the effect of both threatening the country's effort to establish a new 
type of society and ensuring the country's continued reliance on both its trade and aid 
partners. The ambitious transformation attempted by the FRELIMO government 
after independence in 1975 had, as one of its goals, the reduction of this dependence 
both regionally and internationally. However, other aspects of its policies, its 
adoption of elements of Marxism-Leninism, its attempt at introducing a number of 
socialist oriented changes, its efforts to seek closer ties with its "natural allies" in the 
socialist world, its support for the independence struggles of its neighbours, and their 
combined support for SADCC's efforts to decrease reliance on SA, had he effect of 
alienating Mozambique from a number of regional and international powers. 
Mozambique's international isolation, in the form of its limited access to much 
western aid and the regional hostility it faced, first from Rhodesia and then from 
South Africa and Renamo, had the effect of undermining Mozambique's already weak 
economic base. Furthermore, the continuing security crisis also contributed to a 
political decline ill terms of political participation within FRELIMO and state 
structures. These external causes of Mozambique's problems interacted with 
numerous internal causes, particularly some of FRELIMO's misguided policies and 
a tendency toward overcentralisation, to produce a crisis of such serious proportions 
that the government knew it would have to make considerable changes to its positions 
and policies. The focus of the reforms was external: Mozambique had to improve 
its international standing in order to deal with its debt crisis. However, part of this 
also involved internal policy changes which FRELIMO embarked upon in 1983. 
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Mozambique's continuing contacts with IFI's in its efforts to reschedule debt and 
improve its aid flows set in motion a whole train of economic reforms, culminating 
in the structural adjustments programme of PRE in 1987. Especially with the US, 
improvements in Mozambique's position with regard to aid and debt rescheduling had 
always been linked to efforts to change its international orientation toward the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc as well as to encourage it to move away from Marxism-
Leninism. However, as the international environment changed, and as Mozambique's 
contacts with socialist countries decreased, the emphasis switched to internal aspects 
of Mozambican politics. Specifically, pressure began to be put on Mozambique to 
negotiate a settlement with Renamo and to introduce a more democratic multi-party 
political system. 
These pressures were not the only ones operating to bring about the dramatic political 
changes that occurred in Mozambique between 1989 and the beginning of 1991. 
Other factors, for example Renamo's establishment of a stronger political identity 
after 1989, the FRELIMO leadership's shrewd efforts to outwit and outmanoeuvre 
Renamo at negotiations, changes within FRELIMO leadership and calls for more 
democracy from amongst some groups such as the Catholic Church were also 
important. But just as the international pressure was the decisive factor pushing the 
FRELIMO government into starting the reforms, so it and Mozambique's 
overwhelming dependence on continued and massive flows of foreign aid was the 
decisive factor prompting the political reforms. 
However, the fact that the main impetus for reform came from outside has two 
important consequences. Firstly, it means that a lot of the reforms are designed more 
to relieve and answer to this pressure than really to increase democracy. Marina 
Ottaway (1988b) refers to the reforms as being "symbolic" mostly because the state 
did not have the capacity to implement them. In many respects the reforms are 
symbolic but not so much because of lack of state capacity (although this is a 
problem) but because they are so strongly geared toward outside consumption. 
Secondly, the fact that the pressure for political reform came from abroad meant that 
they had to be imposed from above, against the tenor of popular discussion and 
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against even upper level FRELIMO structures. This means that the reforms are 
fragile in nature particularly given the political decay described in Chapter 3. It also 
means an increase in the degree of political centralisation and a decrease in the role 
of low level structures. 
It is possible that an opening up of the political sphere will foster the emergence of 
democracy in Mozambique. However, given the likelihood of continuing violence and 
conflict, even it at a lower level, and the fact that an economic recovery is likely to 
be a very long way away, the chances of this happening are small. 
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